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ABSTRACT
The implementation of policy reforms in developing countries continues to be
negatively influenced by factors such as difficulties with resource mobilization,
the dominance of technocratic policy management advocated by donors, and the
persistence of state centralism.
Tax system reforms in Rwanda constitute institutional and policy reforms aimed
at improving tax compliance and ultimately the contribution of tax revenue to the
national GDP. But, because of implementation flaws, including among others the
scant flow of technical and financial resources; the dominance of a narrow
technocratic approach in implementation; and indeed the failure of the
implementers to mobilize political resources and constituent support, the
realization of the above objective became a less attainable goal.
This research examines the institutional and policy reforms in the tax system and
the dynamics of their implementation, through the manipulation of secondary,
numerical and textual information/ data on tax system administration in Rwanda.
Chapter one of the research deals with the development of the idea to research tax
system reform and the formulation of the research problem, hypothesis and
methodology. In addition to that, chapter one provides an overview of the tax
system reform in Rwanda, a comparative insight into the implementation of
reform policies in developing countries, and contemporary experiences in tax
system reforms. Chapters two and three, which are formative chapters, focus
respectively on the background situations that either influenced or affected tax
system reform in Rwanda, and the normative requirements for tax systems.
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Chapter four evaluates the implementation of reform and how it concurs with
problem situations and normatives. Chapter five is summative in that it provides
an interpretation and recommendations, as well as a summary of the research
findings.
http://scholar.sun.ac.za/
iv
OPSOMMING
Die implementering van beleidshervorming in ontwikkelende lande word negatief
beïnvloed deur faktore soos probleme met die mobilisering van hulpbronne, die
oorheersing van die tipe tegnokratiese beleidsbestuur wat deur donateurs
voorgestaan word, en 'n voortgesette sentralistiese staatsbestel.
Belastinghervorming in Rwanda omsluit institusionele en beleidshervorming met
die oog op verbeterde belastingbetaling, wat tot 'n uiteindelike verbetering in die
bydrae van belastinginkomste tot die BNP moet lei. Teenspoed tydens die
implementering van die hervormingspoging, onder meer as gevolg van 'n gebrek
aan tegniese en finansiële hulpbronne, die bekrompenheid van die tegnokratiese
benadering waardeur die implementeringspoging oorheers is, en inderdaad die feit
dat die implementeerders nie die nodige politieke middele of die publiek se
ondersteuning kon mobiliseer nie, het egter veroorsaak dat hierdie doelwitte moeilik
bereikbaar geraak het.
Hierdie navorsing stelondersoek in na institusionele en beleidshervorming ten
opsigte van die belastingstelsel, en kyk ook na die implementeringsdinamiek
daarvan. Die ondersoek is gegrond op 'n ontleding van sekondêre numeriese en
tekstuele inligting/data oor die administrasie van die belastingstelsel in Rwanda.
Hoofstuk een dui aan hoe die gedagte ontstaan het om navorsing oor die
hervorming van die belanstingstelsel in Rwanda te doen, en stel die
navorsingsprobleem, die -hipotese en -metodologie bekend. Hierbenewens bied
hoofstuk een 'n oorsig oor die hervorming van die belastingstelsel in Rwanda, en
vergelykende insigte in die implementering van hervormingsbeleid in
ontwikkelende lande asook onlangse ervaring wat die hervorming van
belastingstelsels betref. Hoofstuk twee en drie is formatief van aard. Hulle fokus
onderskeidelik op die agtergrondomstandighede wat 'n invloed op
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vbelastinghervorming in Rwanda gehad het, en op die normatiewe vereistes wat aan
belastingsisteme gestel word. Hoofstuk vier evalueer die implementering van
hervorming en hoe dit met probleemsituasies en hervormingsnorme verband hou.
Hoofstuk vyf is summatief van aard en bevat 'n vertolking en aanbevelings, sowel as
'n samevatting van die navorsingsbevindinge.
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1CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION
'The reading of history shows that, the collapse of nations was due often if not always to
the mounting ineffectiveness of their tax system" General Douglas MacArthur. 1
For more than 30 years the tax system in Rwanda, like other systems of the post-
independent public sector in that country, has been experiencing continual
institutional degeneration, compounded by structural complexities, non-
compliance, and subsequently limited returns. This chapter, therefore, provides
an introductory overview of tax system reforms in Rwanda, covering the
following issues:
• Overview and Policy Shift
• Contemporary experiences
• Problem statement, research questions
• Hypothesis, variables, reform trajectories, and tax reform
trajectories
• Theoretical framework which defines tax structure and tax
administration as well as other conceptual definitions
• Research methodology, analytical approaches and thesis structure
Compared to other sub-Saharan African countries, the Rwandan tax system has
shown the lowest contribution of tax revenue to national GDP (at an average rate
of 10%) since 1992. According to the International Monetary Fund (IMF), one of the
1.1 OVERVIEW
I General Douglas MacArthur was Supreme Commander of the Allied Forces (SCAP) in occupied Japan
after World War II, and is renowned for tax reforms in Japan after 1947 (Shoup, 1989:177).
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2main multilateral donors to Rwanda (report 4/2000), the poor performance of
the tax system in Rwanda is rooted in the low per capita income, the
predominance of a subsistence and informal economy, the small size of sectors
which are more amenable to taxation such as mining and manufacturing, the wide
spread of tax exemptions, poor taxation capacity, and the general lack of
compliance with taxation measures.
The significance of this situation is that Rwanda can be technically viewed as a
political economy of governance based on fiscal disequilibria and foreign aid
dependence. According to the 20-year Development Plan, issued by the
government of Rwanda in 2000, for three decades the country had been subjected
to revenue challenges such as an unsustainable tax revenue base, lack of
indigenous capital accumulation, and dependence on foreign aid.
It is in this context that the Rwandan government from 1995started implementing
a comprehensive set of tax system reform packages, with policy objectives of
increasing the quality and quantity of tax revenue contributions to the national
economy, by improving tax administration and ensuring compliance (Rwandan
Budget Speech 2000). The reform measures were however, formulated and
implemented in an unfavourable environment dominated by the impacts of the
1994 genocide and war, which included, the debilitated system of public
administration, a shattered economic infrastructure, and pervasive social crises.
Before going as far as to dissect the content of these reforms - which will be done
in the next chapters - it can, nevertheless, be argued that, from the perspective of
the IMF's diagnosis, the fundamental factor for the poor performance of the
Rwandan tax system is based on; poor economic structure, institutional
inefficiencies in tax administration and tax structure and culture of non
compliance. The reform process was definitely aimed at correcting these historical
woes. In the next section we are going to see how the decision of reforming the tax
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3system in Rwanda was taken as part of a broader environment of policy shifting
by the new government.
1.2 POLICY SHIFT
Reforms to the tax system in Rwanda did not occur in isolation but were done
within the framework of a big policy shift, from the state-controlled economic and
administrative systems of the 1970s and 1980s to the neo-liberal policies and
approaches adopted by the new government in Rwanda. The two phases of the tax
reforms covered in this research were conceived within two macro-economic
policy reforms, namely the Economic Recovery Program from 1995to 1997,and the
Enhanced Structural Adjustment Facility (ESAF)from 1997/1999-2000.
According to her first comprehensive policy document, Towards a New Rwanda
(Declaration of the Rwandese Government on the Principles of a Recovery Policy), the
new government in Rwanda came to power armed with neo-liberal policy
instrumental for economic and public administration reforms: greater market
liberalization, disengagement of the State from commercial and productive
activities, greater regional trade, and reduced public expenditure. The new
economic philosophy was shaped by pragmatic analyses of the economic crisis, the
views and priorities of donors, and the failure of previous approaches to
development, which had been highly interventionist (Humanitarian Assistance
Report 1995, unpublished). The performance of these reform policies is not the
focus of this research, yet they are providing the context for in evaluating the
performance of tax system reforms.
Actually, the fundamental issue here is that the performance of tax system reforms
or other macroeconomic policy reforms in Rwanda, cannot be analysed without a
reference to the performance of the neo-liberal policy reforms implemented by a
number of other African countries between 1980s and 90s. The characteristics of
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41980s/90s policy reforms in Africa or in developing countries at large
influenced the performance of these policies. Among those characteristics,
according to Grindle and Thomas (1991:155)and Schaeter (2000:7) include, the
deeper involvement of the financial institutions, IMF, World Bank and other
Western banking institutions in determining policy priorities for these countries;
dominance of technocrats and technical analysis in defining and deciding on
courses of action for policy implementation, over multiplication of reform
programmes whereby major changes had to be instituted simultaneously; and
more importantly, these policies retained the character of being foreign, that is
failing to win local ownership. All in all these features had an impact on the
success of the policies. Tax reforms were part and parcel of 1980s-90s policy
reforms in developing countries, either as part of macro economic reforms or
public sector reforms. In the next section, we are going to see some of the
contemporary experiences of tax reforms in developing countries.
1.3 CONTEMPORARY EXPERIENCES OF TAX REFORMS
In the 1980s, according to Gillis (1989:8), after the over-pronounced macro-
economic crises and crumbling of externally financed public sectors, tax reform
became a matter of urgency in countries of Asia, Africa and Latin America. Such
reforms were therefore adopted as an immediate policy alternative, in order to
rescue shrunken public financing. In the volume of essays on Tax Reforms in
Developing Countries, Gillis(ed) (1989)noted that the international debt crisis of the
1980s, the decline of commodity prices on the international market, fiscal
imbalances and hashed public finances, elicited the wave of tax reforms in
developing countries.
The most successful in implementing these reforms were Latin American and
Caribbean countries. Included on the list of reforms are the 1981-88tax reforms in
http://scholar.sun.ac.za/
5Indonesia, 1985-90 tax reforms in Bolivia and Uruguay, 1986 and 1988
income tax reforms in Columbia, the 1986and 1987tax reform program in Jamaica,
and ad hoc tax reforms in Guatemala in 1987. Other reforms are the 1983 tax
reforms in Tobago and Trinidad, which were specifically aimed at promoting
indirect taxation (Due & Greaney, 1991: 168), and tax reforms in Jamaica in the
mid-1980s. When it comes to the causal relationship of failures of economic
systems and public sectors management, tax system reform in Rwanda is less
different from those above despite of contextual differences.
1.4 PROBLEM STATEMENT
It is identified from the above that the performance of tax system in Rwanda has
historically been constrained by the poor economic performance as well as
institutional inefficiency associated with poor tax administration. In 1995 the
government of Rwanda started implementing a comprehensive tax reform
program with objective of increasing the contribution of tax revenue to the national
GDP, through improved tax administration and compliance. The reform process
was therefore oriented towards administrative reforms and related institutional,
behavioral and procedural changes. As it has been mentioned above, despite the
historically infallible public sector, the reform process was undertaken in a volatile
situation precipitated by the 1994genocide and war. In any case this situation was
compromising the institutional capacity of the government to implement the new
policies. It is against this background therefore, that this research is focused on the
implementation dynamics of tax system reform in Rwanda.
1.4.1 Research questions
• What is the implementation approach; top-down or bottom-up; exclusive or
inclusive?
http://scholar.sun.ac.za/
6• What type of new organizational developments and
organisational reforms; centralisation or decentralisation?
• Which aspects (contents) of the tax system were reformed; tax structure or
administration?
• How did the reforms impact on mobilization of financial, managerial,
technical and political resources?
1.5 HYPOTHESIS
The research is aimed at examining how the implementation process conform to
trajectories of tax reform, with hypothesis that "The inappropriate tax system reform
trajectories in Rwanda caused unsatisfactory reform outcomes". This hypothesis can be
analysed basing on two variables; trajectories of tax system reform as an independent
variable and reform outcomes as the dependent variable.
1.5.1 Reform trajectories
Trajectories are used to determine the significance and magnitude of reform
processes in public sector institutions. Politt and Bauckaert (2000: 68) define
trajectories as an intentional, patent-route that someone is taking. It stretches from
the starting point to the desired point (Alpha to Omega), spelling out what should
be changed and how it should be done and how changes are measured.
1.5.2 Trajectories of tax reform
The implementation of tax reform is guided by the two main components of the tax
system, tax administration and tax structure. The composition of these two
components makes the trajectories that guide tax system reform. Another
important trajectory in tax system reform is how or the process of reform is
implemented.
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7Tax administration includes elements like the simplification of tax procedures,
regulations and laws; improving technical capacity for tax administration; tax
auditing; efficient enforcement of tax compliance; and information technology.
Tax structure on the other hand, involves the reform of tax bases and rates of
taxation.
Tax reform process includes how the stakeholders of tax system-government
institutions, citizens and civil organizations were involved, methods of resource
mobilisation and management, and political mobilisation. This research on tax
system reform in Rwanda is motivated by the patterns and experiences difficulties
in the process of implementing reform policies in developing countries.
1.6 MOTIVATION
Our research is deliberately focused on the implementation dynamics of the tax
reforms in Rwanda, not necessary to testify the success and failure of tax reform,
but also to inform on the importance of understanding that the management of
policy implementation is a central factor for policy performance.
The implementation phase of the policy reform process determines the nature and
success of the policy reform initiative, yet there is limited attention on the policy
implementation stage among policy analysts and policy makers. It is a crucial and
important stage in policy making which appreciates political, managerial, technical
and economic capacity of the policy, these variables need a continuous and in
depth study in order to realise the policy performance. Actually, the attaining of
the above variables is an outstanding measurement of the policy success.
It is not uncommon, however to find that the process of policy implementation
leads to outcomes quite different from those intended or anticipated by the policy
makers. This is the result of a gap between policy design and policy
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rely on policy implementation.
There has been a tendency among the policy analysts and policy makers, especially
in developing countries, where policy formulation has been widely dominated by
foreign technocracy to evaluate policy performance depending only on policy
results while neglecting the dynamics of implementation. Such evaluations have
been giving incomplete information on either success of failure of the policy. To
day policy analysts in developing countries are challenged to shift the focus of
their analysis from the policy contents to the implementation dynamics of policies
in order to draw the true colour of policy management in developing countries.
The implementation of tax system reform is generally a practical exercise in public
administration, but also needs theoretical foundations.
1.7THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK
Literally, tax reform is a change in the tax system. Ahmad and Stem (1991:2)
conceive tax reform as a remedial measure. Tax reform, as opposed to tax design, is
concerned with the search for and analysis of tax systems that would be an
improvement on the existing state of affairs. Tax reform is therefore nothing other
than an attempt to improve the tax system for better delivery. Tanzi (1991: 171-172)
makes a similar observation that tax reform is principally aimed at creating fiscal
equilibrium by means of an efficient tax system. The idea is to minimize current
expenditure, while upholding capital accumulation.
Essentially, the implied and applied versions of tax system reform by Ahmad and
Stern and Tanzi above, provide the bottom line for tax system reform. First and
foremost, tax system reform is a remedial measure applied to crises in public
finance, referred to as fiscal disequilibria by public economists. In normal
circumstances government revenue, or tax revenue for that matter, must cover the
cost of public sector expenditure on health services, education, security, public
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surpassed by its expenditure, public finance becomes characterized by fiscal
imbalances.
Blumenthal (2000: 351), explicating on the objectives of tax reform, notes that a
good tax system is one which achieves three main objectives: efficiency, simplicity
and equity. In other words the ideal tax system does not distort economic behavior
(efficiency), is borne in a fair manner by differently situated taxpayers (equity), and
is easy to understand and to comply with (simplicity).
Implicitly, therefore, tax system reform is aimed at creating an ideal administrative
and technical atmosphere for generating more tax revenue in the public sector,
while exerting the same measures in controlling the expenditure.
1.7.1 Research area
As can be seen from the above, tax system reform involves reforming both revenue
institutions and institutions for expenditure control and management. This
research, however, is focused on the first part, that is, changing revenue
administration, including reforms in procedures, regulations, structures and
compliance, in accordance with two guiding trajectories: tax structure, and tax
administration.
1.7.1.1 Tax structure
The tax structure is composed of the tax base and tax rates. The tax base includes a
valuated tax object for taxation. If for example income is an object of taxation, the
tax base therefore will include personal income tax, corporate tax and profit tax.
Tax administration is a mosaic of mechanisms and institutions of the tax system;
through which tax bases and tax liabilities are determined (Gillis, 1989: 10).
http://scholar.sun.ac.za/
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1.7.1.2Tax administration
Tax administration is the "real policy of taxation". It deals with the legal and
procedural framework of the tax system - tax assessment, collection, auditing,
sanctions, appeals and record keeping as well as tax information management. Tax
administration is the qualitative aspect of a tax system, which must be properly
organized, well equipped especially with regard to information technology, and
staffed with well-trained, motivated and innovative staff.
However, the apparent tendency has been not to wed the two components
properly in designing tax reforms. Experience shows that in some reforms more
emphasis was placed on reforming tax structures while neglecting the effect of tax
administration in the process. Subsequently some of the tax reforms would end up
being unsuccessful or only partially performed. Intrinsically, long-standing flaws
in the tax structure are mostly aggravated by the underlying weaknesses in tax
administration (Gillis 1989:504-5).
Bird and De Juntscher (1992:1) note that the best tax administration is not simply
one that collects most revenue. More important is how that revenue is raised, that
is, the effect of the revenue generation effort on equity, on the political fortunes of
the government, and on the level of economic welfare.
A poor quality tax administration may collect large amounts from easy-to-tax
sectors, such as wage earners, while it is unable to enforce taxes on business
enterprises and professionals. The level of collection is therefore a somewhat
unsophisticated measure of the effectiveness of tax administration. The more
accurate measure in tax administration is the size of the 'compliance gap', that is
the gap between actual and potential tax revenue, and how that gap varies among
the different sectors of the tax-paying population.
The two tax analysts, Bird and De Juntscher (1992:3) provide three preconditions
for the reform of tax administration:
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• Simplification of the tax system, to
effectively
• Strategy and a comprehensive plan that assigns clear priorities to the task that
ensure that it can be applied
must be performed, tailored to the available resources
• Commitment - from policy makers as well as from managerial and technical
levels.
1.7.2Conceptual definitions
Tax system
The tax system of a country consists of two interdependent principal elements,
tax structure and a mosaic of mechanisms and institutions for tax administration
and tax compliance as referred to above.
Tax structure
It is a configuration of the tax bases and tax rates provided for in legislation. Tax
structure is the most visible component of the tax system (Gillis, 1989:12).
Tax base
It is an objective basis for the levying of tax, depending on valuation. There are a
number of possible tax bases, and these may differ from one country to another.
Among the possibilities are income tax, which is levied upon the individual or
company's income; sales tax levied on goods and services supplied in the market;
property or wealth taxes levied on individually owned properties; and taxes from
sales of goods and services in the international market. Tax bases differ according
to political and economic circumstances.
http://scholar.sun.ac.za/
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Broadening of tax base
It is an approach of governments to enlarge the size of the tax net by enlarging
the tax base, in order to accommodate more incomes, goods and service to be
taxed. There are two ways of broadening the tax base. One is to identify
something new to be taxed, for example adding non-profit making organizations
onto the schedule of company taxes, and another is to expand the existing tax
instrument.
Compliance
There are various definitions of the term, but compliance is usually defined in
terms of the degree to which a taxpayer complies with a tax law (Nobes & James
1997/98:137). No tax system can function effectively without the cooperation of
taxpayers; compliance therefore means the cooperation of a taxpayer in the
ta,xation process. The broader definition of tax compliance would be the degree to
which taxpayers comply with tax law and tax administration without the need
for enforcement activities (Nobes & James 1997/98:138).
Compliance without enforcement measures reflects the efficiency of tax
administration achieved through civic education measures and the building of
trust between taxpayers and tax authority. Radian and Sharkansy (1990:106)
regard voluntary compliance as central to tax policy, as an instrument that can
enable tax administration to collect taxes from large masses of taxpayers. These
two tax analysts confess that without voluntary compliance the process of
eliciting taxes from large masses would overwhelm agencies. Currently there are
two approaches to ensure compliance. One is the carrot and stick approach,
which means the use of punitive measures to compel people to comply with tax
laws. The second approach is referred to as the responsible citizen approach, or
voluntary compliance, which is supposed to be attained through sociological and
psychological means, by mobilizing and providing civic education to citizens
http://scholar.sun.ac.za/
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(taxpayers). Modem tax reformists advocate this approach as a method of
reducing the cost of tax administration.
1.8 PURPOSE
This research is based on an unfolding of relevant information on the
transformation of the tax system in Rwanda, and its future significance in the
management of the tax system in Rwanda. The objectives of this paper therefore
are to:
• Evaluate the current process of reforming the tax system in the country
• Identify possible shortcomings and make possible recommendations for
improvement
• Stimulate intellectual, professional and academic debate and research on a
productive and sustainable tax system in Rwanda.
1.9 METHODOLOGY
This research is applied research aimed at collecting and analyzing existing
datal information on the tax system reform in Rwanda, so as to generate relevant
information and knowledge on the policy of reforming the tax system in Rwanda.
In other words, the research is based on secondary datal information for analysis,
and the sources of information were library collections, books and journals as well
as on-line information. The main source, however, has been public documents
issued by the government of Rwanda, including the annual reports of the Rwanda
Revenue Authority, the Rwanda Development Indicators for 1999 and 2000, policy
documents including a number on tax legislation passed in relation to tax system
reform, national budget speeches and other government policy papers including
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the 20-year Development Plan (2000). Information was also collected from
reports and documents on Rwanda issued by the IMF and World Bank.
Research on tax reform is policy analysis research. According to Manheim and Rich
referred to by Fox, Schwella & Wissink (1991: 306) policy analysis can take six
approaches: correlative analysis, behavioral analysis, institutional analysis, process
analysis, decision analysis and impact analysis. The analytical approach used in
this research includes mainly the following:
Institutional analysis, in this case tax system reform in Rwanda has been analyzed
according to the laws and procedures involved in the process and institutional
arrangements for decision-making.
A behavioral approach was applied to examine how the reform focused on changing
individual behavior, motivation, social relations and groups involved in tax
reform. This also involved altering values and ways of thinking within
government institutions.
A process approach was used in answering questions of who, what, where, when
and how, both at the level of policy planning and of policy implementation with
regard to the tax system reform.
1.10 BREAKDOWN OF CHAPTERS
This thesis is composed of five chapters (see figure 1)
Chapter One: This is the introductory chapter and deals with the
conceptualization of the research problem, hypothesis and methodology.
Chapter Two: As background to tax system reform in Rwanda, this chapter
covers mainly those preceding situations that might have affected or influenced
tax system reform in Rwanda.
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Chapter Three: This chapter deals with the normative requirements for a tax
system - the chapter generates theoretical and conceptual information on tax
system reform and on the principle of taxation in general.
Chapter Four: This chapter provides the analysis of the implementation of the tax
system reform in Rwanda from 1995to 1999.
Chapter Five: Salient features and research findings are analyzed and
synthesized in this chapter, and finally a summary and recommendations are
provided.
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1.11 LIMITATIONS.
The availability of information has been the main issue of concern. The shortfall of
information on Rwandan public sector is deep rooted in the absence of information
systems in the public sector and as lack of information management skills and
policy. Apart from the fact that there is a general shortage of information, even that
which is available is not easily accessible to the public because of highly
bureaucratized information management. According to IMF report 4/2000 accesses
to official information in of Rwanda has been an issue even during and after the
1994genocide.
1.12 CONCLUSION
By and large this chapter has portrayed the scenarios which led to the
development of the research idea. All in all, tax system reform in Rwanda was
inevitable as even other areas of public sector had to undergo reforms for
reinstitutionalisation of the state in that country after a history of institutional
decadence and for strengthening the indigenous source of revenues. The chapter
provided the basic elements which had to guide the research, including; the
rationale of doing this research, a brief theoretical framework, a statement of the
research problem, the hypothesis and the research design methodology. In the next
chapter we are going to look at the background to tax system reform in Rwanda.
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CHAPTER 2: BACKGROUND TO THE TAX SYSTEM REFORMS IN
RWANDA
2.1 INTRODUCTION
".... Specific reform initiatives don't emerge in a void, nor are they decided upon in isolation
of preexisting perceptions, experiences, and values of policy elites, or conditions of the
political economy" (Grindle & Thomas 1991:43).
Chapter 1 introduced the conceptual foundations of the research problem, and put
forward the hypothesis and research methodology. The chapter also presented
experiences of tax reforms in other countries, a brief review on the nature and
characteristics of policy reform in developing countries, and finally the theoretical
framework of the research. Chapter 2 will explore the economic, political and
social background that necessitated and obviously affected decisions about and the
process of implementing tax system reform in Rwanda. The following issues will
be addressed:
• Historical context of the tax system in Rwanda
• History of budget deficits
• The genocide and its related fiscal, economic, administrative and social
effects
• Structural issues, including poverty, debt, primary sector of production
and the composition of the tax system in Rwanda
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2.2 HISTORICAL CONTEXT
A country's tax system usually develops hand in hand with its economic,
administrative and political systems. This is not really the case in Rwanda's
situation, however. Rwanda is a rural country, where about 90% of the population
is engaged in subsistence agriculture. It is the most densely populated country in
Africa, it is landlocked, has few natural resources and a limited industry. Primary
exports are coffee and tea. The 1994 genocide decimated Rwanda's fragile
economic base, severely impoverished the population, particularly women, and
eroded the country's ability to attract private and external investment.
Rwanda is among the poorest countries in the world. Its political history of civil
wars, coup d'états and recently, the 1994 genocide, has been documented widely
and abundantly across the globe. The country has been under foreign domination
for most of its modern history; from 1889 to 1945 it was ruled by Germany, and
from 1945 to 1962 it was under Belgian domination. Like many other former
colonies in Africa, the post-independent Rwandan government continued to run
the country in a neo-colonial fashion. Its political and economic structures
encouraged foreign dependence and state control.
Taxes were the result of an historical and economic malady. Taxation in Rwanda is
not an indigenous institution. It came with the introduction of a cash economy
during colonial times at the end of the nineteenth century. Germany in 1889
introduced cash crop production, mainly of coffee and tobacco, to the indigenous
rural agriculture. The idea was to connect the Rwandan primitive farmers to global
commerce, so that they could raise their own revenue and support the colonially
introduced modem public administration (Dorsey 1994:10).
After the World War II, the Belgians stepped in with a slightly more streamlined
and dual system of taxation. In this new system taxes were collected from
European, commercial and administrative areas in one part of the system, and
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from the indigenous rural population in the other. Unlike the Germans, the
Belgians developed a rudimentary and consolidated system of tax administration,
where - although it involved monarchical authorities and notables - the harsh
control of the process was maintained in the hands of the Belgian administrative
apparatus. The substantial element of the Belgian tax administration, however, was
the allocation of 10% of the collected tax to the traditional leaders. The king took
5% and the rest went to the local chiefs. Belgian colonial government adopted this
system as a measure to control corruption among chiefs (Dorsey 1994:10-11).
Because of insufficient administrative staff, the Germans depended on local chiefs
for the collection of taxes. It is important to note, however, that pre-colonial
Rwanda was among only few African communities, which had developed a
centralised political system under the monarchy. The king was the head of public
affairs, assisted by notables. Apart from the military and traditional judicial
institutions, there were no other public institutions. Basically there was no cash-
based tax system, although citizens were expected to pay tribute to the king in the
form of cattle and labour.
The post-independent government did not do much to improve the tax
administration or the economic situation. As was revealed in chapter one,
according to the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the continued poor
performance of the tax system in Rwanda was rooted in the low per capita income,
the predominance of the subsistence and informal economy, the small size of
sectors that are more amenable to taxation such as mining and manufacturing, the
wide spread of tax exemptions, a weak taxation capacity, and the general lack of
compliance with tax regulations.
The contribution of tax revenue to the total national revenue in Rwanda has been
significantly poor, compared to other African countries south of the Sahara. The
statistics provided by the government of Rwanda in 1999, shows that tax revenue
as a percentage of the GDP in Rwanda between 1990-91was 10.2%,while in other
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sub- Saharan African countries it was 12%. The same applies for 1996; in
Rwanda tax revenue figures per GDP was 9.1%, while in Zambia it was 18.7%, in
Kenya 27.1%, and in Botswana 49.6% (Rwanda Development Indicators 1999). In
1992-93 the ratio of tax revenue in Rwanda dropped from 10.2% of GDP in 1990-91
to 9.1%, while in 1994 during the war and genocide the tax ratio dropped
tremendously to only 3.6%. The tax system in Rwanda has historically been
struggling in a fiscal and structural disequilibrium and lack of institutional
capacity; the next section analyzes these issues in detail.
2.3 FISCAL DISEQUILIBRIUM
Public finance in Rwanda has been characterized by crises with regard to balance
of payments and budget deficit. In 1979 the resource balance, was -86 million US
$, while in 1989 has increased to -250 million in 1998, and -304 in 1999 (World Bank
2000). The current account in GDP percentage in 1995 was -19.0%, while in 1996
the current account balance was also -19.0%. It went down further in the
succeeding years of 1997 -17%, 1998 -16.9%, 1999 -15.3%, 2000 -16.8% (IMF notice
no.01/31).
Budget deficits have been a predominant issue in the Rwandan economic
structure. In 1982-86 government development plans had a budget of US $ 143
million, but 62% of it was funded by external aid. Likewise in 1987 ordinary
government expenditure amounted to US $ 297 million; US $ 209 million of this
was funded by external capital (Africa Today, 1991: 1537).
Essentially the incompatibility between expenditure and revenue generation has
been a constant problem. In 1993 revenue collection declined at an estimated rate
of 6%, but expenditure increased at an estimated rate of 5%. The following year, in
1994, the budget deficit amounted to 16% of GDP (Misser 1995: 207). In 1995
government expenditure was 62 million Rwandan Francs (RWF); the collected
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revenues were 23 million RWF (Egboo 1997: 172). From 1994 to 1998 the new
government experienced a constant budget deficit. Table 1 shows the deficit trend
from 1994, when the budget deficit amounted to -19 million Rwandan Francs
(RWF). It dropped to -8.0 million Rwandan Francs (RWF) in 1995, while in 1996 it
shot up to -24 million RWF; it was -3.8 million in 1997 and is estimated to be -18.4
million by 1998.
The wage bill has been a core factor in the budget deficit. In 1992 the wage bill in
the government sector was 5.4% of GDP, and in 1993 the wage bill was standing at
a rate of 15.7% of the national GDP. The ratio dropped during the war in 1994 to
4.0% of GDP. In 1995, the rate went up again to 4.4% of GDP; in 1996 the rate was
also 4.4%. But it slowly picked up; in 1997 the wage bill stood at a rate of 5.5% of
GDP. However, in 1998 the wage bill declined to 4.6% of GDP after massive
downsizing of the public service (IMF no 98/2001).
The wage bill in Rwanda has been taking up almost half of the national tax
revenues. This trend is shown in Table 3, which indicates that in 1992 the wage bill
was 53% of total revenue. In 1993 annual increases in the public sector pushed the
wage bill to 67% of total revenue; it then shot up in 1994 to 110% of total revenue.
In the succeeding years of 1995 and 1996 it dropped slightly to 62.7% and 53.8%
respectively. Compared to other sub-Saharan African countries, the Rwandan
wage bill has been high. In 1992, the average wage bill in these countries was 44.3%
of total revenue, while in 1994 it was 48.1%. The civil service in Rwanda employs
less than 7% of the labor force.
2.4 THE 1994 GENOCIDE AND ITS EFFECTS
Rwanda a hitherto largely unknown and obscure country, thrust itself onto the centre of
world attention through the perpetration of the worst acts of genocide in latter half of 20th
century, where about between 500,000 to 800,000 (other statistics make it 1million) people
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were killed. The impact on the economy, and psychosocial well being of the populace
was incalculable. Infrastructure, including hospitals and clinics and others were either
destroyed or damaged beyond repair. Also as the consequence of the killings, Rwanda's
human capital was devastated leaving both private and public institutions in disarray
(Duly 2000:1).
The tax reform program in Rwanda was launched in 1995, in the wake of the 1994
genocide fiasco. It was a difficult period for the formulation and implementation of
reforms. First there was the problem of institutional and policy capacity. The new
government had been in power for less than a year. The institutional problem did
not just involve the question of inexperienced personnel; rather more serious was
the issue of an institutional vacuum. During the time of execution of, and
resistance against the genocide, the government in power fled the country with
almost all senior officials in public institutions and public documents.
Administrative institutions like the civil service, government ministries and courts
stopped functioning. The reforms were therefore instituted amidst the social,
political, and economic disarray of the genocide. The next paragraphs contain an
attempt to show the fiscal and economic effects, and institutional and social factors
and their effects on the tax system.
2.4.1 Fiscal and economic effects
According to Misser (2000), during and after the genocide the government's total
tax revenue, as indicated in Table 2 dropped drastically from 9.6% of GDP in 1993
to 3.6% of GDP in 1994, and 6.9% in 1995 (while non-tax revenue were at zero rates,
meaning that the government revenue was depending on tax revenues). The
demand schedule was aggressively rising in the adverse economic and social
situation resulting from the genocide and political upheavals; about 3.5 million
people were considered internally displaced, while about 2.5 million had fled the
country.
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Table 1 Government finance 1994-98 (in billions Rw£)
Government finance 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998est
Total revenue 7.5 61.5 70.8 95.9 99.0
revenue 6.0 23.1 39.4 58.1 66.0
grants 1.5 38.4 31.4 37.8 33.0
Total expenditure and net 26.6 69.5 95.3 109.6 117.4
lending
Current 22.2 42.1 55.9 64.0 75.3
Capital 4.4 27.4 39.4 46.1 42.3
Domestically financed 0.3 0.0 0.0 0.1 2.5
Externally financed 4.1 27.4 39.4 46.0 39.8
Net lending 0.0 0.0 0.0 -0.5 -0.2
Overall deficit including -19.1 -8.0 -24.5 -13.8 -18.4
finance
Source: Rwanda's authority and IMF (IMF 98/200)
The genocide calamity affected the tax system in the country intensively. Most
economic and social activities were coming to a halt, most sources of tax were
ravaged, while government expenditure was increasing in order to support
genocide victims and finance the new administration (Ocheing, 2000: 203). The
scale effects on national expenditure were aggravating. It was estimated that
during the genocide about 1 million people were killed, while another 3.2 million
were internally displaced and 2 million people were estimated to have fled the
country to the neighbouring countries. About 47% of the families in the country
were estimated to have either females or minors as head of the family, these
http://scholar.sun.ac.za/
25
including the high population of widows and orphans. All this was
putting a strain on the government budget (Oxfam 1999, Rake, 1995-96 & Ocheing
2000).
By the end of 1995 it was estimated that the government expenditure would be 62
billion RWF, while the collected revenue stood at only 23 billion RWF, which was
just 7% of GDP. The biggest share of the expenditure was being channelled
towards reviving the administrative system of the central government (Egboo,
1997:172). In addition to that, the state of government's revenue sources was also
depressing, with a slim contribution of non-tax revenue to the total revenue. As
indicated in Table 2, in 1994 non-tax revenue was contributing 0% to total national
revenue, in 1995 slight progress was recorded at 0.4%. Tax revenue in 1994 was
contributing 100% of total national revenue, while in 1995-tax revenue was
contributing 93.5% to the total national revenue (IMF no 98/0115).
In 1995, government had estimated that about US $ 800 million would be needed to
get the economic and social situation in the country on track. The government
therefore opted to approach donors. At the first donor conference in Geneva in
1995, the government of Rwanda tabled a budget of about US $ 617 million that
was expected to support a reconstruction and rehabilitation program, but received
a mild response. By the end of 1996 according to Egboo (1997) out of US $ 517
million pledged by donors only US $ 69 million had been disbursed The fiscal
impacts of genocide were also accompanied by social and economical,
developmental woes including, fall of food production; shortage of human
resources, fall of exports, import increases and excessive tax evasion.
http://scholar.sun.ac.za/
26
Table 2 Budgetary receipts between 1991-1998 (%age)
1991 1992 1993 1994 1995
Total revenue 10.04 10.1 9.1 3.6 6.9
Tax revenue 9.1 8.9 8.4 3.6 6.9
Tax on income and profit 2.2 2.2 2.1 0.9 0.8
Companies 0.6 0.9 0.9 0.4 0.3
Individuals 0.9 0.7 0.7 0.2 0.5
Others 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.2 0.1
Property tax 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.1 0.2
Taxes on goods and services 3.7 3.4 3.6 1.4 2.9
Excise taxes 2.2 1.9 2.1 0.7 1.7
Turnover taxes 1.2 1.0 1.0 0.6 0.9
Road fund 0.3 0.5 0.6 0.1 0.4
Taxes on international trade 3.2 3.1 2.5 1.3 2.6
Import taxes 2.6 2.6 2.5 1.1 2.0
Export taxes 0.5 0.5 .... 0.1 0.5
Other taxes 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1
Non-tax revenue 1.3 1.3 0.7 0.4
Source: IMF
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2.4.1.1 Food production
The output with regard to food production during and after the genocide was
estimated to have declined by one third, while the output in the transport and
communication sector was estimated also to have declined by seventy five percent.
The livestock herds that used to contribute about 5% of the national CDP were
completely wiped out. Public assets, including buildings and other infrastructure
were damaged and looted. The administrative institutions including banks, courts
and policy units had either been shut down, or were rendering a diminished
service.
2.4.1.2 Civil service
By the end of the war and genocide the new government was facing the virtual
collapse of its administrative capacity, both at the central and local levels. The
delivery of social and financial services was being paralyzed owing to the shortage
of skilled personnel. During 1991-93,the number of civil servants was estimated to
be at 41,000, but shortly after the genocide the number fell by about 40% to reach
an estimated 25,000 as many officials were either killed or have fled the country
(see Table 4).
2.4.1.3 Export
The export sector was disproportionately affected by the genocide. By the end of
1994 the export volume had declined at a rate of 60%. Coffee, which is the main
export commodity of the Rwandan economy, was adversely affected. The number
of coffee growers in rural households declined to 38% compared to 54%before the
war (IMF no. 98/115). The production of green coffee dropped from 27.0 in
thousands of tons in 1993 to 21.0 thousands tons in 1995 and to 15.0 tons and 14.8
tons in 1996and 1997respectively. The production of tea, which is the second most
important export product, had also sharply declined. The production of green tea
leaves dropped to 18,567 kilograms in 1994 from 46,945 kilograms in 1993, while
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dried leaves production went down from 11,181 kilograms in 1993 to 4,136
kilograms in 1994. Between 1994 and 1995 coffee exports were placed below 40%
and the export of tea below 30% (IMF no. 98/115).
Table 3 Government sector wage bills, 1992-98) (Source: IMF 2000)
1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997
Wage bill in percent of 5.4 5.7 4.0. 4.0 4.4 5.1
GDP
Wage bill in percent 53.3 67.8 110 62.7 52.8 52.3
of revenue
Average wage 22,622 23,119 13,457 15,988 24,368 27,889
per civil servant per
month
Average wage per 9.3 9.6 ... 3.3 4.1 4.6
Civil servant in percent
of
Per capita GDP
Average for 8.2 8.0 7.1 7.1 7.0 7.0
Sub Sahara Africa
wage bill in percent of
GDP
Average for sub- 43.3 45.3 41.8 37.1 36.4 35.6
Saharan Africa; wage
bill in percent of total
revenue
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2.4.1.4 Imports
Economic statistics after the genocide indicate that the import sector happened to
perform better than other sectors. In 1994 import volumes stood at about 30%. This
was the result mainly of the bourgeoning of humanitarian assistance to alleviate
suffering after the conflict, estimated to be 350 billion RWF. These amounts had no
direct impact on the revenue status of the country as most of them were in the
form of non-budgetary humanitarian grants. Nonetheless the shortage of outputs
(supply of goods) and the inflow of humanitarian aid capital created a buoyant
demand, which led to a surge in consumer price inflation of 64% in that year
despite a contraction of money.
2.4.1.5 Tax failure 1995-1996
Two years after the 1994 genocide, mainly foreign non-governmental organizations
(NGOs) took the lead in importing and supplying consumer and capital goods
owing to the absence of government and other economic operators. By 1995 there
were about 140 foreign NGOs in the country, including UN agencies, churches and
various other types of non-governmental organizations (Humanitarian Assistance
Report 1997). These organizations were conducting different socio-economic
transactions in the guise of relief services that were automatically tax-free.
NGOs became the main employer in the country and paid high salaries. Apart
from the fact that their activities were not taxed, their well-paid employees were
not taxed either since no taxes were deducted from their wages. This means that
for two years after the war, between 1994-95, both individual and corporate
incomes fell outside the tax net. Some workers in the public sector were in double
employment. An employee would be receiving his or her basic salary from the
government, while at the same time being paid a premium by an NGO. Sometimes
this was more than the government paid. This was common practice in public
projects run jointly by the government and an NGO.
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In actual fact, taxable personal and company incomes were hard to detect.
Tender services to the government were supplied through NGOs under the banner
of assisting government administration, thus causing the mushrooming of
unregistered supplying and construction companies.
The new government elites, including senior military officers, became the main
beneficiaries of the situation. Government officials, a small number of elites
employed by NGOs, and the newly emerged small group of 'speculative
businessmen' formed a cluster of speculative local investors, who transferred NGO
capital to small restaurants, unprofessional shops, and non-registered construction
companies, in all types of unprofessional cash transactions. The three groups
formed an economic class that thrived on tax evasion facilitated by the government
officials and to some extent senior military officers. Nevertheless the 1994genocide
did not only cause the above social and economic malady, but also worsened
structural and institutional problems, including tax system faced by the Rwandan
economy, since independence.
2.5 STRUCTURAL AND INSTITUTIONAL ISSUES
In the above sections we saw that a trend of adversarial economic and fiscal
circumstances dominated Rwanda's economic history, and that the effects of the
1994 genocide worsened the situation. Rwanda also had structural problems as
was mentioned in the introduction to this chapter, the 1994 genocide just
intensified the situation. The structural crisis in the Rwandan economy relates
among other things to poverty, indebtedness, and the dominance of the primary
sector of production.
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Table 4 Size of civil service, 1991 - 98 (in number of persons)
1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998
Employment 41,529 40,153 42,027 25,389 31,794 34,882 40,622 40,204
Teachers 22,473 23,235 27,046 18,440 19,778 22,865 26,740 28,8363
Non 19,05E 16,918 14,981 6,949 12,016 12,017 13,882 11,341
teachers
Health 5,202 5,202 4,452 2,280 5,064 4,357 4,759 2,706
Others 13,854 11,716 10,529 4,669 4,652 7,660 9,123 7,635
In percent of 0.6 0.5 0.6 0.3 0.4 0.4 ... ...
population
Sub-Sahara 1.3 1.2 1.2 1.1 1.0 1.0 ... ...
average per
population
Source: IMF/ 2000
The 20-year National Development Plan, a policy paper issued by the government
of Rwanda in 2000, outlined the following structural problems in Rwanda;
• The country has a largely subsistence economy which has changed little
since independence
• The agricultural sector is characterized by low productivity, low value,
and low skills, which has worsened over time especially since the early
1980s, when the agricultural sector reached the frontier of extensive
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agriculture but failed to
intensified and high-value production
• Over half of the population of Rwanda lives below absolute poverty
make the transition to
levels; the number has increased since the genocide in 1994
• Human resources are underdeveloped, even by sub-Saharan African
standards, especially in the field of science and technology
• The country is land-locked, with a high cost of access to the ports and
72% of traffic being routed by the Northern Corridor road system
• Public and private sector capability is underdeveloped
• The country has an undeveloped middle class and low levels of
entrepreneurship. Industries enjoy high tariff protection, are dependent
on imports for raw material (over 80%) and are mainly import
substituting. Industry provides employment to less than 2% of the
population and it provides less than 20% of GDP
• There is a low level of savings and investments. Overall savings are -7%
of GDP. The level of investment is 10% of GDP while the average savings
rate in sub-Saharan Africa is 8% and that of investment 21%
• The market size is small, with overall domestic demand of about 1.8
billion dollars
• The country lacks viable natural resources capable of kick-starting the
economy and needs development in exploiting those that are known and
• identified, especially natural gases and minerals. The implication of these
structural deficiencies is the permanent history of poverty in Rwanda.
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2.5.1 Poverty
In 1996 the World Bank classified Rwanda as one of the poorest countries in the
world, with its per capita income of US $80, and about 70% of the population living
in absolute poverty (Oxfam, 1999; Misser 1997: 923). Rwanda is a tiny country in
central Africa, with a population of 8 million people and a growth rate of 3.6%
(1999). In 1985 it was estimated that 40% of households were living below the
poverty line. The number went up after 1993 when the percentage of households
living below the poverty line increased to 53% and 70% in 1997 (Debt
Sustainability Document, 2000). In 1996, according to the World Bank, Rwanda's
gross national product (GNP), at average prices of 1994-96, was estimated to be US
$ 1,268 million, which is equivalent to $190 per head. It was recorded as one of the
lowest in the world. Itwas also estimated that the GNP per head was decreasing at
an average rate of 8.2% between 1990-1996, while GDP has decreased at a rate of
9.7% in 1990-1996 (Misser, 2000:924).
The recent history of poverty is closely related to the economic stagnation facing
the country between 1986 and 1994, which primarily originated from the persisting
stagnation of non oil commodity prices in the international market; poor economic
policies adopted by the post independent governments and the frequent civil strife;
the declining of agricultural productivity in the context of a growing population;
and the impact of the genocide in 1994 which decimated the human resources base
(Oxfam 1999).
Apart from the constant decline of GNP per capita between 1992 and 1996 from US
$250 to US $205, social development continued to be an issue. Table 5 indicates that
alongside the decline of GNP, the infant and child mortality figures were
increasing. In 1992 the infant mortality rate was 85 infant deaths out of every 1000
births, while in 1996 the rate was 125 out of 1000; similarly the child mortality rate,
which by 1992 was 141 children out of 1000, shot up in 1996 to 185 out of 1000.
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Because of such structural imbalance, Rwandan government is entirely
depended on foreign resources, mainly grants and debts.
2.5.2 Debts
Rwanda is among the highest indebted poor countries. By 1995 its outstanding
foreign debts amounted to US $1 billion (Egboo 1997: 171). Like many other
African countries, Rwanda borrowed heavily in the late 1970s and early 1980s. But
the total amount of external debt rose rapidly after 1985, as regional recession and
a collapse in world coffee prices hit the government's earnings (Oxfarm, 1999).
Between 1985 and 1997 external debt more than doubled, from US $400 m to over
US $1 bn. The Rwandan government also built up a large public domestic debt,
reaching the equivalent of US $220 m in mid-1997.
Debts have been overshadowing the economic progress of the country by holding
back the flow of revenues. According to World Bank statistics presented by Oxfam
in Table 6, the net present value of debts in Rwanda by 1999 was 65% of CDP,
while in terms of exports debts stand at 557%. At the same time government is
spending 32% of CDP for debt servicing, which is 23% of government revenues.
2.5.3 Creditors
In common with other African countries the share of the multilateral creditors in
Rwanda's external debt has steadily been raising, parallel to the increase of debt.
Today, over 80% of Rwanda's debt is owed to multilateral creditors. By the end of
1997, US $947 m out of Rwanda's total external debt of US $1164 m, comprised
arrears owed to multilateral creditors. About US $558 M was concessional debt
owed to the International Development Association (IDA), the World Bank's 'soft
loan' arm. 17% of the total external debt, equal to US $203 M, was owed to the
African Development Bank (ADB). Only 16% of the total external debt is owed to
bilateral creditors, and 6% to the Paris Club.
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Table 5 Rwanda's deterioratinghuman development -1992 and 1996
I Indicator 11992 I
~I--G-N-p--pe-r-c-ap-i-ta-(-u-s-$-)------------~I~-2-09----
I Infant mortality rate" r I
'I--C-h~i~ld--m-o-rt-a-I-icy--ra-t-e-*------_----~_--_114~1~--1~-5----
,I Illite~acy - aged 10+ ('Yo) 'ril
.--s-e-v-e-re--w-a-s-ti-n-g-------------------f~-------
I I
0.7 5.3
Of children- under-fives (%)
_ _ _ J _
125
1996
60
* (Per 10,000 live births) Source: UNICEF 1998, UNDP 1995
In descending order, the principal bilateral creditors at the end of 1995 were:
France (US $54 m), Saudi Arabia (US $27 m), Kuwait (US $18 m), China (US $14 m)
and Japan (US $14 m). Only US $18 m, less than 2% of the total amount, was owed
to private creditors. In chapter one we saw that among of the factors for poor tax
returns in Rwanda is lack of manufacturing and mineral sectors of production,
meaning that the largest portion of taxpayers in Rwanda depend on primary sector
of production, agriculture in particular.
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Table 6 Rwanda's External debt indicators, 1999
'I
GDP
I
65%
i
Net present value/exports
I
557%
I
Debt service/exports
I
32%
Debt service/governmentFrevenues
Source: WB 1998
2.6 PRIMARY SECTOR DEPENDENCE
The economic structure of Rwanda is dominated by the primary sector, which by
definition is composed of the mining and agricultural sectors whose outputs are
mainly for consumption. Agriculture is the largest sector of the economy in
Rwanda. In terms of GDP, agriculture in 1989 was providing 40% of national GDP,
while engaging about 93% of the economically active population. In 1994
agriculture was accounting for 51% of the national economy, employing more than
90% of the labor force and contributing 40% of foreign earnings (Rake 1999: 381).
The industrial sector, including manufacturing and mining, has been contributing
less. In 1988 the industrial sector was contributing 22% of the national GDP, from
17% in 1985, while employing 3% of the economically active population.
The service sector, which is the next largest sector in the country, was contributing
about 34% of national GDP by 1988. InAfrica Today (1991) it was observed that the
manufacturing sector in Rwanda is the weakest section of economy, the reason
among others is of low technology. It consists mainly of the processing of
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agricultural products and other consumer items, like beverages, matches,
and soap for the small home market.
The agricultural sector for a period of 20 years has been contributing more than
other sectors. Table 7 shows that in terms of GDP, in 1979 agriculture was
contributing 53%, 43.3% in 1989,47.4% in 1998, and 45.7% in 1999. In comparison,
the industrial sector was contributing 20% in 1979, 18.7% in 1989, 21.2% in 1998,
and 20.5% in 1999. Within the industrial sector manufacturing was contributing
14.0%in 1979,11.2%in 1989,13.0%in 1998,11.7%in 1999 (World Bank 2000).Main
products of manufacture were beer, lemonade, sugar, cigarettes, matches, soap,
plastic shoes and blankets.
Rwanda is a country with limited natural resources such as mineral and oil. The
main export commodities are coffee and tea, which are restrained by international
prices. For example, in 1986coffee accounted for 82% of Rwandan exports, but the
prosperous nature of coffee exports in the1980s was drastically cut short by the
international price in 1989 (Anderson 2000:441). Actually, 99%of Rwanda's export
economy depends on primary commodities: coffee, tea and tin. Pender, (1997)
referred to the economy of Rwanda as has been utterly dependent on the
fluctuations of commodity prices in the world markets.
Up to 1990, Rwanda was one of the weakest countries in the world, most
vulnerable to the fluctuations of the world market, least able to control its own
affairs, and increasingly dependent on the West. Even before the collapse of
commodity prices, Rwanda obtained more income from aid than from its own
exports.
Hyweghen (1999:356) observes that the consumption driven Rwandan agriculture
is providing no safety net for rural farmers in a monetary economy. For over a
decade agricultural productivity has been declining due to the exhaustion of arable
land, fragmentation, and the over-exploitation of available agricultural land owing
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to the rapid growth of the rural population, the degradation of the soil,
lack of modem inputs and weak research and extension (ESAF policy paper, 1998).
Table 7 Structure of Rwandan Economy (%GDP)
1979 1989 1998 1999
Agriculture 53.6 43.3 47.4 45.7
Industry 20.5 18.7 21.2 20.5
Manufacturing 14.0 11.2 13.2 11.7
Service 25.9 38.0 31.4 33.8
Private consumption 76.6 85.0 90.4 88.7
General government 13.1 12.7 11.3 12.7
Imports of goods and services 22.8 17.3 22.9 21.1
Source: World Bank 9/9/00
2.7 COMPOSITION OF THE TAX SYSTEM
The tax system in Rwanda is divided into four main regimes: income tax, property
tax, and taxes on sales and goods and international trade. Between 1978-80, the
total income tax was standing at 11.13% of GDP, while taxes on goods and services
were at 2.12%, taxes on foreign trade 3.18%, and property tax was 0.15% (Tanzi,
1987). Of the total tax revenue, the share of income taxes was 19.5% in 1978, while
taxes on goods and sales were contributing 19.21%, foreign trade 54.23%, and
property tax 1.10% (Tanzi 1987: 212).
As is shown in Table 8, in recent years taxes on goods and services as well as on
foreign trade continued to dominate the tax structure. In 1993, out of the total tax
revenue of 23.9 billion (RWF), taxes on income and profit were 5.9 billion, while
taxes on goods and services were 10.3 billion, foreign trade taxes and other taxes
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were 7.2 billion, while property taxes were 0.5 million. In 1994, when the total
tax revenue was 6.0 billion (RWF), taxes on income and profits were 1.5 billion
(RWF), taxes on goods and services 2.3 billion (RWF), foreign trade taxes 2.2 billion
and property tax 0.1 billion (IMF No. 98/115).
In 1995 total tax revenue was 21.7 billion (RWF), taxes on goods and services were
9.9 billion (RWF), while taxes from international trade increased from 7.2 billion
(RWF) in 1993 to 8.9 billion in 1995 (table 8). According to the above configuration
of the Rwandan tax structure the contribution of income tax regimes, continued to
be less visible in the composition of tax revenue in Rwanda. Likewise tax bases
within the income tax structure - individual and corporate taxes, maintained
fluctuating disparities.
From the base years of 1978 and 1980, taxes from income and profits were making
2.7% of GDP, but out of this individual income taxation was contributing 0.2%
while company taxes were contributing 1.24% (Tanzi, 1987). In the 1990s the
contribution of company taxes was fluctuating, in 1993 out of total income tax
revenue of 1.5 billion, company's tax was contributing 0.7, while individual tax
contributed 0.4.
In 1995 revenue from individual taxes outdid the revenue raised through company
taxes by more than half, contributing 1.6 billion (RWF) to the total income tax
revenue of 2.8 billion (RWF), while company taxes were contributing 0.8 billion
(see table 8). In 1996 individual taxation figures started decreasing; out of the total
income tax of 10.0 billion, company's taxes contributed 6.6 billion RWF, while
individual taxes were only contributing 2.7 billion. Similarly in 1997, company's
taxes were contributing more than half of the total income tax, which amounted to
14.2 billion RWF. During this time corporate taxes were contributing 9.3 billion
RWF, while individual taxation was providing only 4.3 billion RWF.
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Table 8 Receipts, 1993-1997 (in Billions of Rwandan Francs)
1993 1994 1995 1996 1997(est)
Total revenue 25.9 6.0 23.1 39.4 58.1
Total tax revenue 23.9 6.0 21.7 36.2 54.9
Taxes on income and profit 5.9 1.5 2.8 10.0 14.2
Companies 2.5 0.7 0.8 6.6 9.3
Individuals 2.1 0.4 1.6 2.7 4.3
Others 1.3 0.3 0.3 0.8 0.6
Property taxes 0.5 0.1 0.1 0.3 0.4
Taxes on goods and services 10.3 2.3 9.9 14.4 21.9
Excise taxes 5.9 1.1 5.7 7.9 12.3
Turnover taxes 2.8 1.0 3.0 5.0 7.5
Road fund 1.6 0.0 1.2 1.4 2.1
Taxes on international trade 7.2 2.2 8.9 11.5 18.9
Import taxes 7.0 1.8 6.9 10.7 13.5
Export taxes 0.0 0.1 1.8 0.3 4.3
Other taxes on international 0.2 0.3 0.3 0.5 0.8
trade
Non-tax revenue 2.0 0.0 1.4 3.2 3.1
Grants 18.1 1.5 38.4 31.4 41.6
Source: IMF, NO. 98/115
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Two situations need to be notified here, as far tax system reform in Rwanda
is concerned; first, there has been poor tax administration that originated basically
from the poor performance of public sector management. The second situation is
that poor economic outputs limits the creation of a tax paying community. In other
words the nature of economic structure dominated by poverty and rural
agriculture creates low tax morale among the Rwandan people. Implicitly therefore
tax system reform in Rwanda has to go concurrently with public management
reforms and economic structural reform to transform the rural population into
viable economic community, thus tax paying community.
2.8 CONCLUSIONS
The chapter reflected on those administrative and political situations that have
either influenced or affected the implementation of tax reform policy in Rwanda.
But the most important aspect revealed in this chapter, is that the problems of the
tax system in Rwanda have historical roots, mainly in economic development and
the political organization of tax administration. Tax administration in Rwanda is a
colonial invention, introduced into a primitive and traditional system of
production and incompetent colonial administration. The post-colonial
governments inherited this legacy of substandard tax administration.
In this chapter, it was also revealed that historical failure of the tax system in
Rwanda has been constantly manifested in a continuous budget deficit. In fact, in
this chapter the budget deficit was shown to be the result of the failure of the tax
system. The chapter also reflected extensively on structural factors that dominated
the Rwandan socio-economic situation. They not only had a major impact on the
development of an effective tax system, but reforming the tax system was also a
way of resolving them.
Briefly, despite the genocide effects presented as episodic events with respect to
the tax system, the remaining tax system problems in Rwanda are economic and
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institutional. The significant point to note, however, is that the performance of
the tax system is a multifaceted process, so the reform of the tax system for better
performance needs also to be a multifaceted process, including economic and
institutional reforms. In the next chapter we are going to look at normative
requirements for tax system reform.
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CHAPTER 3: NORMATIVE REQUIREMENTS FOR A TAX SYSTEM
3.1 INTRODUCTION
Chapter 1 provided an introduction to the research, and traced out the research
problem, hypothesis, the methodology and theoretical framework of the research.
Chapter 2 underlined institutional, economic and political factors that influenced
or affected the tax reform process in Rwanda. Chapter 3 explores the normative
requirements for a tax system by addressing the following issues:
Theories of Taxation, including concepts such as Taxation and
Political Systems, Allocation of Resources and The Philosophy
of Public Goods. Issues such as Democratic Values in a tax
system, the Quality of the Public Sector in tax administration,
Properties of a Good Tax System and Types of Taxes are dealt
with. The chapter also examines technical issues concerning an
Efficient and Effective tax system, Tax Administration and
Compliance, Reform of Tax Administration, Privatisation of
h Tax Administration, and Tax Structure and Administration in
Developing Countries, followed by a Conclusion.
3.2 THEORIES OF TAXATION
Taxation is a multidisciplinary field of study. For the last 300 years, taxation has
been at the centre of varied academic interest, from public economics and public
finance, to public administration and political science. Insights from other social
science disciplines such as sociology, psychology and the humanities have made
an imminent contribution to modernising tax administration.
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Nevertheless, the four canons of taxation - equity, efficiency, certainty,
and convenience - postulated by Adam Smith in 1776, have continued to be the
building blocks in the study and practice of tax administration.
Taxation is as old as the state. 1/And it came in those days, that there went out a decree
from Caesar Augustus, that the entire world should be taxed" (Luke ii: 1). And the
whole world has in fact been rendering unto Caesar ever since (Nobes & James
1997/98: 1).
There are different views on the concept of taxation. Taxation is considered either
to be a relationship between politics and economics, or an interventional facility for
the government to keep an upper hand in the economy. Likewise taxation in some
quarters is regarded as an act of government to drain resources from the people,
while other analysts like Wagner (1991: 14) refer to taxation as a contractual
relationship between government and citizen.
The varied conceptualisations of the tax phenomenon extend to different contexts,
but the thrust of all of them has a bearing on the relationship between three pillars:
people (citizen or taxpayer), resources (economy) and government.
"Taxation is a compelling phenomenon, precisely because it is where the politics meets
the economics. The way in which national taxes create incentives, the way in which
political and economic life becomes organized" (Bates in Gillis 1989:487).
3.2.1 Classifications and Definitions
According to Sommerfield (1980: 1), tax can be meaningfully defined as any non-
penal yet compulsory transfer of resources from the private sector to the public
sector, levied on the basis of predetermined criteria and without reference to the
specific benefits received in order to accomplish some of the national social,
political and economic objectives.
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Nobes and James (1997/98: 10)expand on this definition with their view that tax
is a compulsory levy made by public authorities for which nothing is received
directly in return. Benjamin Franklin wrote in 1789: "In this world nothing can be
said to be certain except death and taxes", and that "Taxes are transfers of
resources from person or economic unit to government and are compulsory or
legally enforced" (Cohen & Cohen in Black et al, 1999: 114). All in all, there
continues to be rifting debate on taxation, whether to classify taxation as penal or
non-penal, as a compulsory responsibility or a confiscation.
Sommerfeld et al (1980:5)expound on the debate by pointing out that tax payment
is compulsory in the sense that it is a transfer of resources without prior assent of
the taxpayer, and without specific and roughly equivalent benefits. This is in
contrast with private transfer that is performed through an agreed form of
exchange between the supplier and consumer of a commodity. Principally taxes
are used for purchasing public goods. This power of compulsion is restricted to the
public sector of a sovereign government.
In modern economics taxation is the method used by the government to divert
resources away from individual citizens to the control of the government.
However, Sommerfeld et al distinguished it from outright confiscation because of
taxing principles, which are a set of criteria that have to be met before taxing can
commence. The common understanding is that these criteria will fall within the
limits of equality, and will provide the desired result. The most direct method of
transferring resources from the private sector to the public sector would be the
outright confiscation of wealth. This method has been used exclusively during
wars and political chaos.
The two elements, confiscation and compulsory responsibility, highlight the
mutual relationship between public and private resources. While confiscation
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takes away private resources by direct means in a crisis, taxation diverts private
resources to the public sector indirectly and by means of a peaceful process.
Obviously both lead to the decrease of wealth among private citizens and a
corresponding increase in the wealth of the state (Sommerfeld et a11980: 6). Other
means of transferring resources from the private sector to the public sector include
beneficiary charges, government bonds and inflation.
3.2.2 Objectives of Taxation
Taxation is the responsibility of the state. In other words, from the above
definitions and explanations taxation is shown to be the process of a material
relationship between the state and its institutions and the citizen. According to
Sommerfeld et al (1980), there are five reasons why citizen should pay tax: for
raising revenue for the government; insuring price stability through inflation and
government purchase; economic growth; eeconomic development by promoting
savings and investment; as well as wealth redistribution.
3.2.3 Four Canons of Taxation
Adam Smith (1776), in his book The Wealth of Nations (Book V, Chapter II
(www.worldbank.org) provided the basic principles of taxation, sometimes called
the four canons of taxation: Before I enter upon the examination of particular taxes,
it is necessary to premise the four following maxims with regard to taxes in
general.
I. The subjects of every state ought to contribute towards the support of the government,
as nearly as possible, in proportion to their respective abilities; that is, in proportion to the
revenue which they respectively enjoy under the protection of the state.
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II. The tax which each individual is bound to pay ought to be certain, and not
arbitrary. The time of payment, the manner of payment, the quantity to be paid, ought all
to be clear and plain to the contributor, and to every other person.
III. Every tax ought to be levied at the time, or in the manner, in which it is most likely to
be convenient for the contributor to pay it. A tax upon the rent of land or of houses,
payable at the same term at which such rents are usually paid, is levied at the time when it
is most likely to be convenient for the contributor to pay; or, when he is most likely to have
where to pay.
IV. Every tax ought to be so contrived as both to take out and to keep out of the pockets of
the people as little as possible over and above what it brings into the public treasury of the
state. A tax may either take out or keep out of the pockets of the people a great deal more
than it brings into the public treasury, in the four following ways. First, the levying of it
may require a great number of officers, whose salaries may eat up the greater part of the
produce of the tax, and whose perquisites may impose another additional tax upon the
people. Secondly, it may obstruct the industry of the people, and discourage them from
applying to certain branches of business, which might give maintenance, and
unemployment to great multitudes. While it obliges the people to pay, it may thus
diminish, or perhaps destroy, some of the funds, which might enable them more easily to
do so. Thirdly, by the forfeitures and other penalties which those unfortunate individuals
incur who attempt unsuccessfully to evade the tax, it may frequently ruin them, and
thereby put an end to the benefit which the community might have received from the
employment of their capitals. An injudicious tax offers a great temptation to smuggling.
But the penalties of smuggling must rise in proportion to the temptation. The law,
contrary to all the ordinary principles of justice, first creates the temptation, and then
punishes those who yield to it; and it commonly enhances the punishment, too, in
proportion to the very circumstance that ought certainly to alleviate it, the temptation to
commit the crime. Fourthly, by subjecting the people to the frequent visits and the odious
examination of the tax-gatherers, it may expose them to much unnecessary trouble,
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vexation, and oppression; and though vexation is not, strictly speaking, expense, it
is certainly equivalent to the expense at which every man would be willing to redeem
himself from it. It is in some one or other of these four different ways that taxes are
frequently so much more burdensome to the people than they are beneficial to the
sovereign.
These four maxims of taxation have been the guiding principles for designing and
reforming tax systems. From these maxims, the former World Bank Senior
Economist, Stiglitz (1980) derived four characteristics of a good tax system:
• Economic efficiency: The tax should not prevent efficient allocation of
resources.
• Administrative simplicity: The tax should be easy and inexpensive to
administer.
• Flexibility: The tax system should respond easily to changes in economic
conditions.
• Transparency: Individuals should be able to ascertain their tax burdens so
that burdens can be politically tailored to what society considers desirable.
3.3 TAX SYSTEM AND STATE
In modern communities governments are accepted to be the only institutions that
collect taxes; it is done in return for rendering collective services to the community
(Gildenhuys, 1993: 211). By and large, taxation is an essential source of finance for
the government if is to be able to discharge its responsibility of providing service
to its citizens. Tanzi & Zee (2001) remarked that "until someone comes with a better
idea, taxation is the only practical means of raising revenue to finance government
spending on goods and services that most of us demand".
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The more provision is made for public goods and services, the higher
government expenditure is, and therefore the more taxes government needs to
raise either directly or indirectly. Needless to say, this is an unwelcome gesture to
the taxpayers, as it reduces private spending (Nobes & James 1997/1998:7).
However, governments still have other means of transferring resources from the
people without going to taxation. These other means include the debasement of the
currency through the production of too much money. This is fiscal manipulation
that leads to the decline of the value of money, thus reducing the purchasing
power of the private sector while in the meantime increasing the financial capacity
of the public sector. Government can also transfer resources from the private
consumer by commercialising some of its services (Nobes & James 1997/98: 8).
According to Rosen (1999), taxation and the provision of public services constitute
a public process that raises mixed feelings. These feelings are typical of and
inextricably bound up with the taxing and spending activities of the government.
In biblical times, the prophet Samuel in 1030 B.C. resisted the appointment of a
king for Israel in spite of the people's request, because of his concerns about the
expenditure that would be incurred to maintain the government.
"This will be the manner that the king shall reign over you. He will take your sons and
appoint them unto him, for his chariots and to be his horsemen and shall run before his
chariots .... And he will take your daughter to be his performers and to be cooks and to be
bakers. And he will take your fields and Vineyards, and Oliveyard, even the best of them
and give to his servants ... He will take the tenth offlocks, and ye shall be his servants. And
ye shall cry out of that days because your king ye shall have chosen" (1 Samuel 8: 11-18,
in Rosen 1999:1).
Samuel's objections were rejected by the Israelites. "Nay; there shall be king over us;
and that our king may judge us, and go out before us, and fight our battles" (1 Samuel19-
20). The Israelites wanted a government that could collect taxes and at the same
time be capable of providing a collective service. Samuel's position versus that of
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the subjects presents mixed feelings about taxation. Essentially, the subjects
recognized the importance of having a government that could take responsibility
on their behalf, and therefore the necessity for them (subjects) to pay taxes to
enable the government to meet its responsibilities. On the other hand Samuel, a
member of the intelligentsia of that community, gives the impression that the
existence of a government to whom taxes are paid amounts to exploiting the
citizens (subjects).
The fundamental notion here is the political dynamics of taxation, governance and
service delivery. Though technically there is no direct return on paying tax, the
taxpayer knows that the indirect result of paying tax is to finance the government,
which principally can represent the people, provide justice, and lead the people to
the battle. Paying tax is legitimation of government. If people were not prepared to
pay tax, government as an institution would not be able to exist. That is why
Samuel had to caution the Israelites that since they accepted having a government,
they had to be prepared also to pay tax. The debate between Samuel and the
Israelites connotes the implications of tax compliance and the role citizens have in
building the political system of a country.
3.3.1 Taxation and Political System Performance
Taxing and providing services are a source of legitimacy that a political system
enjoys. According to Heywood (1997: 19), a political system is a complex,
interrelated and interdependent set of activities between government and citizens.
Politics is a broader concept both in application and in theory. But in a simplified
way Heywood defined politics as human and academic activity shaped by conflict
and cooperation. "Human society is characterized by people with rival opinions,
different wants and competing interest, which are likely to disrupt the rules of
living together, while still need to live together". Augmenting this principle,
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Heywood (1997:4) notes that politics is developed as a neutral force to arbitrate
for the interest of rules of living together.
A political system is exemplified by the process of interaction between system
capacity (government institutions) and citizens' effectiveness (participation).
Political theorists have recognized that there are two sources of conflict in society;
namely system capacity and citizen's effectiveness (Dahl & Tufte 1973: 137).
According to Dahl and Tufte, system capacity means the institutional capacity of
the government to deliver public goods such as laws, allocate public resources,
collect taxes, and do other things aimed at meeting the needs of the citizens.
The Elton Mayo model of inputs and outputs (Heywood 1997:11) simulates this
process. Provision of public goods and service is an output of the government that
is processed by the public institutions from the citizen inputs. The citizens' inputs
include public demands, and support of the citizens for the government through
paying tax and complying with the demands of their public responsibilities.
Citizen demands vary from welfare issues to economic and social infrastructure, as
well as to sound policies. However, achieving citizen effectiveness goes beyond the
provision of public needs to entail also the participation of citizens in the decision-
making process (Dahl & Tufte 1973: 5).
Almond and Bingham (1978: 303-305) include in the performance of a political
system the effective implementation of three main objectives of taxation.
According to these two scholars a political system will be judged with reference to
its capacity to extract resources; distribute wealth; and lastly having the capacity to
regulate the economy.
Taxation and taxes, according to Fox (1999: 103) enable the government to perform
its economic, political and social functions. Taxation enables the government to
meet the three main and distinct policy objectives of allocation, distribution and
stabilization. In the same vein Nobes and James (1997/98:8) state that taxation
enables the government to facilitate the allocation of economic resources, creating a
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way for equal and just redistribution of wealth, and maintaining economic
stability in the country.
3.3.2.Allocation of Resources
The allocation function of government according to Fox, relates to the process of
securing the efficient provision of social goods (public goods and services), (Nobes
& James, 1997/98, Gildenhuys, 1993, and Rosen 1999). Contrary to private goods
social goods are not acquired through market transactions. Social goods can be
defined as goods that are regarded as socially valuable to and benefiting all
consumers. The allocation function means the distribution and redistribution of
resources in the country.
A tax system is one of the methods used by the government to distribute incomes
and wealth, in lieu of the market. Through market mechanisms individual income
and wealth are determined by market values (demand and supply). To put it
differently, in a market system the distribution of income will occur among those
who have something to exchange in the market. Therefore people without land
and without capital, unemployed, destitute and other groups of have-nots, are
taken care of by the government. So, by taxing the rich government becomes able
to supply public goods and services to those who cannot obtain these things
through market competition, thus making for an equitable distribution of wealth
(Nobes 1997/98: 10).
Gildenhuys (1993: 218) finds the redistribution function an implicit and deliberate
government policy for balancing the poor and the wealthier in an economic society
through taxation. When more tax is collected from one taxpayer than from another,
and both receive the value of the collective services equal to the per capita cost of
rendering such services, then redistribution of wealth automatically takes place.
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The redistribution policy is a significant function as it helps to
determine the tax structure and at the same time it helps the tax authority to deal
with issues of horizontal and vertical equity in a tax system. Wealth differentiation
is a common phenomenon in any community, but Musgrave (1984) as quoted by
Gildenhuys (1993:217),identifies some fiscal means that are used by government to
balance the situation:
1. A tax transfer scheme combined with a subsidy to low-income households.
2. A program whereby the income tax is used to finance public services
especially those such as public housing, which particularly benefits the
low-income households.
3. A combination of taxes on goods purchased by high-income consumers
with subsidies to other goods that are used chiefly by the low- income
consumers.
Fox (1999:104) regards the redistribution policy as an economic function, which is
usually performed by the market, but not successfully. The market principles
provide that change in economic conditions can improve the position of an
individual in society while it is not to the detriment of another person's position,
which is of course an indication of market efficiency. However, Fox concludes that
the market approach does little to solve the basic social issues of distribution and
redistribution.
The redistribution of wealth is an unavoidable responsibility of governments to
ensure equality in society. Todaro (1994: 41-42) observes that all nations should
have an equal distribution of wealth, but while people have a right to their
endowments this distribution should be arranged to maximize happiness or
should meet a certain standard of equity.
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"There are large disparities between the income of the rich and poor and in both
developed and undeveloped countries. Nevertheless, the gap between the poor and rich is
generally greater in undeveloped countries than in developed countries" (Todaro in Fox
1999: 104).
Fox (1999) and Gildenhuys (1993) both discuss devices for balancing the wealth
and income in a society, namely, transfer through income tax schemes, use of
progressive income tax to finance public services, and using taxes on goods
purchased largely by high-income consumers to subsidize goods mainly used by
low-income households. But Gildenhuys (1999: 219) decries the fact that
redistribution policies do not meet the needs of target groups because of poor
implementation. He notes that the underlying problem of policy implementation is
that fiscal policy benefits do not always reach their target groups because of the
abundant administrative cost that absorbs a big portion of the benefits.
3.3.3 Stabilisation
Maintaining stabilisation is another reason that a government intervenes directly in
the economy through taxation. Nobes and James (1997/98:108) identify two ways
through which governments have been influencing the economy. One is through
fiscal policy and another is through monetary policy. Fiscal policy refers to
maintaining the balance between government expenditure and income, which
includes taxation as the main source of income for the government, while monitory
policies are normally conducted through the supply of money in the economy.
Government applies fiscal and monitory policies to stabilise the economy in terms
of ensuring the employment of all factors of production in the country and at the
same times securing stability of prices (Nobes & James, 1999: 10).
In short government collects tax as deliberate policy of generating revenue in order
to be able to supply goods and services to the citizens. In the next section we are
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going to examine what public goods entail and the relationship between this
concept, the government and taxes.
3.4 THE PHILOSOPHY OF PUBLIC GOODS
Government intervenes in the market to facilitate the provision of public goods.
Adam Smith (1776)accentuated the fact that markets are unlikely to provide public
goods because they don't provide a direct profit.
"[Government has] the duty of erecting and maintaining public works and certain public
institutions, which can never befor the interest of individual neither for small number of
individuals, to erect and maintain; because their profit could never repay the expenses to
any individual or to any small number of individuals, though it may do much more than
repay to great society (Nobes & James1997/98: 9).
There are two fundamental principles in the allocation of public goods and
services. Firstly, individual persons cannot be excluded from consuming public
goods, even if they are not able to pay for them. The second principle is that the
private sector and market cannot provide pure public goods, basically, because a
neutral consumption relationship exists, in which individual preferences or biases
do not matter. Furthermore, consumption of public goods is the inherent right of
every citizen (Nobes & James 1997/98:9).
The provision of public goods is deeply entrenched within the framework of the
policy relationship between the government and citizens, which implies that the
government has the authority and the right to draw resources from the citizens
(taxpayers) with the intent of providing public goods. Yet this model of demand
and supply does not entail that the functional allocation of public goods can be
simulated by market mechanisms. Pope John XIII equated the provision of public
goods with a moral obligation that the government has:
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"There exists an intrinsic connection between the common good on one hand and
the function of public authority on the other. The moral order which needs the public
authority in providing the common goods in human society, requires also the authority to
be effective in attaining that end" (in Rosen 1999: 61).
Different authors put public goods in different categories, namely pure public
goods and impure ones. Put simply, Rosen (1999: 61) defines pure public goods as
non-rival and non-excludable goods that have no additional cost whatsoever for
another consumer. Such goods include roads and sanitation. Compared to this are
the impure and excludable public goods, which are also bound to the market
principle of competition.
There are instances of private sector involvement in providing public goods. For
example, the protection of personal property is the responsibility of government,
but today it is commonly found that private security companies are engaged in
providing security services to individuals and their properties, in addition to the
government's involvement in this service. Thus the private and public sector are in
partnership in providing services.
Tax collection and allocation of public goods and services are political processes by
and large, so the government is challenged to observe basic democratic principles.
In the next section we explore taxation on the basis of this challenge.
3.5 DEMOCRATIC VALUES OF TAX SYSTEMS
Some puzzling issues emanate from a logical interpretation of the allocation
function. Usually allocation is referred to as a revenue function. From an orthodox
view, taxes are mainly levied to cover the cost of collective services. Nonetheless
taxpayers cannot determine the amount of tax to be paid, nor decide on the type of
services to be given to them (Gildenhuys, 1993:215).
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Public goods are financed from the government budget, which is made up
from the taxes received from the citizens. Fox (1999:104) challenges the
unilateralism of the government in the allocation of public goods, maintaining that
collecting taxes from the people must go hand in hand with an approach where
supplying social goods and the cost of their allocation should be determined by the
consumer, or else voluntary taxation will be at a risk.
Musgrave (1959:16-17)regards the allocation of public goods as an interaction
between taxation and expenditure. He notes that the primary challenge is that
allocation and budget must be balanced. The amount of resources (taxes)
transferred from private pockets must be equal to the amount of resources added
to the public use.
The ideal concept of empowering taxpayers to play a role in decisions on what
they receive and the expenditure of the government needs to be sustained by the
effective existence of democratic values in a public financial system. Democratic
values in public resource management include elements such as representation,
responsiveness, transparency, legitimacy and public accountability (Schewlla et al,
1999: 15). All of these elements have important implications in public resource
management, but most significant is public accountability. This entails that the
actions of public organisations are subject to public scrutiny, to encourage debate
and public criticism. According to Schwella et al (1999: 16), representative
institutions and news media should lead the debate. This will empower legislative
institutions to exercise control over the government on behalf of citizens.
Brinkerhoff and Goldsmith (2001) observe that the democratic representation of
taxpayers in the public financial system is possible through the participation of
civil society organisations (CSOs) in fiscal policy. Fiscal policy relies heavily upon
an influx of resources from taxes. Having a tax system that people accept, if not
wholeheartedly embrace, and that functions both effectively and fairly, is
important to encourage tax compliance and an ongoing flow of financial resources
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to government coffers. In many developing and transitioning economies,
however, citizens' perceptions, attitudes, and behaviors regarding taxes result in
widespread non-compliance and evasion. For example, the post-apartheid
government in South Africa is facing significant problems with non-compliance.
Before coming to power, the African National Congress encouraged its supporters
to refuse payment of water and utility charges as a means of contesting the
legitimacy of the state-sponsored black local authorities. Now the ANC faces the
challenge of reversing a /I culture of nonpayment" for municipal services among
township residents. The resulting arrears pose a major financial burden on all
levels of government (Brinkerhoff & Goldsmith 2001).
Taxation is a facet of macroeconomic policy that is relatively easy for the layperson
to grasp. While ordinary people encounter monetary policy only indirectly, they
are likely to have had immediate experience of public revenue agencies, and may
have developed strong opinions about taxes. This may make it easier for CSOs to
marshal their members to follow and influence tax policy.
Civil society organisations in developing countries are therefore taking an
increased interest in tax reform. Because fiscal policy is so intimately connected
with who gets what, which is one classic definition of politics, the configuration of
contextual factors and the range and relative positions of interest groups are highly
influential in shaping the opportunities and outcomes of participation.
In 1994, for example, the Freedom from Debt Coalition in the Philippines launched
a national tax campaign, focused on making the tax system more progressive. The
campaign proposed tax exemptions for low-income groups, tax incentives for
small and medium enterprises, and limitations on deductible expenses for
corporations. These proposals, however, never entered the political mainstream-a
problem often encountered by groups that claim to speak for the poor. Even
though the Philippines gets high marks for democratisation since the fall of the
Marcos regime in 1986, that has not ended the hegemony of private fortunes and
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large, family-owned business monopolies. The national tax campaign
had no noticeable effect on the Philippines Comprehensive Tax Reform Program
enacted in 1997with the support of international financial institutions.
Fiscal policy determines the way governments manage revenues, expenditures,
and debt. Civic involvement on the revenue side principally concerns the level and
structure of taxes-who pays and how much. On the expenditure side, civic
involvement focuses on: 1) priorities for public spending-who gets what services,
and how generously are those services; and 2) efficiency, effectiveness, and equity
issues related to spending for services. The relationship between revenue and
expenditure is critical, for it determines the fiscal surplus or shortfall-which in
tum affects overall macroeconomic stability. The involvement of civic
organisations in matters of government revenues and expenditure provides an
opportunity for taxpayers to participate in the process.
3.5.1 Tax payers' participation
The two scholars Brinkerhoff and Goldsmith (2001) suggest two ways of enabling
the participation of taxpayers: information sharing and consultation. Most of the
opportunities for participation in fiscal policy exist at the levels of information
sharing and consultation. Within the category of expenditure policy, an important
opportunity exists for collaboration and empowerment through service delivery
satisfaction surveys and/ or budget monitoring.
3.5.1.1 Sharing of information
Sharing information with taxpayers is an important way for governments to
convince the population of the social benefits associated with tax payments.
Information is critical to allowing civil society to attain higher levels of
participation, because it provides the knowledge base for citizens and CSOs to
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influence policy makers to make the tax system fairer, cheaper to administer,
and/ or more effective. Tax authorities are often a primary target for administrative
reforms to enhance the customer orientation of the public service.
3.5.1.2.Consultation
Brinkerhoff and Goldsmith (2001) suggest that there should be deliberate
consultation and collaboration between government and the civil society in
implementing tax reforms. Overhauling the tax system has many implications for
low-income groups. Tax reform may lead to a reduction in government revenue,
an increase in revenue, or a shift to new sources of taxation with no net effect on
revenue. In addition, reform often seeks to redress imbalances between relatively
better-off and worse-off societal groups via redistributive revenue measures. To
handle these difficult tax issues consultation and collaboration among the
stakeholders (government, taxpayers and the civil society) are required to find the
balance between maintaining adequate funding for important government
programs, assuring some minimum level of compliance, and providing sufficient
incentives to private investment, while avoiding placing an undue burden on poor
people.
Whatever the specifics, tax policy is prone to attract political controversy because it
invariably creates self-aware winners and losers (stakeholders whose tax liability
drops and others whose liability goes up). Tax reform is one of the fiscal policy
"battlefields" on which "wars of attrition" over monetary and fiscal policy change
are fought between societal groups with conflicting interests. While public sector
officials might prefer to avoid such conflicts, serious tax reforms invariably
produce controversy. Civil society participation can help resolve these battles.
For example, Australia wrestled for years to find a better way to raise public
revenue, but the debate floundered over whether to shift to a broad-based
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consumption tax. A civil society forum in 1996,the National Tax Reform Summit,
was instrumental in moving the debate forward, demonstrating that participatory
processes can facilitate "tough" decisions. The gridlock broken, Parliament soon
voted for a New Tax System that took effect in 2000 (Brinkerhoff & Goldsmith
2001).
This suggests that, for many countries, the first steps for increasing participation in
tax policy need to focus on information dissemination and transparency regarding
existing tax procedures. Such an approach involves several targets. First, it means
encouraging tax authorities to pay closer attention to their relations with citizens,
and engage in a more systematic and broader outreach. Most public sector reform
programs already do this (including those in the United States where the IRS has
been singled out for improvement along these lines). Second, it includes capacity
building in the media to raise the quality of reporting on tax issues. Third, it aims
to selectively strengthen the advocacy of CSOs that have an existing or nascent
interest in tax policy. Most 'poor' countries are unlikely to have single-issue
advocacy groups devoted to tax issues, as found in OECD countries. Still, tax
issues can be taken on by organisations that have a broader economic policy
agenda, such as DISHA in India or the Institute for Democracy in South Africa
(IDASA).
3.5.2Participation in Expenditure Policy
The participation of taxpayers is not restricted to the receipts side of public finance
but can involve the expenditure side as well. Brinkerhoff and Goldsmith (2001)
point out that government spending is the flipside of tax policy, and participation
on this issue mirrors participation on the levying of taxes. Once again, the
composition of the budget affects low-income people directly. They tend in most
countries to be heavy users of government social services, and service delivery
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inefficiencies, skewed distribution of services, or cutbacks in service levels can
have an immediate and negative impact on them. The overall level of public
spending also affects them, but usually more indirectly through impacts on
macroeconomic aggregates.
Governments in developing and transitioning countries typically have to walk a
budgetary tightrope, and the well-documented experience with structural
adjustment demonstrates the problems, tensions, and pitfalls of maintaining this
balancing act. Because governments everywhere need the support of their
constituents to remain in power, there is a universal tendency to spend more rather
than less to assure support and popularity. HIPC country governments have little
choice but to cut down on what they spend, although it is difficult to determine
where cuts should be made. Public officials face resistance from all groups that
bear the brunt of fiscal discipline-whether that be government workers whose
pay is cut, businesses that lose tariff protection and other subsidies, or rural
producers who have to pay international market prices for agricultural inputs.
While technical arguments enter into the debate, ultimately political bargaining
will resolve the question of which groups make which sacrifices.
Because fiscal policy is so politically charged, governments have tended to manage
the policy process by seeking to insulate policy makers from outside pressures.
From the point of view of government, opening the budget debate to increased
popular input raises three main concerns: a) participation will discourage fiscal
discipline; b) it will raise citizens' expectations regarding resource allocation and
subject government to demands it cannot meet; and c) it will set off conflictual,
divisive, and potentially destabilising political dynamics. While in some cases
these fears may be valid, evidence exists to suggest that they may be overstated. At
the very least, there are approaches and tools, many of which are already being
used in Participatory Poverty Assessments (PPAs) and Country Assistance
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Strategies, to help offset the potentially negative
participation can have (Brinkerhoff & Goldsmith 2001).
A tax system is part of the public sector. In fact, to put it differently, taxes are a
impact that
public institution, and therefore the quality of the public sector depends on the
quality of the tax system. The next section covers the relationship between a tax
system and the quality of the public sector.
3.6 TAX SYSTEMS AND QUALITY OF THE PUBLIC SECTOR
A high quality public sector requires an efficient tax system, and an expenditure
system that minimizes inefficient and unproductive spending (Tanzi 2000:4).
According to Tanzi implementing public policies is only possible if resources are
raised through taxation. Thus there is a need for an appropriate system to collect
taxes. And, of course, there is a need for institutions that will spend the money and
keep track of that spending.
Taxation is a traditional institution of the state. The state fulfils its role through the
set of rules, laws, and institutions that guide and make up the public sector (Tanzi
2000: 7). The higher the quality of the public sector, the easier it will be for the state
to fulfil its role. By the quality of the public sector is meant here the characteristics
that allow the state to pursue its objectives in the most efficient way. Although it is
difficult to separate the two, the quality of the public sector is not necessarily the
same thing as the quality of economic policy. A high quality public sector is simply
the instrument that facilitates the formulation and the implementation of the
government's policies. A good public sector makes it easier for the government to
pursue good policies. But, even a high-quality public sector cannot guarantee
consistently good economic policies because it cannot prevent policy makers from
occasionally pursuing poor policies.
http://scholar.sun.ac.za/
64
However, one would hesitate to say that a country's public sector is of a high
quality if poor policies are frequently pursued, and one would expect to find a
high correlation between the qualities of the public sector, as defined here, and the
quality of economic policy. In other words, over time a high quality public sector is
likely to promote good policies and a low quality public sector is likely to promote
poor policies. The quality of the public sector is signified by the quality of public
institutions.
3.6.1 Quality of public institutions
The quality of the public sector may be adversely affected by the absence of some
essential institutions, or by the poor performance of the existing institutions. For
example, in may countries, there are no institutions responsible for enforcing
competition or for forcing full disclosure on the part of financial institutions, or for
requiring the publication of good accounts on the part of enterprises whose shares
are traded in the stock market. As a consequence the market may function less well
because of cronyism and monopoly powers or because of lack of essential
information.
The performance of public institutions depends on many factors including (a)
tradition and reputation; (b) the resources they have available and the discretion
over their use; (c) the clarity of their mandate; (d) their organizations; (e) the
incentives that they face; (f) the quality of their leadership and staff; and (g) the
freedom they have over organisational matters (Tanzi 2000:10).
Tax administration is one fundamental example of such institutions. lts
performance will depend, in part, on its tradition and its reputation. A tax
administration that has been efficient, honest, and proud in the past is likely to
continue to be so in the future unless it faces truly fundamental shocks. By the
same token it is very difficult in the short run to change a corrupt and inefficient
administration. lts performance will also depend on the resources that it has
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available to hire capable employees and to pay good salaries, to invest in new
computer technology, to carry out necessary audits and so on. The clarity of its
mandate - for example, to enforce fairly and objectively the tax laws - is important.
lts day-to-day independence from political pressures is essential.
Tanzi (1995:15) acknowledges that when the mandate becomes unclear, either
because the laws are not transparent or because the institution is subjected to
political interference that forces it to accommodate the special circumstances of
some taxpayers, problems develop. This, for example, has been the case in some
transition economies and in some developing countries.
In these countries, according to Tanzi (1995:18),political interference has reduced
the quality of the tax administration. The organisation of the tax administration is
also important and so is the set of incentives that it faces. If an institution is poorly
organised, or if good or bad performances are compensated equally, the
contribution of this institution to the quality of the public sector will be low.
There are current attempts to strengthen incentives by making tax administration
politically independent like central banks, and by negotiating explicit contracts
between the government and the tax administration that require quantitatively
specified performances. InAustralia, for example, the government guarantees that
the tax administration will receive a given level of resources over a three-year-
period. In exchange the tax administration commits itself to delivering specified
outcomes and some quantified outputs.
A discussion on enforcement mechanisms and control would not be complete if
two fundamental points were not made. The first is the weakness of the cash
accounting approach that has traditionally characterized the measuring of the
operation of the government, in providing support for efficiency controls. The
second is the developing field of measuring consumer reaction and preferences
with respect to the services rendered by public agencies. Before addressing these
two points, it is important to mention that any concept of quality of government
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services must be related to the cost of those services and to the resources
available to deliver them. The more resources that are available, the better the
quality that one could expect public services to have.
To insure the implementation of tax reform policies, there must be concurrent
reform in the public sector aimed at creating public institutions of high quality that
are capable of policy implementation and tax collection as well as public resource
management. Essentially, high quality in the public sector with regard to the
implementation of tax reforms must reflect new values in public resource
management. These values include public entrepreneurship, accountability,
transparency, representation, efficiency and effective management. Moral and
administrative values such as social equity, rule of law and a culture of
constitutionalism are also paramount (Schwella et al, 1999: 16-17). Quality public
institutions in tax administration therefore exemplify a good tax system. We
review the characteristics of good taxation below.
3.7 PROPERTIES OF GOOD TAXATION
Adam Smith is one of the pre-industrial tax analysts who by 1776 had defined four
qualities of taxation, namely, equity, certainty, convenience and efficiency. The
idea is that each tax system should be scrutinized on the basis of these four
principles (Nobes & James 1997/98: 17).
Black et al (1999: 118) have in turn identified the following four properties of 'good
tax': it is equitable, economically efficient, administratively efficient, and flexible.
The authors regard these four properties as the criteria for designing any tax
system. Inother words there can be different tax systems, which are amended over
time, but the evaluating standard will always be whether the particular tax system
is founded on the pillars of promoting the fair and equitable treatment of all
taxpayers, is shaped in a way that does not distort economic behavior, is
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administratively less costly in terms of enforcement and compliance, and is
flexible enough to reflect the dynamic characteristics of the economy.
3.7.1 Equity
Equity is an evaluating indicator of whether the tax burden is being shared fairly in
the society (Gildenhuys 1993:224). Tax analysts have designed some principles to
evaluate the principle of equity. Prominent are the ability to pay principle
followed by the benefit principle. Adam Smith (1776), as quoted in Black et al
(1999:119),said of the responsibility to pay tax, that "The subjects of every state ought
to contribute towards the support of the government as nearly is possible to their respective
abilities, that is in proportion to the revenue which they respectively enjoy under protection
of state".
Equity is a common term in political and humanistic studies, but the thrust of its
meaning concerns the relationship among men and between men and state.
Quoting from Black law dictionary, Gildenhuys (1993:224) defines equity as "the
spirit and habit of fairness and justice and right dealing which would regulate intercourse
of men with men - the rule of doing to all others, as we desire them to do us, or as it is
expressed by the Justinian, to live honestly to harm no body, to render every man his due
"
Mohr, Fourier and Associates (1996:445) conclude that equity is always a
contentious issue. The matter is complicated further by the fact that we often do
not know who actually bears the burden of taxation. Part of or the entire burden
can sometimes be shifted to other participants in the economy.
3.7.2 Benefit principle
Mohr, Fourie and Associates (1996: 120) refer to the benefit principle as the factor
which requires the tax burden to be apportioned to the taxpayers in accordance
with the benefits each receives from government expenditure. Gildenhuys (1993)
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calls the benefit principle an endeavor to apply market principles in determining
the price of public goods and services. But the scope for applying the benefit
principle to government funding is restricted; government provides public goods
and services, which characteristically are non-rival and non-excludable.
According to Nobes and James (1997/98: 78-79), the benefit approach in taxation is
unlikely to be applicable, because of two reasons. First, how do you determine who
benefits more from the service? For example, how can you determine who benefits
more than others from defense and security. The second reason concerns
redistribution; sometimes government expenditures are designed in a
straightforward fashion for the redistribution of incomes. For example, in order to
supplement old age pensions government raises funds through taxation; but the
taxpayer does not benefit from it. The threat here is that, if the benefit principle is
applied, the government will not be able to provide such services.
Aronson and Schwartz (in Gildenhuys 1993), explain that the benefit principle
helps to clarify both the expenditure and tax side of government activities. The
benefit principle is applicable to the allocation of quasi-collective goods and
services, and the corresponding model of taxation is the 'user charge'.
3.7.3 Ability to pay principle
The ability to pay principle defines equity in the process of taxation according to
the financial ability of the taxpayer. The principle insists that people should pay
tax according to their ability. It has two dimensions, namely horizontal and vertical
equity. Horizontal equity requires that people in the same position should be taxed
equally, while vertical equity requires that people in different positions should be
taxed differently. At this level of equity the rich are expected to pay more than the
poor although all of them will have equal rights to the public goods.
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Black et al (1999: 121-122) point out difficulties in the implementation process.
The ability to pay principle requires public consensus and indicators, measures
and criteria to determine paying ability. Traditionally, the measures that have been
used include income tax, consumption tax, and wealth and utility taxes.
3.7.4 Types of Taxes
Tax bases that have eventually developed for the levying of different types of tax
differ from one country to another. The most well known ones include income tax,
sales tax or consumption tax, and wealth or property tax.
3.7.4.1 Income taxation
Income tax is based on three levels of valuation, namely personal income,
cooperate income, and capital gains taxation. Income tax, like many other taxes,
emerged during the mercantilist stages of state formation. It was introduced in
Britain for the first time in 1779 to finance the war with Napoleon. When peace
resumed the tax was abolished in 1802. The tax was reintroduced in 1842 and
remained forever since (Nobes & James 1997/97: 149-150). Income tax is composed
of tax on individual or company income, and some countries have a capital gains
tax where the increase in the value of assets is taxed (Black et al, 1999:154).
3.7.4.1.1.Personal/individual income tax
Personal income is known as gross income, which is technically made up of
receipts and accruals (e.g. wages, salaries, dividends, rents and royalties and
interests). Gross income, before being taxed, has to undergo an accounting process
of calculating taxable income from an individual gross income. The taxable income
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is arrived at after deducting all exemptions and deductions provided by
the law (Blacket al, 1999:159).
Income taxation holds another version of 'tax expenditures'. These are
'expenditures' in the sense of forgone taxes, which are normally caused by the
loopholes within the legislation. These include exclusions, exemptions, deductions
and rebates. Exclusions are effected when some form of non-cash income such as
payments in kinds are excluded from the tax base. Exemption is a type of tax
expenditure that is common in administration whereby certain persons or groups
of people are declared exempted from paying income tax, like soldiers, religious
officials and others. It is regarded as a method of providing tax relief to the poor
and aged. Deductions occur when a certain type of expenditure is excluded from
tax liability as a part of personal income tax, for example, medical expenses. Tax
rebates involve the subtraction of a specified amount from the tax to be paid (i.e.
from taxable income).
3.7.4.1.2.Company Taxation
Individuals who pay taxes may own companies, but governments tax these
companies separately from personal incomes. Certain reasons are advanced for
this (Blacket al, 1999:168):
• From a legal point of view companies are taxed as separate entities
because the law recognizes them as a legal personalities. They function as
independent institutions with their own identities.
• Companies receive benefits from the government, which include security
and protection and a business environment. They utilize these services in
an individual capacity. These public services are financed through
taxation. So a company's income becomes liable for taxation.
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• Companies are taxed separately from shareholders in
order to control the possibility of tax avoidance. If companies were not
taxed shareholders would decide to retain their personal incomes in the
companies, thus limiting their liability to personal income taxation.
Company shareholders are amongst the group of high-income earners,
and taxing of companies gives effect to the principle of ability to pay.
• Company taxation is administratively simple especially in developing
countries that have a limited capacity for the administration of income tax.
3.7.4.2. Property Taxation
Under personal income taxation tax is levied on an individual's income, while
under property taxation tax is levied on the property owned by the individual.
Technically the two differ in two respects; one is that income tax is levied on the
flow of resources, while property tax is levied on a stationary resource, that is
taxation of stock. Assessing the two tax bases depends on different financial
reports. For wealth/property tax, the tax assessor refers to a financial statement -
the balance sheet (or the statement of the financial position at one moment in time)
- whereas in assessing the income tax base the assessor depends on information
provided by the income statement (or statement of profit and loss for a given
period of time (Sommerfeld et a11979:2).
Property tax is divided into two categories: personal property (furniture, motor
vehicles, shares, bonds and bank deposits), and real property (land and capital
invested in the improvement of land). Land means farming, residential,
commercial and renting land. The capital aspect of land taxation involves farm
buildings, homes and business buildings.
According to Rosen and Skinner (in Black et al, 1999:190), property tax is an
unpopular type of taxation for the following reasons:
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• Property taxation is a tax on unrealised capital income, which
may cause solvency and liquidity problems for some taxpayers.
• The burden of the land part of a property tax is on the owner of the
property at the time of taxation. Since land ownership is mostly
concentrated in the hands of a few property owners and ownership is
often coupled with political power, the tax is fiercely resisted.
• Land tax increases the risks of farming, which is already subject to external
risks and seasonal fluctuations in income.
• Property tax requires much administrative input, for properties to be
accurately identified and valued.
3.7.4.3 Indirect Taxes
Indirect taxes are type of taxes, which are imposed on commodities and are
realized through market transactions. Their main characteristic is that the tax
burden falls on the consumer. Originally this type of tax is collected from the
salesman or a merchant, who transfers the tax burden to the consumer through
price increase (Nobes & James 1997/98, Black et al, 1999, and Mhro, Fourie &
Associates 1996). With income tax a taxpayer pays a tax directly based on the
source of income and uses. Under commodity taxation a taxpayer pays tax through
consumption. While an indirect tax is paid through commodity exchange, the
direct tax is paid directly by an individual, company or a household. Indirect taxes
include VAT, excise and sales duties.
3.7.4.4Advantages of indirect taxation
Indirect taxation is based on the benefit principle. One of its advantages is that it is
able to bring into tax nets those small incomes that could not be covered by the
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income tax system. Most small incomes operate outside of the tax net,
because of being earned from informal sectors, and thus are difficult to calculate.
According to Black et al (1999:96), it was only through the purchase of
commodities that these sectors can be taxed.
Indirect taxation is levied on consumption, allowing the consumer to substitute a
higher taxable consumption for a lower one. There is thus a chance for the
consumer to make a choice. For example, if imported beer is highly taxed and thus
expensive, the consumer has the chance of opting for a locally produced beer.
Consumption taxes can be used to achieve multiple objectives (Black et al, 1999:
196). It can be used to correct market failures such as externalities, by means of
increasing or lowering taxes. It can also be used as deterrent and for protection
measures. For example consumption tax is used for environmental protection
when those commodities which have an environmental impact, are highly taxed to
discourage their use. The same applies to health issues. It is common today for
taxes on tobacco to be very high in many countries as a way of discouraging
smoking.
Nonetheless, indirect tax is regarded as unprogressive as it contributes to reducing
the work effort of a taxpayer. The assumption here is that the opportunity of
purchasing luxury goods is an incentive for hard work, but because of indirect
taxation the taxpayer will be opting for cheap consumption while reducing the
interest to work. Additional to that, indirect tax rates may encourage smuggling.
Indirect taxation has some other recommendation as a tool used by the
government to regulate trade relations. Several countries use consumption tax to
protect local products against imported ones by imposing higher taxes on
imported products while lessening tax on locally produced products. This helps in
promoting the market for local products thus promoting local industry.
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Indirect taxation is preferred by the tax authorities in developing countries
because of its being relatively simple to administer compared to income tax.
Indirect taxes also provide limited scope for tax evasion. Enforcement of
compliance is therefore easier. However, according to Gildenhuys (1993:231-232)
tax on consumption has a regressive effect, in that it hurts the poor proportionally
more than the rich.
Conversely the progressivity of commodity taxation is challenged in other
quarters. Black et al (1999:196)observe that the broad based taxes on goods tend to
be regressive. The reason is that consumption declines when income increases.
This has led to the exemption from indirect taxation or zero rating of certain basic
consumer goods and services.
3.7.4.5User Charges
Besides taxes, sources of government revenue include user charges or benefit taxes
- administrative fees, borrowing and government-induced inflation. User charges
are prices charged for public goods or services normally delivered by the
government. User charges take the form of a market mechanism, but these charges
are levied in the political market (Black et al, 1999: 113). Gildenhuys (1993: 361)
defines user charges as amounts of money paid for the use of public goods
containing both collective and quasi-collective services. User charges is a source of
finance to the government that serves to finance the operational cost of the public
services.
User charges are the result of transactions within the public sector whereby an
individual is required to pay an amount of money in exchange for public goods
and services delivered. This type of taxation places government in a contractual
market relationship with taxpayers (Black et al, 1999:210). The user charge is not a
form of commercialization of public services, but the application of market
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principles in the management of public resources, where the supplied
goods change from being non-rival to rival and competitive. Both government and
the people will be able to make efficient decisions on consumption and supply
based on the cost margin principle.
Mohr, Fourie & Associates (1996:432) state that public goods supplied under user
charges are less than public, although not totally private either; thus they have a
mixed character. Rivalry for the use of public goods due to government's limited
capacity for supply is limited by means of user charges. For example, public library
services can elicit rivalry and competition when there is congestion at admission
points and this excludes some people from the service. According to the benefit
principle of taxation, user charges are usually benefit taxes that are levied where
such exclusion is possible.
3.7.5Commodity taxation in Africa
It is a given fact that African economies rely heavily on consumption taxation.
Shalizi and Squire (1988:2)therefore propose that the distortion cost of these taxes
should be reduced in order to strengthen their ability to generate revenue for Sub-
Saharan countries. The following should be done in this regard:
• Broad-based consumption taxes such as general sales tax and Value-
Added Taxes are to be used as the main mechanism to generate revenues.
• Specific taxes such as excise duties should be used to add a degree of
progressivity to commodity taxes and to compensate for deductions.
• Limited import duties to provide protection are required to protect
domestic producers.
• Most export taxes must be eliminated where possible (Shalizi & Squire
1988:6).
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3.8 EFFICIENT TAX SYSTEM
A tax system is evaluated for economic efficiency by referring to the degree to
which the imposed tax influences the normal functioning of the economy. The
response of consumers and producers, the ability to apply the resources at their
disposal to meet consumption, or the ability to employ the available factors of
production should not be influenced unproportionally by the tax system.
Blumenthal (2000: 351) defined a good tax system as one that achieves three
objectives namely simplicity, efficiency, and equity. An ideal tax system does not
distort economic behavior, is borne in a fair manner by differently situated
taxpayers, and is easy to understand and comply with. Failing in any of these
respects may result in an incomprehensive tax system that turns out to be an
additional burden to the taxpayers and their resources, thus limiting the chance for
voluntary compliance.
Adam Smith in 1776 identified four elements that hamper the efficiency of
taxation, namely the use of an excessive number of tax officers; inflicting penalties
on the tax payers; abstracting the tax payer's industry; and finally the frequent
visits to and odious examinations of tax payers. All of these account for the burden
of taxation. Nobes & James (1997/97: 20-21) group these elements into three
categories: the excess burden of taxation; administrative cost and compliance cost.
3.8.1The Excess Burden
Taxation is a process of transferring the spending power from the taxpayer to the
government, a process that widely impacts on the tax community. It affects the
consumer and producer's choice. This occurs on two levels; first there is the change
in income status of a taxpayer, and second there is the substitution effect. Taxation
can reduce the income status of the taxpayer but this cannot necessarily distort the
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economy, but when the taxpayer decides to substitute the patterns of
consumption because of the tax structure, by shifting from highly taxed
commodities to lower taxed ones, or the producers decide to change the
employment of factors of production in response to taxes, it distorts economic
behavior and tax becomes less efficient.
For example, if a higher tax is imposed on margarine than on butter, consumers
will shift to butter, while the producer will have to follow the same pattern or will
be deprived of the market (Nobes & James, 1997/98: 23). The excess burden in
taxation is a violation of the principle of tax neutrality. The principle of tax
neutrality requires that people should not be influenced by the tax system in
choosing one course of economic action rather than another solely or
predominantly because of their tax position. Inprinciple neutrality entails a neutral
tax system, which is required to minimize the impact of tax rates on the economy
(Gildenhuys, 1993:223).
3.8.2Administrative Efficiency
In an equal way administration of taxation makes for excess burden. Collecting
revenue is a costly exercise that must be carried out by the government. But on the
other side a taxpayer incurs costs to process tax payments, hire specialists to help
complete tax returns, and communicate with tax authorities. These are called
compliance costs. The administrative efficiency of any tax system entails the
minimizing of the administrative cost of taxation while also minimizing the
compliance cost on the side of taxpayers.
The two elements, administrative cost and compliance cost, also have a direct
relationship with two other problems in tax administration: tax avoidance and tax
evasion (Black et al, 1999:143).Tax avoidance is defined as a legal manipulation by
a taxpayer to avoid liability to pay tax through finding loopholes in the tax system.
http://scholar.sun.ac.za/
78
Sometimes this offence is supported by poorly drafted legislation. Tax evasion
is illegal and consists of an action that contravenes tax laws. The most common
forms of evasion are underfeporting of income and claiming more deductions than
warranted. Tax evasion is quite prevalent in the informal sector. Good tax
administration therefore requires that tax evasion and tax avoidance be kept at
minimum level. For this purpose the golden rules in tax design are simplification
of laws and procedures, and minimization of incentives for tax delinquency.
Penalties for tax evasion should be high and actively enforced.
When evaluating taxes according to the criterion of administrative efficiency a
number of other issues should also be considered including the level of community
literacy and community tax morality. In order for taxpayers to be willing to part
with their hard-earned incomes, they must be convinced of the equitable
distribution of the tax burden as well as the returns expected to be accrued through
public goods provision (Blacket al, 1999:144).Political will to enforce tax laws and
a spirit of transparence in tax valuation and collection are elements supporting
efficient tax administration.
There are seven diagnostic tests for an efficient tax system: high concentration
indexes, a low erosion of the index, a low collection lag, a low specificity index, a
high objectivity index, reasonable penalties and finally, low cost of collection
(Tanzi 1991:164).
Concentration index
Efficient performance of the tax system is expected to be realized from few taxes
and tax rates. The concept of a concentration index refers to collecting a large share
of total tax revenue from few sources. It is more transparent and easy to manage.
Dispersion index
The dispersion index means that in order for any tax system to be efficient it needs
to contain the mushrooming of nuisance taxes. According to Tanzi, small and
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nuisance taxes obfuscate the tax system by making the analysis difficult
while becoming costly for the taxpayer's compliance.
Erosion index
The erosion index of a tax system originates from either legal actions (tax holidays,
exemptions, deductions and exonerations) or from illegal actions such as tax
evasion and smuggling. The erosion of a tax index is a challenge to tax revenue
generation to the extent that the government is thereby compelled to raise the tax
rate in order to compensate the losses of eroded tax bases. Automatically this
affects the concentration index while inviting more tax avoidance and evasion.
Therefore a good tax system must keep the erosion index at minimum.
Collection lag index
A tax system cannot be efficient if the process of tax collection is dominated by lags
in tax collection. This occurs in different tax systems either because of the tax laws
that allow lags in paying tax, or because of the delinquency of the taxpayer.
Specificity index
Another test for the soundness of a tax system is the degree to which the system
relies on specific taxes such as ad valorem. These types of taxes according to Tanzi
(1990: 161) must be minimized in order to have an effective tax system.
Objective indexes
The efficiency of a tax sys tern will be affected by the objectivity with which it is
levied and measured.
Enforcement index
The effectiveness of a tax system is further marked by its capacity for enforced
compliance. When tax compliance is not enforced, the divergence between the
statutory and effective tax system may become so large that the legal tax system
loses its meaning. So an effective tax system will be determined by the effective
http://scholar.sun.ac.za/
80
application of enforcement measures such as penalties, education and
information services, monitoring of compliance and others.
Cost of collection
The cost of collecting tax should be relatively low to justify the efficiency of the
system of tax collection. By and large tax collection depends on the structure of a
tax system. It must also take into account other related issues. Size and
geographical configuration of the country, the number of inhabitants, level of
literacy in the country and the standard of accounting and bookkeeping contribute
to the cost of collection.
3.8.3 Inefficient Tax Administration
It is true that several tax systems have failed to realize their objectives because of
inefficiencies in tax administration. Corruption, poor record keeping, and
incompetent staff, lack of equipment and unfavorable tax procedures and
regulations, blurred their performances. At the end of the day, according to Tanzi
(1995:2), such tax administration reduces tax revenue, creates distortions or non-
neutralities in the tax system and introduces different kinds of inequities through
the tax system, for example between the honest citizen and tax evaders.
According to Tanzi (1995) there are five causes of inefficient tax administration: tax
laws themselves which appear to be complex and opaque demanding difficult
information from the tax payer; inefficiency originating from the political system,
whereby the policy makers legislate and make decisions on a tax system in a
biased manner; lack of the necessary degree of professionalism; and lack of a clear
strategy for improving efficiency.
There are different things that contribute to lack of professionalism: lack of a
proper rewarding system; approaching administration as routine work in
performing tasks in hand; where salaries are low and do not differentiate between
bad and good workers; where tax inspectors are not above accepting bribes for
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preferential treatment; and political interference in tax administration (Tanzi
1995:3); lack of a clear strategy for reforming tax administration; and the economic
system.
3.9 EFFECTIVE TAX SYSTEM
A tax system is the set of institutions and policies that determine the process of
taxation in the country. In economic terms a good tax system characteristically
needs to be fair to the taxpayers and to the government, and is required to be
consistent with macroeconomic policies (Nobes & James 1997/98: 132). A tax
system is also referred to as the interrelationship between structures and tax
administration (Gillis 1989:8).All in all there are different attributes of a tax system
that cause the unraveling of efficiency and effectiveness of taxation both in public
economics and public finance. Ariyo (1997:8) has commented that in both
developing and developed countries the tax structure has a direct relationship with
economic growth and development. And for that matter the tax system is a major
determinant of other macroeconomic indexes.
Tanzi (1991:158)has outlined what he calls the characteristics of an effective tax
system. In his analysis he points out that a tax system is divided into two lines of
analysis, one is statutory and another is effective tax. The statutory tax system is
provided by the law, but is not regarded as an effective system until the
administrative inputs are made to implement the system. Therefore an effective tax
system is an evaluating factor for the implementation of tax laws and policies.
A tax system is further threefold in character. Tanzi (1995:1)describes a country's
tax system as something that can be analyzed in terms of statistical, statutory, and
effective ways. The statistical description allocates actual tax revenue and provides
an impression of the revenue importance of various tax bases and tax rates; the
statutory description is one found in the codes, tax laws and tax regulations; the
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effective descriptions is based on economic reality taking into account all
the distortions caused by tax evasion, tax avoidance, misapplication of laws,
abuses on the part of tax officials and so forth.
In the next section we see how an efficient and effective tax system is translated
into effective and efficient tax compliance.
3.10 TAX ADMINISTRATION AND COMPLIANCE
Usually the term tax compliance is used in terms of the degree to which a taxpayer
complies with a tax law (Nobes & James 1997/98: 137). No tax system can function
effectively without the cooperation of the majority of taxpayers. Compliance
therefore means the cooperation of a taxpayer in the taxation process. The broader
definition of tax compliance would be the degree to which a taxpayer complies
with tax law, and administration without the need of enforcement activity (Nobes
& James 1997/98:138).
The US Internal Revenue Service defined tax compliance in a framework consisting
of reporting and that a compliant tax payer files all required taxes at the proper
time, that the returns accurately report tax liability, and that it is in accordance
with internal revenue codes and other regulations and court decision as applicable
at the time and are adhered to (Hasseldine 2000:299). Kinsey in Hasseldine (2000)
defines non-compliance with tax laws as the intentional or unintentional failure of
taxpayers to meet their tax obligation. In any case, compliance and non-compliance
are the result of behavioral patterns of taxpayers in the process of taxation. There
are certain patterns of non-compliance such as:
• Non-compliance is wide spread.
• Non-compliance includes unreported income, overstated subtractions, not
filling in tax returns and calculation errors.
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• Not all instances of non- compliance are in the taxpayer's
favor. There are sometimes an over reporting of income and sometimes a
taxpayer does not claim the deductions which she or he is entitled to.
• Most instances of non-compliance involve small amounts (Hasseldine
2000:301).
In the process of insuring compliance, tax administration is required to provide a
service to the taxpayer to meet his/her compliance objectively, improving tax
payers' confidence, easing the burden of compliance, and dealing with tax law
complexity (Le Baube & Vehorn 1992:310).
The argument of assisting taxpayers is regarded as a function of government in the
process of taxation. Adam Smith in early days referred to this as an important area
of government objectives in taxation:
• To support those citizens who wish to comply with tax laws by making
compliance as easy as possible.
• To minimize the amount of public and private resources diverted to other
uses in order to ensure that taxes are well collected.
• To strive through education to increase the number of willing compliers
(Le Baube & Vehorn 1992:310).
In this regard tax administration has three responsibilities (Silvan, 1992 in Bird &
De Juntscher, 1992:8). The first is to facilitate tax compliance by providing a service
to the taxpayers, by providing them with clear instructions, clear forms, and clear
information. Second is the monitoring of compliance, by establishing and
maintaining the current account of taxpayers and management of information
systems covering both ultimate taxpayers and third party agents such as banks by
maintaining appropriate and prompt procedures in detecting non-filers. Thirdly,
tax administration must deal with non-compliance.
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Silvan (1992) further emphasizes that the main goal of tax administration is to
foster voluntary tax compliance. Penalizing tax evaders or going after delinquents
are not in themselves objectives of tax administration, voluntary compliance must
be encouraged irrespective of the good performance of the administration. The two
levels of differentiation, enforced and voluntary compliance, are the test of
functionability of tax administration in utilization of the enforcement resources.
Voluntary compliance is similar to self-enforced compliance, which mostly is
achieved through civic education measures and building of trust between
taxpayers and the tax authority. Radian and Sharkansy (1990: 106) regard
voluntary compliance as central to tax policy, at the same time being an instrument
of the tax administration to collect taxes from large masses of taxpayers. These two
tax analysts state that without voluntary compliance the process of eliciting taxes
from large masses would overwhelm tax agencies.
According to Silvan, voluntary compliance does not deprecate the use of penalties
in tax administration. He emphasizes that taxpayers will comply effectively if they
believe that not doing so will mean that they can await the substantial risk of being
penalized in a relatively severe fashion. Of course, administratively there are also
other factors expected to be in operation for the tax administration to sustain
voluntary compliance that has a low cost for the taxpayer to comply and for the
government to enforce. These factors would include fairness, simplicity of laws
and procedures. These and others are provided by effective tax administration.
3.10.1 Effective & Efficient Compliance
Silvan in Bird & De Junstscher (1992: 275), when distinguishing between effective
and efficient tax administration, maintains that the maximum level of voluntary
compliance is the reflection of the effectiveness of tax administration. By the same
token, the level of enforcing compliance at the minimum rate will determine the
efficiency of tax administration.
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In countries characterized by non- compliance, the ability of tax
administration to impose effective penalties is a key to shaping the behavior of
taxpayers. Silvan (1992) identifies some common shortcomings found in non-
compliance areas:
• Unregistered taxpayers: This originates from the gap between registered
taxpayers and potential taxpayers.
• Taxpayers who do not fill in tax returns: This is reflected in the difference
between registered taxpayers and potential tax according to the law.
• Tax evaders: This is the difference between the tax reported by the
taxpayers and the potential tax according to the law.
• Delinquent taxpayers: This is the gap between the amount of taxes
taxpayers are reported as owing and that which the tax administration
may eventually assess.
The above four reasons for shortfalls in tax revenue provide indicators to evaluate
the effectives of tax administration for compliance. The objective data must be
looked at to estimate the degree of effectiveness displayed by the administration
dealing with each gap. In any case the issue here is not only to ensure that the
shortfalls have been prevented but how administrations are effective in dealing
with it (Silvan in Bird & De Juntscher, 1992:275).
Etcheberry in Bird & De Juntscher (1992)when commenting on Silvan's shortfalls
adds another level of classifying non-compliance by classifying taxpayers
according to geographical areas, the economic activity they perform, and the size
or legal status of their business.
Among the tools mentioned by Silvan to deal with the above shortfalls are the
monitoring of the four situations in order to be able to identify where the gaps are,
tax auditing and an effective information system.
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3.10.2 Information System
Controlling the above examples of non-compliance entails introducing computer
equipment to improve the performance of tax administration. Yet according to
Silvan, computer technology has been in use in tax administration for a long time
but has failed to help realize the intended objectives because of unreliability. Many
developing countries have been spending millions on buying computer equipment
without being able to improve the effectiveness of their tax administration (Silvan
in Bird & De Juntscher, 1992: 300). The generic problems identified with the failure
of information systems in the developing countries include:
• The systems are not reliable; they produce a number of considerable
errors.
• Control is often done manually.
• There is no adequate follow-up for collecting delinquents' taxes.
• The use of TIN (tax identification number) is not reliable enough.
• An independent manual system is used to keep record of payment.
• Processes are duplicated because the same bits of information are
transcribed over and over again for different purposes.
• The systems are too rigid and incapable of swiftly adjusting to changes in
tax legislation.
• There are duplicates of files for documents.
• Statistics are not available timeously.
• There are no systems to support enforcement activities.
The above realities highlight the fact that tax administration does not function only
to collect revenue but also to provide the means how the revenue can be collected.
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Birds and De [untscher's argue that the best tax administration is not simply
one that collects most revenue, more important is how that revenue is raised -
taking into account the effect of the revenue generation effort on equity, on the
political fortunes of the government and on the level of economic welfare.
A poor quality tax administration may collect large amounts from easy to tax
sectors, such as wage earners, while it is unable to enforce taxes on business
enterprises and professionals. The level of collection is therefore a somewhat
unsophisticated measure of the effectiveness of tax administration. A more
accurate measure in tax administration is the size of the 'compliance gap' - that is,
the gap between actual and potential tax revenue - and how that gap varies among
the different sectors of the tax-paying population.
As we have seen from the above in chapters 1 and 3, tax administration is the
mainstream of a tax system. Birds and De Junstcher, referred to in chapters 1 and 3,
indicate that tax administration means the tax policy, so the tax system entails the
administrative behaviour of a tax system. The next section in detail therefore
examines what the reform of a tax administration entails.
3.11 REFORMING TAX ADMINISTRATION
A country's tax administration represents an institutional arrangement through
which citizens fulfill their obligation to the government. A tax administration
should strive to be both effective and efficient. A tax administration is effective
when all citizens attain a high level of compliance. Efficiency, as we saw above, is
achieved when the administrative cost of tax revenue is minimal. The government
is however frequently warned not to pursue efficiency at the expense of
effectiveness. Achieving a balance between efficiency and effectiveness or at least
moving towards it, must be the goal of tax administration reform (Tanzi 1995: lO-
ll).
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Tax administration covers a wide area and its impact is widely felt in a country.
It involves different aspects of government management, and economic and social
change. Reforming tax administration therefore requires careful analysis. Tanzi
(1995:5) identifies the basic elements for tax administration reforms as follows: an
explicit and sustained political commitment; a team of capable, hard-working
officials dedicated full time to tax administration reform; a well-defined and an
appropriate strategy; relevant training; additional resources or reallocation of
existing resources; and changes in incentives for both taxpayers and tax
administrators.
In the same vein, tax analysts Bird and De Juntscher (1992:3-4) have identified the
pre-conditions for the reform of a system of tax administration as: Simplification of
the tax system insuring that it can be applied effectively; a strategy and
comprehensive plan that assigns clear priorities to the task that must be
performed, tailored to the available resources; and commitment; commitment from
policy makers as well as managerial and technical support.
The above two versions of requirements for tax administration reforms have two
things in common, the internal dictates within the system of tax administration
and the influences emanating from the relationship between tax administration
and political structures in the country. Neither of the two can be addressed
without another (refer to topic of taxation and quality of public sector above).
Political commitment provides fertile ground for reforming tax administration
through the enactment of laws and adoption of reform policies. Political
commitment in this case means that the will and knowledge of policy makers are
profound for reforming tax administration. Likewise internal managerial capacity
that entails proper sets of plans and strategies for reforming the system of tax
administration, professional, well-motivated and trained technical and managerial
staff, capable of charting out the course of reforms, are indispensable elements.
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Reforming tax administration is a process that aims at achieving efficiency
and effectiveness in a tax administration. Tanzi describes how tax administration
reform has, by means of an intervention to improve effectiveness, measures to
improve efficiency of tax administration (Tanzi 1995:11-20).
3.11.1 Measures To Improve Effectiveness
For tax administration to be made effective Tanzi recommends five tools which can
be used by a tax authority: intervention to improve voluntary compliance;
adoption of the principle of self-assessment; taxpayers education; prompt detection
of tax filling and paying; and improvement of audit coverage.
Voluntary compliance - the primary goal of tax administration should be the highest
possible voluntary tax compliance. This is determined by how the administration
has employed scarce resources to identify instances of non-compliance, and taking
appropriate action.
Adoption of principle of self-assessment - this step entails empowering the taxpayers to
assess and pay tax liabilities according to prescribed procedures. Clear
instructions, procedures and sufficient encouragement are needed in order to
attain this objective, thus reform in tax administration must effectively address the
institutionalization of this ingredient.
Taxpayer education - taxpayers must be equipped with basic knowledge of who is to
be taxed, what she or he is to be taxed, how to pay taxes and how to calculate
his/her tax liabilities in order to carry out his/ her own tax self-assessment. This
can only be achieved through taxpayer education.
Prompt detection of tax filling and paying - a critical step in tax administration is the
prompt detection of taxpayers who fail to submit tax returns (stopfilers) and
taxpayers who fail to calculate correctly their tax liability on their tax return or
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make timely payment (delinquent taxpayers). A key function in tax
administration is to ensure that if taxpayers fail to comply, this is followed up by
means of notifying them, significant penalties, and other remedial actions. It is
important to convey the impression that, in this area, "big brother is watching".
Given the need for an accurate up-to-date register in order to detect stopfilers and
delinquent taxpayers, tax administration reform should establish whether there is
a problem with non-registration. This must include ensuring that all the businesses
are properly registered. Records of registered taxpayers must be examined in order
to detect suppliers or customers who are not registered taxpayers.
Tax administration reform should be guided by the need for adequate resources to
detect stopfilers and delinquent taxpayers. This encompasses the development and
implementation of a system for tax return processing and accounting that quickly
and accurately records taxpayers' transactions with the tax administration and
speedily identifies stopfilers and delinquent taxpayers (Tanzi 1995:12).
Improvement of audit coverage - Non-compliance extends beyond stopfiling and
delinquency to encompass fraudulent actions by taxpayers to understate their tax
liability in ways that cannot be detected in the collection process. In a modern tax
system it is critical for taxpayers to believe that if they engage in such fraudulent
actions, they will be caught and appropriately penalized. Also, it is important that
taxpayers be confident that their competitors are paying the same taxes so they
may compete fairly. This requires that an effective audit program be carried out by
the tax administration.
Taxpayer compliance depends to a significant degree on their belief in the
effectiveness of the audit program. Further, the chance of being audited will
appear greater, and compliance will be higher, if the actual details of the audit
program are not known. It is important that taxpayers believe that a larger
percentage of taxpayers are audited than is actually the case. This suggests a
rationale for the tax administration not to disclose the information regarding its
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audit selection strategy and the number of taxpayers to be audited in a
given period of time. Instead, the tax administration should promote the view that
a variety of factors may lead to an audit. Towards the end, the tax administration
should show taxpayers that it has both the information and the capacity to detect
violations.
An audit plan represents a strategy to detect violations as efficiently as possible
using the different types of audit with the resources available to the tax
administration. The plan should specify how many of the different types of audit
should be conducted each year in each local tax office, with the proportions
varying based on the registration of new taxpayers, business developments, and
the results of previous audits. The plan should reflect an analytical approach to
increasing the probability of detection. Specific strategies would likely vary from
year to year. For example, one year it may be decided to conduct a wide audit of
taxpayers in the same or similar business, say restaurants. In another year, more
audits might be conducted than usual on wholesalers ..
Application of adequate penalties - The tax system can be expected to function
smoothly and yield anticipated revenues only if adequate penalties are imposed
for violations that strike at the heart of the tax system, such as failure to file returns
and to pay tax on time. It is important that interest provisions for late tax payment
compensate the government for the time that the taxpayer had the use of the
government's revenue. The total interest cost of late tax payment should exceed the
interest rate for borrowing money - it should be less costly for the taxpayer to
borrow than to pay taxes, delaying tax payments, as a way to obtain cheap
financing from the government must be prevented. In addition, it must be accepted
that if registration and other requirements critical for a smooth functioning tax
system are adopted, adequate penalties should be applied for violations of these
requirements as well.
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The theoretical literature on tax evasion has often concluded that if
penalties are high enough, audit coverage can be limited. In a way, the literature
has suggested that there is a trade-off between administrative expenditure and size
of penalties. However, when the penalties are very high and audits are rare, the
penalties are unlikely to be fully enforced by the magistrates. Furthermore, the
taxpayers can appeal these sentences and delay for years the application of the
penalties. Thus, the penalties lose their deterrent value. Highly visible penalties
such as the closing of shops for a few days of a few weeks by government as was
done effectively in Argentina, Chile and Peru may bring better results.
3.11.2 Measures to Improve Efficiency of Tax Administration
Along with an overall strategy outlined above for enhancing effectiveness, tax
administrations can adopt a number of measures to focus their scarce resources in
the most efficient manner for revenue collection and enforcement. Tanzi (1995: 14-
20) presents the following measures as fundamental in order to attain the efficiency
in tax administration: Establishment of a Large Taxpayers Unit; adoption of a
threshold for tax registration; imposition of some form of alternative tax; use of
final withholding; use of banks; and organizational considerations.
3.11.2.1 Establishment of a Large Taxpayers Unit
The establishment of a Large Taxpayers Unit can be an effective initial step
towards an efficient tax administration. This special unit, possibly made up of an
elite group of better trained and less corruptible officials, monitors collection of
taxes from taxpayers who, although not large in number, account for the major
part, sometimes as high as 90 percent, of tax revenue from consumer taxes and
corporate income taxes. Such a unit can virtually guarantee the timely collection of
most tax revenue and the prompt identification of stopfilers and delinquent
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taxpayers so that appropriate action, including the imposition of penalties, can
be taken. A Large Taxpayers Unit can significantly reduce errors in tax
declarations and minimize delays in the collection of substantial amounts of
revenue due to errors, late filing and other violations. Such a unit properly focuses
in initial efforts in tax administration reform on the adoption of more efficient
procedures for the more important taxpayers, rather than on small taxpayers
whose revenue generation is not substantial.
A Large Taxpayers Unit serves as a model for the adoption and expansion of
modern tax administration practices for other taxpayers. Inmany countries, Large
Taxpayers Units were introduced as pilot projects, thus allowing the tax
administration to tryout new methods and technologies. The successful
implementation of such pilots demonstrates to the tax administration, which as a
bureaucracy tends to be resistant to change, that it is possible and advantageous to
modify procedures and systems. Inmany countries the Large Taxpayers Unit was
applied to progressively larger groups once these modem practices were tested.
For example, Argentina initially developed these new practices for a group of less
than 1000, but has since expanded the group to more than 200000.
Large Taxpayers Unit may include executing not just the collection, but also the
audit function, for several reasons. The detection of evasion is important for the
same reasons as the monitoring of compliance with filing and paying requirements
for large taxpayers. In addition, large taxpayers usually carry out a high volume of
transactions and have complex operations. They frequently have several branches
of operations and sometimes branches outside the country. They have skilled
accountants and lawyers, and may use forms of evasion that are difficult to detect,
such as transfer pricing. These characteristics of large taxpayers often make it
necessary to establish special monitoring units with highly specialized staff.
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3.11.2.2Adoption of a threshold for tax registration
In a modern economy, it is not feasible to collect all major taxes from every
economic enterprise. The accurate computation of tax liability by a taxpayer, and
its control by the tax administration, requires that the taxpayer be able to maintain
books and records of a certain minimum standard. Furthermore, for the system as
a whole to operate reasonably and effectively it is not necessary that every
enterprise should be liable to pay all taxes that apply to enterprises. For example,
the objective of the VAT is to impose a tax on the value of goods and services
consumed by individuals. This tax is collected from enterprises on the basis of their
value added (and also on imports), as a matter of convenience. In effect, although
such enterprises are specified as taxpayers in the VAT law, they are acting as "tax
collectors". The operation of such a system is not undermined significantly if
small-scale enterprises, which, even though their numbers may be very large,
account for small proportions to the value of goods supplied to final consumers,
are exempted from liability to pay the tax.
In most cases, in all VAT systems, small-scale enterprises are exempted from
liability to pay the tax. For this purpose, the most satisfactory measure of the size of
the enterprise is its annual turnover; those enterprises with turnover below a
certain threshold are not required to register as VAT taxpayers (though they may
be liable to pay other taxes, such as corporate income tax). This provision is
necessary to allow the tax administration to concentrate its limited resources for
controlling and monitoring the VAT on those taxpayers that account for the major
part of value added. The appropriate level for this threshold should be calculated
in such a way that potential VAT revenues are reduced by only a small percentage.
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3.11.2.3 Imposition of some form of alternative tax on small taxpayers
With the threshold proposed above, most small enterprises engaging in cash
transactions would not be liable, in principle, to pay VAT on their sales, and would
not receive any credit for VAT already paid on their purchases. Every country
finds it difficult to tax income (or value added) of small traders in an appropriate
manner. To assess the true level of income reasonably accurately when most
transactions are not recorded, can absorb considerable resources and the revenues
generated by this use of the tax administration's limited resources are likely to be
small.
Three main alternative solutions to this dilemma have been adopted in different
countries. The first is to levy an annual license fee on small traders, as a rough
substitute for liability to VAT, income tax, or both. Different license fees are often
set for different types of businesses. Such fees need to be set at a level high enough
to act as a reasonably fair substitute for income tax or VAT, but not so high as to
discourage enterprise.
The second approach is a "presumptive tax," under which the taxable income of
the small business is computed indirectly on the basis of certain objective
indicators, such as the value of goods for sale, the number of employees, total
wages paid, and the amount and type of physical assets. Estimating taxable income
on a presumptive basis can, however, require considerable effort on the part of the
tax administration.
The third general approach to taxing the incomes of small traders engaged
primarily in cash transactions relies on the withholding of tax on their purchases.
Inmany countries, imports by traders who are not registered for VAT, and sales of
goods to such traders by registered enterprises, are subject to a special withholding
tax, which is typically around two percent of the value of the purchase. Traders
who believe that the amount withheld by their suppliers exceed the liability on
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their value added have the option of registering for VAT and submitting
returns showing their actual VAT liability.
3.11.2.4 Use of final withholding
Withholding taxes on income when it is earned is a mechanism widely used in
developed and developing countries for collecting revenue with minimal use of
administration resources. Tax withholding is a very important mechanism given
the large volume of revenue collected through withholding in many countries. A
popular mechanism is wage withholding; commonly know as pay-as-you-earn
(PAYE), in which employers are withholding agents for personal income tax on the
earning of their employees. This shifts the tax administration's monitoring
responsibilities from a large number of individual taxpayers to a much smaller
number of employers, thus achieving a more efficient focusing of administrative
resources.
Taxes can be withheld on sources of income rather than wages by collecting from
the payer rather than the payee with the same efficiency gains. This includes
payments of interest by banks, dividend payments by companies to stockholders,
interest and dividend payments by mutual funds, and other like payments.
3.11.2.5 Use of banks
Banks have a natural role in the administration of taxes, as they constitute
institutions well suited for receiving tax payments. Banks are accustomed to
receiving payments and handling money, and are well equipped for this task. The
main tax administration services provided by banks entail the receipt of payment
forms, the receipts of money from taxpayers, the deposit of these monies into the
proper tax accounts, and the banks are also responsible for processing tax returns
combined with payment forms: this system has substantially improved the
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efficiency of payment. The responsibility for maintaining an accurate
record of taxpayers' transactions and enforcing the collection of taxes remains,
however, with the tax administration.
3.11.2.6Organizational considerations
The measures discussed above for improving the effectiveness and efficiency of tax
administration strongly influence the organization of the tax administration. Once
the tax administration determines its key functions, an organizational structure
should be adopted to support these functions. The discussion in the previous two
sections suggests the following five principal functions:
• Taxpayer education: staffs in this function are responsible for educating and
assisting taxpayers in tax matters. They distribute printed material that
explains tax regulations. They respond to inquiries from taxpayers. This is a
very important function that in the past often did not receive the attention
that it deserves. Countries such as Canada, New Zealand, and Trinidad and
Tobago provide good examples of successful taxpayer education.
• Registration, accounting and returns processing. Staffs in this function are
responsible for data entry and the processing of declarations and payments
processing. For instance, if a taxpayer uses the wrong tax rate, a computer
can detect the error and automatically send a letter asking for payment at
the correct rate. After the data have been verified, they are stored in a
master file, which is a central record of all taxpayer transactions with the tax
administra tion.
• Collections enforcement. The emphasis of this function is on collection of
taxes from stopfilers and delinquent taxpayers. Basically, all compliance
• control except inspection is centralized in this function. The accounting and
processing department provides much of the information that is needed.
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• Audit. The audit function is devoted to the detection of
underreported taxes. Staffs in this function usually perform audits of
taxpayers' files and record the tax administration office or audits of business
activities and records at the taxpayers' premises. It is important to note that
the accounting and processing department will already have performed
routine checks.
• Legal services and appeals. The staffs in this function take cases to court,
defend tax authorities against legal appeals, and provide advices as to
which actions are legal and which are not.
Within a functional organization, the workflow within the tax administration is
more specialized in order to best support a self-assessment system. The main
objective is to identify the exceptions, that is, in the instances of noncompliance.
The major part of the staff concentrates on the exceptions, as well as on audit to
check compliance. Such an organization entails a strategic element of self-
checking among staff whereby the work in one function serves as a control on
another. In other words, the organizational structure itself becomes a self-
enforcing measure.
3.12 PRIVATIZATION OF TAX ADMINISTRATION
Putting the private sector in control of the tax function has been an endless point of
debate in the area of public-private partnerships. Traditionally taxation is known
as a classical function of the state, but there are suggestions that some parts of tax
administration can be run by the private sector without government losing control.
Above all, the privatization of some functions of a tax system continues to get
precedence through the new paradigm of public-private partnership (Acuna 1992:
377).
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However, privatization of tax collection is not new to the history of tax
administration. It existed in Europe as 'tax farming' before the emergence of the
modern public administrative structures in the 17th and 18th centuries (Bird 1989:
322). According to Bird, privatization of tax collection is still possible in modern
times without applying the tax-farming system that was so unpopular during its
age. The present practices of privatizing some important functions of customs in
Indonesia and Jamaica is an indication of that possibility.
The growing practice of paying private collectors for tax collection is a form of
private sector involvement in tax administration without impairing the control of
the government. In Senegal tax inspectors are rewarded in accordance with the
amount of additional tax and fines they collect. In fact, tax commissions and
privatization of tax collection imply the use of third parties in tax collection.
Withholding wages by employers or withholdings of banks on profit tax are
methods of utilizing third parties in tax collection.
3.13 TAX SYSTEMS IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES
Patterns of tax paying in developing countries differ from one country to another.
In most cases, however, they share basic historical and economic factors. The
common characteristic of tax structures in developing countries is that personal
taxes are hard to collect because of predominantly agricultural economies where
people are widely dispersed. Generally speaking it is a diminishing tax base. As a
result the personal tax base is limited to only public employees and employees of
big firms and particular multinational companies (World Bank 1991:16).
Additional to that, because of administrative flaws, tax structures in developing
countries rely much on taxes on goods and services, especially trade taxes.
http://scholar.sun.ac.za/
100
Income tax is however regarded as an important tax system in a modem
economy as it permits moderate progression in the distribution of the tax burden
(Musgrave 1987: 251) although its percentage contribution is low against total
revenue in developing countries. There are two schools of thought on this. One
relates to the level of development, including income per capita of the people, and
the second is the administrative capacity of the tax system (Newberry & Stern 1987,
Tanzi, 1987& 2001,Goode 1962,and Musgrave 1987).
According to Goode (1962) the large agricultural sector, poor accounting systems,
low level of literacy and the fact that most economic activity takes place in small
establishments, cause the effective income taxation to be low. Musgrave (1987:250)
is opposed to the idea of income tax, because developing countries are in need of
capital formation and saving, so preference should go to consumption tax instead
of depending on income tax, which draws from individual and company's savings.
But consumption in developing countries is so low that it cannot cause a surplus to
be transferred to the budget. Musgrave therefore argues that although
consumption is low for the large part of the population in developing countries,
due to the common phenomenon of unequal income distribution among the poor
communities, there will be a limited scale of luxury consumption that provides a
base for taxation (Newbery & Stem 1987:250).
The poor performance of income taxation is attributed to the combination of two
factors, namely economic development as measured by per capita income, which
affects the contribution of income tax in developing countries, and the highest level
of avoidance, and exemptions, which are common in tax administration in
developing countries (Tanzi, in Newbery & Stern, 1987:245). Because of limited
administrative capacity many of the tax systems in developing countries depend
on indirect taxation, which includes sales taxes, and foreign trade.
The fundamental challenge of many tax reforms has been the issue of
administrative capacity of tax systems. Tax administration as was defined in
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Chapter 1 is referred to as the "real policy of taxation". It deals with the legal
and procedural framework of the tax system - tax assessment, collection, auditing,
sanctions, appeals and record keeping as well as tax information management. Tax
administration represents the qualitative aspect of a tax system and must be
properly organized, well equipped, especially with information technology and
staffed with well-trained, motivated and innovative staff.
Different tax analysts on tax reform in developing countries have been converging
on a common line that the strengthening of tax administration is as critical as the
success of tax reforms. In other words tax reforms need strong tax administration
to be successful (World Bank 1991:51). Bird and Oldman (1990:450)have observed
that tax administration is central and peripheral to tax reform in developing
countries. The problems of tax administration in developing countries, according
to these two analysts, include poor training, low status, poor salaries and poor
equipment. In order to reform tax administration, therefore, it is necessary to
review the organizational and procedural aspects, while insuring that laws are
properly drafted and codified; that the administration is properly organized, well
staffed, and trained, that taxpayers are located, placed on the tax roll and that their
returns are adequately examined and audited; that relevant information obtained
from other government departments elsewhere is utilized; that controversies
between taxpayers and administration are adequately resolved.
Tax administration starts with the enactment of laws, the identification of
taxpayers, the assessment of tax; the control and verification of assessment; tax
litigation; and finally the collection of taxes. These are categorically the instruments
of tax compliance. Therefore tax administration reform should be aimed at
improving the compliance of taxpayers, the efficiency with which taxes are
assessed, and collected.
Tax administration is a formidable challenge to developing countries, where large
numbers of taxpayers are technically operating outside the tax net. Workers in
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these countries are typically employed in agriculture or in small
enterprises. As they are seldom paid in regular, fixed wages, their earnings
fluctuate and many are paid in cash off the book. The income tax base is therefore
hard to calculate. Nor do these workers typically spend their earnings in large
stores that keep accurate records of sales and inventories. As a result modem
means of raising revenue, such as income tax, and consumer taxes, play a
diminished role in these economies and the possibility that such a government will
achieve a high level of growth is virtually nought (Tanzi & Zee 2001).
Tanzi & Zee (2001)underlines the factors that threaten the creation of efficient tax
administration in developing countries. Among these are a lack of well-educated
and trained staff, poor payment of tax officials, lack of capacity to computerize the
tax operations (or even to provide efficient telephone and mail services) and
limited ability of taxpayers to keep accounts. As a result, governments often take
the path of least resistance, developing tax systems that allow them to exploit
whatever options are available, rather than establishing a rational, modem, and
efficient tax system.
This situation has been affecting the efficiency of the systems in these countries in
terms of tax equity and tax neutrality. The tax burden is being carried by the few
whose earnings can be recorded, while other economic operators have been
shifting to informal economic undertakings, hiding from taxation and thus
affecting neutrality as well as encouraging tax evasion and avoidance.
The current trend in developing countries to integrate into the world economy
calls for new sophisticated tax policies in order to remain competitive in the global
economy. The changes in the international trade influenced by economic
liberalization, compel the developing countries to shift their reliance on foreign
taxes to domestic taxes. This reality further calls for the strengthening of tax
administration.
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3.14 CONCLUSION
The chapter explored the theoretical foundations of tax and tax administration.
Apart from theoretical definitions and applications of the four maxims of taxation,
the chapter observed in depth the essence of taxation and its role in relationships
between government and the citizen. Taxation and legitimation of political
systems, taxation and public goods and service philosophy, taxpayer's
participation and the quality of public institutions and their effect on taxation were
topics that drew attention to the position of tax in government's functions of
distributing the resources and stabilization of the economy.
The chapter also concentrated on the conventional theories of tax and tax systems.
In this discussion topics of the types of taxes were reviewed, factors contributing to
an efficient and effective tax system, tax administration and compliance, how to
undertake tax administration reforms, and measures for effective and efficient tax
administration were outlined.
The chapter also reviewed how the private sector can be involved in tax
administration, which traditionally has been recognized as the sole responsibility
of the government and its institutions. References and current experiences have
shown that a modern tax system has room for accommodating the new paradigm
of public-private partnerships. Finally tax administration and tax structure in
developing countries were explored. In the next chapter tax system reform in
Rwanda and its shortcomings in relation to normative requirements as observed in
chapter 3 will be explored.
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CHAPTER 4: ANALYSIS OF TAX SYSTEM REFORM IN RWANDA
4.1 INTRODUCTION
The purpose of this chapter is to provide an analysis of the implementation
dynamics of tax system reform in Rwanda. Chapter 1 has set a conceptual
foundation for the research problem, hypothesis formulation, and research
methodology and techniques. Chapter 2 analysed and evaluated the background
situations that preceded and eventually affected the policy decisions on and in
implementation of tax system reform programme in Rwanda, while Chapter 3
contained a closer scrutiny of existing literature to establish the normative
requirements of a tax system.
In this chapter, therefore, the main issue is the operationalisation of the tax system
reform programme. The researcher analyses and evaluates how the reform process
is impacting on tax structure and tax administration, how the institutional and
structural issues are dealt with and how the reform is realising the normative
requirements for a tax system. All of this will be examined through the following
related issues:
• The trend of tax system reform in Rwanda, including reform
phases.
• Reforming of tax structure, with reference to the income tax
reforms; corporate tax; establishment of large enterprises;
presumptive taxation; and control of exemptions
• Consumption tax reforms with reference to the tariffs reduction
policy; introduction of VAT.
• Tax administration reforms, including legal and procedural
simplification with reference to tax flaws in customs, improving
tax collection and accelerating auditing of enterprises.
• Institutional reforms, reference to the Rwandan Revenue
Authority, its structure and functions.
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4.2 THE TREND OF TAXREFORMS IN RWANDA
The process of reforming the tax system in Rwanda can be categorized into two
successive phases, 1995-97 and 1997-99. In practice the reforms have been a
continuous process from 1995 to the present. But in order to create a barometer for
this study it is possible to divide the process into two major phases. Tax reforms in
Rwanda have been adopted and implemented within the macro economic reform
frameworks, so the analytical framework for tax reform in Rwanda should be
conceived within the macro-economic reform programmes that have been in place
since 1995.
The first phase of tax reform (1995-97) was conceived within the three-year
national Economic Recovery Program, which was the first macro-economic policy
reforms adopted by the new government after the 1994 genocide and war. The
second phase, 1997-1999, which was essentially a continuation of the first, was
implemented within the broader program of macro economic reforms known as
Economic Structural Adjustment Facility (ESAF) sponsored by the IMF and the
World Bank from 1997 -1999/2000.
4.2.1 Phases
In launching the first phase of tax reforms, 1995 -1997, the government described
the aim of reform as the rapid restoration of the revenue base, through a number of
temporary and structural measures, including the rebuilding and strengthening of
the capacity of revenue administration and implementing a range of discretionary
measures to increase tax revenue contribution (IMFNo 4/2000).
The first measure to be declared by the government included the establishment of
a Large Enterprises Unit that later became responsible for assessing and collecting
taxes from the 150 largest taxpayers, accounting for 80% of total tax revenue in the
country. Additional to that the government declared new measures to restore and
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improve the capacity of the customs authority, including the provision of
basic equipment and reinforcements for mobile surveillance and anti smuggling
operations (IMF No 4/2000).
The second phase was embedded in an economic structural adjustment program,
which introduced different reform measures including:
• The establishment of the Rwanda Revenue Authority (RRA), with the aim
of strengthening tax administration;
• The strengthening of the Large Enterprises Unit;
• The gradual inclusion of small enterprises into the tax net by offering to
self-employed persons or small enterprises (with an annual turnover of 60
million RWF or less) the choice of paying either presumptive income tax of
4% of annual turnover or the regular income tax;
• The curtailment of exemptions; and
• The conversion of coffee tax into an ad valorem tax at the rate of 16% (IMF
No4/2000).
In 1999, the government intensified the reform process by introducing different
administrative and structural issues, including the withholding of income tax from
its suppliers, and revising the system of penalties for late payment. These measures
were accompanied by a number of customs administrative reforms, which
involved the reshipment inspection of all petroleum products and tightening the
control on transit goods, and the introduction of a taxpayer identification number
(TIN) used for both inland revenue collection and at the customs. By 1999, all large
enterprises and half of the smaller enterprises had been assigned tax identification
numbers.
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4.3 TAX STRUCTURE REFORM
Tax structure, as we saw in the theoretical framework of tax reform in Chapters 1
and 3, is part of a tax system and is composed of the tax base and structure rating.
The tax base includes a valuated tax object for taxation. If income is an object of
taxation, for example, the tax base will be income related, hence personal income
tax, corporate tax and profit tax. If the object of valuation is a commodity, then the
tax base will be commodity related, hence sales tax, export tax, and import tax.
4.3.1 Income Tax Reforms
As has been mentioned in Chapter 2 and Chapter 3, the performance of income tax
in Rwanda, as in many of the developing countries, has been hampered by an
economic structure dominated by subsistence agriculture and an informal
production sector. Table 2 in Chapter 2 shows that 94%of the Rwandan population
is employed in the rural sector, mostly in subsistence agriculture, and that 50% of
the secondary economy is taken up by informal business activities where incomes
are not accessible for income taxation. The modern industrial sector contributes
only 6% of the national GDP, while the service sector contributes only 30% and
agriculture 40.95%.
However, the two-phase tax system reform program in Rwanda focused on
different measures for the revitalization of income tax regimes. The process started
with parliament enacting the Code for Direct Taxation in 1997, to amend the
income tax law of 1964. The code articulated new measures for income tax
administration in the country, including a reduction in company and maximum
personal income taxes from 50% to 40%, the imposition of income tax on public
enterprises and on military personnel, the introduction of a Large Enterprises Unit
and the imposition of presumptive taxes on small enterprises, and a curtailment of
a series of tax exemptions.
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4.3.1.1 Corporate Tax Reform
Reforming the corporate tax base went hand and hand with the establishment of a
unit focusing on large taxpayers, in 1995. This strengthened the country's capacity
to administer company tax. The unit became responsible for assessing and
collecting taxes from the 150 largest taxpayers in the country, accounting for 80%
of total tax revenue. The Large Enterprises Unit became part of the Rwanda
Revenue Authority in 1997 and functioned as a separate unit dealing with the
enforcement of the compulsion to fill in tax returns, assessment, collection
(including the recovery of arrears), auditing, taxpayers' education and registration
(IMF No 4/2000, RRA Annual Report 1998).Before 1998most of these enterprises
were not paying taxes, so the first operation undertaken by the newly established
Revenue Authority was to audit and collect arrears.
The activities of the Large Enterprises Unit boosted the country's total income from
taxes. By April 1999 the large taxpayers unit had been able to recover 11 billion
Rwf in tax arrears from different companies, including public organizations - table
9 indicates that 9.6 billion Rwf of the 11 billion Rwf were collected from 15 large
public enterprises.
By 2000, the unit under RRA had managed to collect, through ICHA, 7.2 billion
Rwanda Francs, and 3.1 billion through the withholdings of 219 big enterprises. In
the year 2000 the unit was reported to have completed the auditing of about 102
files amounting to 10billion Rwanda Francs in tax arrears, and to have filed notes
of taxation to 118 companies that were expected to generate about 2.6 billion Rwf
(RRA report 2000).The contribution of company tax to total revenue shot up from
3.9% in 1995 to 16% in 1999, although it then dropped one percent in 2000
registering only 15%of total tax revenue in the country (RRA,Report 1999& 2000).
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4.3.2.Why a Large Enterprises Unit?
Establishing a Large Enterprises Unit for efficient tax collection is one of the
popular measures in modern tax administration. Tanzi (1995)in Chapter 3 refers to
the Large Enterprises Unit as a special functional unit in tax administration, made
up of an elite group of better trained and less corruptible officials, it monitors the
collection of taxes from large taxpayers who, although there are only a few of
them, account for a large part (sometimes as high as 90 percent) of tax revenue
from VAT and corporate income taxes. Such a unit can virtually guarantee the
timely collection of most of the tax revenue and the prompt identification of
stop filers and delinquent taxpayers, so that appropriate action can be taken,
including the imposition of penalties. A large taxpayer unit can significantly
reduce errors in tax declarations and can minimise delays in the collection of
substantial amounts of revenue due to errors, late filing and other violations of tax
regulations. Such a unit properly focuses on initial efforts in tax administration
reform and on the adoption of more efficient procedures for important taxpayers,
rather than to focus on small taxpayers whose revenue generation is not
substantial.
A large taxpayers unit serves as a model for the adoption and expansion of
modern tax administration practices. Tanzi (1995, see also Chapter 3) reflects on
practical trials with the establishment of the Large Enterprises Unit. He
acknowledges that in many countries, large taxpayers units were introduced as
pilot projects, thus allowing the tax administration to try out new methods and
technologies. The successful implementation of such pilot projects demonstrates to
the tax administration, which as a bureaucracy tends to be resistant to change, that
it is possible and advantageous to modify procedures and systems. In many
countries the large taxpayers units were applied to progressively larger groups and
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with regard to modern practices. For example, Argentina developed new
practices for a group of less than 1 000. It has now expanded the group to more
than 200000 (Tanzi 1995:12).
A large taxpayers unit may take on not just the collection but also the auditing
function, for several reasons. The detection of evasion is just as important as the
monitoring of compliance with filing and paying requirements. In addition, large
taxpayers usually carry out a high volume of transactions and have complex
operations. They frequently have several branches of operations and sometimes
branches outside the country. They have skilled accountants and lawyers, and may
use forms of evasion that are difficult to detect, such as transfer pricing. These
characteristics of large taxpayers often make it necessary to establish special
monitoring units with highly specialized staff.
4.3.3 Presumptions
The corporate economy in Rwanda is dominated by small enterprises. Most of
them are involved in service provision, and they are mostly run on an informal
basis. Among the measures adopted in the tax reform program was the
introduction of presumptive taxes to facilitate the tax administration of small and
medium enterprises.
http://scholar.sun.ac.za/
111
Table 9 The tax arrears of the 15 Largest Public Enterprises (1999)
Enterprises Amounts
Air Rwanda 470.2
Banque Nationale du Rwanda 6.4
CER 44.3
Electrogaz 3,939.7
INR 102.4
Imprisco 83.4
ORTPN 61.9
OCIR The 37.9
ONATRACOM 133.9
OPROVIA 22.4
ORINFOR 112.9
RAR 37.7
RwandaTel 3,586.1
STIR 882.7
SORWAL 90.1
Total 9,611.8
Source IMF 2000
In 1996, the government announced the imposition of a presumptive income tax of
3% of their annual turnover on all enterprises. This was followed by the
government offering self-employed persons or enterprises with an annual turnover
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of RF 60 million or less, the choice of paying presumptive income tax of 4% of
annual turnover or of paying the regular income tax. This was adopted as one of
the government's measures to include small enterprises in the tax net.
As from January 1999, the presumptive income tax rate was reduced from 4% to
2%,with a view to improving compliance. For enterprises with an annual turnover
below RF 36 million, however, the presumptive tax became mandatory (IMF No
4/2000).
Before the war there were about 700 informal enterprises in the country, but the
number shot up after the war and by 1999there were about 8 000 small enterprises,
mostly operating informally. The nature of their economic operation, in every case,
precluded the application of available methods of taxation, yet they were
employing a significant size of the urban labour force.
After the establishment of the Rwanda Revenue Authority, small and medium
enterprises (5ME) also became the focus of a special section of the organization.
Most of the small and medium enterprises by 1997 were among those companies
with backlogs in tax arrears. But, by 1999, the RRA had managed to recover taxes
from 5MEs with tax arrears amounting to 110 million Rwf, followed by 340.9
million Rwf recovered in the year 2000. In 1999, the Revenue Authority also
managed to collect about 1.3 billion Rwf from 5MEs by declaration, while in 2000
the RRA collected about 2,02 million by declaration, and distributed 1 610 notes of
taxation to the value of 917 Rwf (RRAReports, 1999& 2000).
Tax systems in developing countries are facing the challenge of a big community of
potential taxpayers operating outside the tax net. We saw in Chapter 3 that most
taxpayers in these countries are typically employed in agriculture or in small
enterprises. As they are seldom paid in regular, fixed wages, their earnings
fluctuate and many are paid in cash off the book. The income tax base is therefore
hard to calculate. Nor do these workers typically spend their earnings in larger
stores that keep accurate records of sales and inventories. As a result, modern
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means of raising revenue, such as income tax, and consumer taxes, playa
diminished role in these economies (refer to Tanzi Chapter 3).
In the light of this argument, Musgrave (1990: 299) (see Chapter 3) divides
taxpayers into four distinct categories:
1. Very small taxpayers, who should be exempted
2. Small taxpayers, who should be subject to presumptive tax in lieu of other
income tax and sales tax
3. All other taxpayers, who should be subject to the regular system of filling
in returns and declarations
4. The hard to tax group, for which the system of review is based on
estimation.
Tanzi in Chapter 3 regards presumptive taxes as one of the best approaches for the
taxing of small and difficult to tax groups. Under a presumptive tax system the
taxable income of a small business is computed indirectly on the basis of certain
objective indicators, such as the value of goods for sale, the number of employees,
total wages paid, and the amount and type of physical assets. Estimating taxable
income on a presumptive basis can, however, require considerable effort on the
part of the tax administrator.
4.3.4 Exemptions
Before 1994, tax exemptions and deductions were the main features of the tax
system in Rwanda. At the inception of the tax reform program in 1995, the removal
of exemptions became the central agenda. In 1995 government started the process
of reducing tax exemptions and combating tax evasion. The process included a
review of the investment code so as to streamline incentives for investment and
make them more transparent (IMF, No 4/2000). This was criticized for being
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designed in a 'hidebound' way, referring to the relationship that existed
between some government officials and some big businessmen in the country - a
relationship consolidated by the former corrupt tax system.
The Code on Direct Taxation enacted in 1997 consolidated the anti exemption
campaign, and included measures aimed at reducing exemptions on the
importation of personal effects, reducing the privileges of public enterprises, non-
governmental organizations and religious entities, and compelling military
personnel to pay income tax. Sales tax, previously set at 5% for essential consumer
goods and 10% for other goods and services, was standardized at 10% for both
domestically produced goods and for imports. The series of exemptions had been
limiting tax equity and the economic efficiency of the tax system. Removing these
exemptions also resulted in the termination of the existing investment code on the
allegation that it was providing suspect incentives.
The newly introduced investment code prescribes a number of incentives for
investors, including;
• The reduction of customs tariffs on raw material and intermediate goods
required as inputs for the production sector
• Reduction of income tax rates
• Accelerated depreciation of plant and equipment aimed at reducing
taxable capital
• Profits in the first years of operation
• Exemption from import duties and sales tax on plant, machinery,
equipment or construction materials that are not obtainable in Rwanda
• Investors will be entitled to first arrival privileges covering such items
as cars, office equipment, personal and household effects
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• Following liberalization of the money markets, repatriation of
dividends has been made very flexible and easy
• There are proposals for externalization of funds by a foreign investor.
Investors are entitled to a refund of duties and sales tax payable on imported
goods.
Tax incentives have been used by developing countries all over to attract foreign
investors and promote investment in general. In his discussion of this issue,
however, Tanzi (2000) raises a couple of issues about this approach. He indicates
that;
• Tax incentives can be abused by existing enterprises posing as new ones
through nominal reorganization, and their revenue cost becomes high
• Foreign investors base their decision to enter a country on a host of factors
(such as natural resources, political stability, transparent regulatory
systems, infrastructure, and skilled work force), of which tax incentives are
not the most important consideration
• Tax incentives could also be of questionable value to the foreign investor
because the true beneficiary of these incentives may not be the investor but
rather the treasury of his home country. This can come about when any
income spared from taxation in the host country is taxed by the investor's
home country.
4.3.5Performance of income tax in Rwanda
According to Figure 2, income tax since 1995has made a substantial contribution to
the Rwandan tax structure. By 1998 it was contributing 2.8% to the national GDP,
from 2.5% in 1997, 2.3% in 1996, 0.8% in 1995 and 0.4% in 1994. Before that, from
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1991 to 1994, income tax collection had shown mild growth only. In 1991 it
was contributing 2.0%, while in 1992 it stood at 2.2 % and at 2.1 % in 1993.
In terms of total revenue, income tax collection at the peak of the 1994 massacres
reached 23.5 %, then the rate dropped drastically in 1995 to 12.1 % of total revenue.
With regard to the composition of income tax in Table 4, company tax during the
reform process was leading the way at 3.9% of income tax collected in 1995, to
16.8% in 1996. This tax base remained more or less constant with contributions of
16.0% in 1997 up to 19.2% in 1998. Individual income tax formed 6.9% of income
tax collected in 1995, 6.9% in 1996, showed a slight increase to 7.4% in 1997,
dropping to 6.1 % in 1998.
Figure 2: The performance of income tax per GDP from 1991 to1998
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This difference between the performance of individual income tax and company
tax is the result of the reform effort that concentrated on recovering corporate tax,
by establishment the Large Enterprises Unit, removal of the number of exemptions,
and taxation of public enterprises. In 2000, however, personal income tax had
improved to 11% of the total tax revenue, from 10.2 % in 1999. In contrast,
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company tax dropped form 16.8% of total tax revenue in 1999 to 15.5% in 2000
(see table 10).
Table 10 The income tax performance per tax base
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000
Company tax 3.9 16.8 16.0 19.2 16.8 15.9
Individual tax 6.9 6.9 7.4 6.1 10.2 11.5
Others 1.3 1.8 1.0 1.7 - -
Property tax 0.4 0.8 0.7 0.8 - -
Source: IMF Report No 4/2000 & RRA Report 2000
4.4 CONSUMPTION TAX
Tax reform initiatives in Rwanda are also aimed at improving the performance of
consumption tax or indirect taxation. This type of reform includes different
measures for imports and exports taxation and for excise duties. In the course of
reform, consumption tax became a major focus as it was contributing 70% of total
tax revenue (RRA, 2000).
Commodity taxation has remained a major source of tax revenue, not only in
Rwanda for the last century but also in the rest of sub-Saharan Africa. Findings on
tax policies in sub-Saharan Africa are that any tax reform in these countries should
focus on clearing possible distortions of consumption tax while employing possible
instruments of commodity taxation, induding:
• Broad based consumption tax such as sales tax and value-added tax (VAT),
as a mechanism for generating revenue
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• Commodity specific taxes such as excise tax are used to
introduce a degree of progressivity in commodity taxes and compensate
for the presence of externalities
• Import duties are limited to providing protection if required to domestic
producers
• Most export taxes should be eliminated.
Right from the beginning of the reforms instituted in 1995, the tax authority in
Rwanda started clearing the distortions in the import section by removing a series
of exemptions on imported goods and balancing rates between imported and
domestically produced goods. The sales tax rate previously set at 5% for essential
consumer goods and services was standardized at 10% for both domestically
produced goods and imported goods. The collection of sales tax on imports was
shifted to customs for better administration, and specific tax rates for beer and soft
drinks were increased by 70%.
At the end of 1995, the improvement in the contribution of taxes on sales of goods
and services to the GDP became pronounced. It had increased from 1.4%in 1994to
2.9% in 1995. This upward trend was maintained in 1996 with an increase in
specific consumption taxes on alcohol, soft drinks, and petroleum. The sales tax
revenue shifted from 2.9% in 1995 to 3.3% in 1996, and in 1997 it went up to 3.9%,
while in 1998 it was estimated to be 4.5% of GDP. Reforms in consumption tax
were dominated by the increase in excise taxes. By 1999 excise taxes on cigarettes
and beer had been raised from 60% to 80%, on wines and spirits from 60% to 90%,
on soft drinks from 35%to 60%,and on petroleum products from 25% to 60%.
Despite improvements, taxes on international trade have not been doing well. In
1995taxes on international trade was 2.6%of national GDP, in 19962.7%; in 1997 it
increased to 3.3%while it declined in 1998 to 2.5%. The fundamental cause of this
decline included poor import tax collection owing to the fact that a wide range of
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exemptions were granted to international and non-governmental
organisations, and diplomatic missions. As a result almost 50% of imports were
exempted from import duties, and turnover and effective rate duty collection
amounted to only 1.6%. The majority of exempt products are consumer goods
(52%), with other exemptions applying to capital goods (27%), intermediate goods
(16%), and petroleum products (5%). In 1999, in line with objectives under CBI, the
maximum import tariff rate was reduced from 40% to 25%, and intermediate rates
from 20% to 10%, to 15% and to 5% respectively, while most of the capital goods
remained zero-rated. A second causative factor was that the export tax on coffee
was eliminated (IMF 2000).
The Rwandan tax system is composed mainly of three taxation regimes: income
tax, taxes on goods and services, and taxes on international trade. Of these three
types of taxes, sales tax is still contributing the lion's share. In 1994 sales tax
contributed 39% of total revenue according to table 12, in 1995 it increased to
49.9%, but dropped in 1996 to 36.5%. It increased again to reach 37.7% in 1997, and
then increased further to 42.2 % in 1998. The contribution of taxes on international
trade was 36.6% in 1994, but as it is shown in this figure increased to 38.5% in 1995,
dropped to 29.2% in 1996, again increased to 31.8% in 1997, and declined in 1998 to
23.9%. Compared to other sources, taxes on income and profits have been the least
impressive performers.
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Table 11 Production of principal manufactured goods and minerals
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999(est)
Manufactured goods
Beer (million liters) 49.1 59.4 76.3 65.0 53.5
Non-alcoholic (million liters) 14.3 18.8 26.7 36.3 22.1
Sugar (metric tonnes) 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 2.1
Soap (tonnes) 5,019 6,959 7,500 6,966 6,469
Corrugated iron sheets 2450 2,085 4,229 2,588 4,575
(thousand tonnes)
Cigarettes (millions) 35.9 128.5 252.9 303.0 217.0
Textile (million meters) 2.9 5.8 8.6 10.3 9.8
Cement (metric tonnes) 36,000 42,452 60,505 58,929 66,291
Minerals
Cassitterte 247.0 330.0 327.0 330.0 308.0
Wolfram (metric tonnes ) 19.2 62.3 42.0 1888.0 122.0
Colombo-tantalite (metric 53.9 97.0 224.0 224.0 224.0
tonnes)
Gold (kilograms) - - 10.0 17.0 10.0
Source: IMF Report No 01/30-2000
In 1994 income tax stood at 23.5% of the total tax revenue, while in 1995 it
dropped drastically to 12.1%, but shot up again in 1996 to 25.4%, decreased
slightly in 1997 when it stood at 24.4%, and was raised to 27.0% of total revenue
in 1998 (see table 12).
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Table 12 Contributions to the total tax revenue (percentages)
1995 1996 1997 1998
Income tax 12.1 25.4 24.4 27.0
Sales tax 49.9 36.5 37.7 42.2
International tax 38.5 29.2 31.8 23.9
Source: RRA Report 2000
4.4.1 Tariffs
On the one hand tariff reduction continued to impel the performance of
international trade taxation into Rwandan tax reform. Apart from affecting the
flow of import tax, however, the tariff reductions are not attracting more imports
into the country. Under ideal circumstances, lower tariffs would stimulate import
volumes and also encourage compliance, thereby mitigating to some extent the
potential impact of the lower tariff rates on revenue. Mid-way through 1999, it
became apparent that due to a combination of exogenous factors in Rwanda, this
was not happening. Import volumes decreased rather than increased despite the
lower tariff rates and revenue targets were not being met. The government then
decided to impose a temporary surcharge on imports of finished and semi-finished
goods in order to balance the budget (Budget Speech 2000).
Though the reduction of tariffs is one of the strategies to make imports affordable
to local consumers, it remains a bane to local manufacturers who are still unable to
compete in international market. Balancing the advantages and disadvantages of
affordability and competition became a challenging experience to the Rwandan tax
administration (Budget 2000). In Chapter 2 we saw that the manufacturing sector
in Rwanda is among the weakest in the world dealing with small consumables.
Table 11, shows that manufactured products are dominated by alcoholic and non-
http://scholar.sun.ac.za/
122
alcoholic beverages, a little sugar production of an estimated 2.1 metric
tones, soap, cigarettes, corrugated iron sheets of which the average annual
production is estimated to be 581.1 sheets, textiles and cement production. It has to
be remembered, as pointed out in Chapter 2, that these products are produced
with poor technology.
Reducing import tariffs as part of an overall program for trade liberalization is a
major policy challenge currently facing many developing countries. In Chapter 2
we saw that there are two concerns that need to be addressed when embarking on
tax reduction. First, tariff reduction should not lead to unintended changes in
relative rates of effective protection across sectors. Second, nominal tariff reduction
is likely to entail short-term revenue loss. This loss can be avoided through a clear-
cut strategy in which compensatory measures are considered in sequence; first
reducing the scope of tariff exemption in the existing system, then compensating
for tariff reduction on excisable imports by a commensurate increase in their excise
rates, finally adjusting the rate of a general consumption tax such as VAT to meet
the remaining revenue needs.
4.4.2VAT
The government of Rwanda in the middle of 2000 introduced Value-Added Tax
(VAT) as part of an attempt to broaden the base for sales tax. It was introduced to
replace the unpopular ICHA (L'impot su le Chiffre d'Affaires) or turnover tax,
decried by the government because it was difficult to valuate, and which ended up
encouraging a number of exemptions. In broadening the sales tax base through
VAT, the government anticipated increasing its tax productivity from the current
11.0% to 17% of GDP (RRA, 2000).
The VAT system in Rwanda would ostensibly have two rates, namely the standard
rate at x% and a zero rate. In essence there will however be three categories,
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namely standard rate, zero rate and exempt. The VAT design excludes
essentials or basic necessities. Items such as basic foods, medical care, educational
supplies and common passenger transport are exempt from VAT. Furthermore the
coverage of VAT is extended to the commodities currently subject to excise taxes
(beer, wine, spirits, cigarettes, soft drinks, petroleum products) that do not attract
ICHA (Budget Speech 2000).
The challenge in the introduction of VAT is deciding on a rating system. There are
two systems rating VAT - single rate, and multiple rates. Single rates that would
include one positive rate (standard rate), zero rate and exempt, are advocated on
the basis of its lesser administrative cost. Multiple rates will require lower rates,
high rates, zero rated and exempt.
In most cases, as we saw in Chapter 3, countries introduce VAT because they are
dissatisfied with their existing tax structures. There are four probabilities why any
country introduces VAT (Tait 1988:9);
• The existing sales taxes are unsatisfactory
• A customs union requires discriminatory border tax to be abolished
• A reduction in other taxation is sought
• The evolution of the tax system has not kept pace with the development of
the economy.
Introducing VAT in Rwanda would be in line with the government's policy of
reforming tax administration based on the principle of broadening the tax base,
while reducing tax rates and of course encouraging compliance. VAT was
therefore introduced in Rwanda with the aim of broadening the tax base of sales
tax. Sales tax in Rwanda contributes 21% of the total tax revenue. In fact, the
process of tax reform is envisaged to improve indirect taxation and to bring
reluctant taxpayers into the tax net. The government is also looking at sales tax to
fill the gap left by the reduction of tariffs and elimination of export tax. Rwanda is
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a member of COMESA, the Organization for Common Market for
East and Southern African Countries, which demands the abolishment of border
taxes for member countries. Rwanda is under pressure to comply, irrespective of
the fact that its international taxation continued to dwindle.
4.4.2.1 VAT and indirect taxes
Value-Added Tax, according to Choi (1990:369) (see Chapter 3), is a tax system in
which enterprises are taxed on the value they add to the goods and services they
purchase from other enterprises. It is an indirect taxing system, which collects tax
at each stage of the production and distribution process. Indirect taxes are types of
taxes that are imposed on commodities and are realized through market
transactions. Its main characteristic is that the tax burden falls on the consumer.
The salesman or merchant from whom this tax is originally collected transfers the
tax burden to the consumer through price increases (Nobes & James 1997/98; Black
et a11999; and Mhro, Fourie & Associates 1996).
Indirect tax is based on the benefit principle. One of its advantages is that it is able
to bring into income tax nets those small incomes that could not be covered by the
income tax system. Most small incomes fall outside the tax net because they are
earned from informal sectors, and thus are difficult to calculate. According to Black
et al (1999) it is only through purchasing of commodities that they can be taxed
(see chapter 3).
The difference between indirect and direct taxation is based on the issue of who
pays tax. While an indirect tax is paid through commodity exchange, the direct tax
is paid directly by an individual, company or a household. Direct taxation includes
tax bases of income tax, property tax and Pay-As-You-Eam tax. Indirect taxes
include VAT, excise duties and sales duties.
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4.4.2. 2 Advantages of indirect tax
Indirect taxation is levied on consumption. The consumer can substitute his higher
taxable consumption for a lower one, and this provides the consumer with the
opportunity to make choices. For example, if imported beer is highly taxed and
thus expensive, the consumer can choose between imported and locally produced
beer.
Consumption taxes can be used to achieve multiple objectives. In Chapter 3, Black
et al (1999), argued that consumption tax can be used to correct market failures
such as externalities, by increasing or lowering tax. It can also be used as deterrent
and protection measures. For example, consumption taxes may be used to protect
the environment - those commodities that might have an adverse environmental
impact, could be highly taxed to discourage their application. The same applies to
health issues. It is common today for taxes on tobacco to be very high in many
countries, as a way of discouraging smoking.
Nonetheless, indirect tax is regarded as unprogressive as it contributes to reducing
the work effort of a taxpayer. The assumption here is that the opportunity to
purchase luxury goods is an incentive for the taxpayer (consumer) to work hard,
but because of indirect taxation the taxpayer will be opting for cheap consumption
and will lose interest in working. In addition to that indirect tax rates may
encourage smuggling.
Indirect taxation has also been recommended as a tool to enable government to
regulate trade relations between foreign and local companies. In several countries
consumption tax is used to protect locally produced goods from imported ones,
through imposing a high tax on the imported product while lessening the tax
payable on locally produced goods. This helps to promote the market for local
products by promoting local industry.
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Tax authorities, especially in developing countries, as we saw in
Chapter 3, prefer indirect taxation, because it is relatively simple to administer
compared to income tax. Not only that, but also because indirect tax becomes
favorable for tax administration because of the limited scope for tax evasion.
4.5 TAX ADMINISTRATION REFORM IN RWANDA
In Chapter 1 we demarcated this study on two parameters, namely tax structure
reform and tax administration reform. In Chapter 3 we indicated that a tax system
is made up of two principal interdependent elements, namely tax structure and tax
administration. In the above paragraphs we concentrated on reform measures
taken by the government of Rwanda in reforming the tax structure. In the next
paragraphs, therefore we are going to deal with reforms in tax administration.
In Chapter 3 we saw that tax administration refers to an assortment of mechanisms
and institutions governing tax administration and compliance. On the other hand,
tax administration reform means the reform of mechanisms and institutions of the
tax system. The mechanisms and institutions of tax administration and compliance
include both readily observable and veiled elements, the legal and procedural
framework governing assessment, tax collection, audit, sanctions, appeal, record
keeping, as well as information technology, reward structure, disciplines and
accountability.
A country's tax administration system represents an institutional arrangement
whereby citizens fulfill their obligation to the government to pay tax; for this
reason tax administration should strive to be both effective and efficient. As we
saw in Chapter 3, tax administration is effective when there is a high level of
compliance with tax laws by all citizens. Efficiency is achieved when the
administrative cost per dollar of tax revenue is minimal.
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Again, according to Chapter 3, tax administration covers a wide area and its
impact is widely felt in a country. It involves different aspects of government
management, economic and social change and requires encompassing analyses.
The analysis made by Tanzi (1995: 5) (see Chapter 3) that provides the basic
elements of tax administration reforms, include: an explicit and sustained political
commitment; a team of capable, hard working officials dedicated £UIltime to tax
administration reform; a well defined and an appropriate strategy; relevant
training; additional resources or reallocation of existing resources; changes in
incentives for both tax payers and tax administrators.
Tax administration reform is not revenue targeted, but system targeted. It is aimed
at creating a sustainable tax system with effective and efficient measures of tax
collection. Essentially tax administration reform deals with how tax revenue
should be collected. As Birds & De Juntscher (1992)put it (see Chapter 3), the best
tax administration system is not simply the one that collects most revenue. More
important is how that revenue is raised - that is, the effect of the revenue
generation effort on equity, on the political fortunes of the government, and on the
level of economic welfare.
A poor quality tax administration may collect large amounts from easy to tax
sectors, such as wage earners, while it is unable to enforce taxes on business
enterprises and professionals. The level of collection is therefore a somewhat
unsophisticated measure of the effectiveness of tax administration. A more
accurate measure in tax administration is the size of the 'compliance gap' - that is,
the gap between actual and potential tax revenue - and how that gap varies among
the different sectors of the tax paying population.
The fundamental objectives of tax reform in Rwanda are to increase tax revenue in
the country, by broadening tax bases and improving tax administration and
compliance (Budget 2000). Apparently the five-year-old tax reform in Rwanda is
aimed at two areas of tax administration:
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• Simplification of procedures
• Institutional reform.
4.5.1Legal and procedural simplification
The legal and procedural framework of tax reform in Rwanda is explicitly focused
on reforming the tax structure, which in turn had an impact on simplifying
procedures at various levels of tax collection. Included are measures such as
presumptive taxes, reducing exemptions. The introduction of presumptive taxes
eased the administrative burden of auditing, assessing and filling tax returns for
the small taxpayers, while shifting the effort to the collection of taxes from large
taxpayers. Similar to this was the reduction of administrative resources, which
were being used in administering and calculating the diverse tax exemptions.
Reforming the administrative process started with numerous pieces of legislation
passed by the government between 1995 and 1997. Some of these include the 1995
decree and its four subsequent amendments on fixing entry duty tariffs, the
Parliamentary Acts on Consumption Tax in 1997, the Code on Direct Taxes enacted
by the Parliament in 1997, with its 1998 amendment. The code amended the direct
taxation code of 1964, which covered taxes on company profits, individual profits
and property. The code of direct taxes covers also tax on professional revenues, on
rental revenues, and movable or chattel taxes (vehicles).
This code made it possible to impose taxes on public enterprises and on those
enterprises in which the government is a shareholder, as well as on military
personnel. At the same time the code withdrew exemptions and deductions that
were initially granted to several non-profit making organizations including
churches, NGOs and other associations, by the 1964 law. This included also the
revoking of the existing investment code that was said to have uncoordinated
incentives for investors (IMF Report No 4/2000).
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The 1997 Direct Code of Conduct for Direct Taxes came into being after the
initial recovery in tax collection through ad hoc measures undertaken between
1995-96. In 1997 government embarked on the ambitious plan of reducing the
primary fiscal deficit to 0.9% of GDP, from the equivalent of about 2.2 % in 1996.
This improvement required efforts to increase revenue by about 26% (equivalent to
about 1% of GDP), which demanded also fundamental reforms in tax structure,
which in tum led to the simplification of procedures, and regulations in the
administration of certain tax regimes (IMF2000).
Other measures introduced by the law included the reduction of the period for
declaration of tax, from 5 years to 3 years to enable investors to declare their taxes
within the concerted framework of three years during which capital is considered
able to be turned into profit. Banks were allowed to deduct taxes from the interest
of credits, which have no assurance of repayment, and there was a reduction in
company and maximum personal income tax rate from 50% to 40%.
The code provided for the conversion of specific excise taxes on soft drinks and
alcoholic drinks, cigarettes and petroleum products, into ad valorem taxes, and for
the introduction of presumptive taxes, which enabled small taxpayers with limited
expertise to pay tax.
In the same development, the code simplified rent tax procedures by allowing a
taxpayer to deduct the rehabilitation cost of the house. At the same time the code
required the landlord to pay tax in advance. The responsibility for the collection of
rental tax was shifted to the local authority, which would transfer 80% of the taxes
collected to the central government with 20% remaining behind to support the
administration of the tax.
The Code on Direct Taxation took a central role in reforming income tax
administration, including changes in the penalty structure. The additional tax fine
levied upon the unintended offences in declaration liabilities was removed. This
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however was seconded by the tightening of penalties on the intended
default, by increasing the fine from 15%to 18%.
4.5.2Customs
Since the inception of the tax reform process, progress in reforming tax
administration has been mired in legal and procedural loopholes, which
dominated the customs authority. All in all most of tax flaws in customs were
mainly identified with the administration defaults - fraud and smuggling.
Presenting the government budget for the year 2000 the Minister of Finance and
Economic Planning identified a number of weak links in customs administration,
which have been influencing tax evasion.
To begin with, the surveillance strategy initiated back in 1995 to impound
smuggled goods became less effective. Experience was already showing that when
smuggled goods are impounded, pending fines and payment of duties, the
smugglers would rather abandon the goods and remain underground, thus
rendering the surveillance mechanism impractical.
Another common area of customs fraud concerns goods in transit. In essence,
imported goods crossing Rwandan borders to the neighboring countries have been
crossing without customs clearance, and some of them would end up in the local
markets. The reform process has been shifting the tax burden to local traders,
whose commodities have been facing severe competition from illegally imported
goods, thus causing conflict between government and local traders.
In addition to that, the warehousing facility provided by the customs authority had
become a source of fraud. Importers had been using the customs warehouse
MAGERWA to store their uncleared goods for longer than the 12months allowed
by the law. This posed a problem for the customs authority and gave leeway to
importers who wanted to avoid paying import duties. Fraud in the customs
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administration continued to be as rampant as ever because it involved high
value products (alcohol, petroleum and liquor) (Budget 2000).
In the light of this situation the government proposed the following special
legislation for the period 2000-2001,in order to institute stricter measures:
• To empower the Rwanda Revenue Authority to confiscate and dispose of
the goods being smuggled as well as the vehicles used to transport them
• To increase fines and allow the possible seizure of goods and vehicles on
violations of transit goods
• Other administrative reform measures to close loopholes
• Reducing the minimum warehousing period from 12months to 6 months,
pending a subsequent review for tightening the period more. Increasing
pre-shipment inspection (PSI),whereby the importer that has goods above
US$ 5000 in value must be inspected by SGS. This is expected to
consolidate the use of PSI, which mostly was being neglected by the
importers thus allowing loopholes for fraudulent purposes
• The monthly reconciliation of SGS valuation with that of customs, and
justification of eventual differences between taxation proposed by SGSand
effective taxation by customs (this will require only administrative
directives)
• Enacting and implementing ministerial decrees to reduce delays in the
clearance of goods and improve revenue collection
• Increasing storage fees, by levying penalty charges for late clearance after
customs declaration, and reducing the period of storage from 12 to 3
months, after which the goods shall be considered abandoned and
auctioned
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• Enacting and implementing a directive to reduce transit fraud
by limiting the time periods of transit journeys between borders and
borders, borders and Customs, and imposing progressive penalties
• Enacting and implementing a ministerial decree to reduce customs fraud
and evasion by introducing mandatory clearance by professional clearing
agents ("customs broker")
• Improving the coverage of imports subject to pre-shipment inspections
(above US $ 5 000) to 90 percent; and report on a monthly basis PSI
coverage, based on PSI documents (in addition to customs declaration
forms), import value, and tax collected by customs.
4.5.3 Improved tax collection
On improving tax collection government prescribed the following measures:
• Enacting and implementing a revised law on fiscal procedures to reduce
the legal delays and the taxpayer's response time to the revised tax
assessment between the notice to start a tax audit and the confiscation of
assets to collect the tax from 123 to 76 days
• Enacting legislation to establish an independent tax tribune working
under the chamber of arbitration that would be able to arbitrate conflicts
between tax officials and taxpayers without replacing the judicial courts.
4.5.4 Accelerated auditing of enterprises
Government has also put in place measures to accelerate the auditing of
enterprises:
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• To complete 1998 tax audits (risk-based) for at least 100
large enterprises with assistance from external auditors under the UK-
DFID support project
• Thereafter to complete at least 20 audits of large enterprises per month
• Increase the number of VAT issue-oriented audits to significantly
improve compliance, in particular for small and medium enterprises
• To strengthen tax collection through the extension of the avis-a-tiers
détenteur to clients of enterprises in arrears, and exclusion of such
enterprises from public auctions for at least six months
• To strengthen control of exit of excisable goods from factories
• To collect dividends from state enterprises
• To ensure that fees for services and other non-tax revenue are collected
in accordance with the services delivered.
4.6 INSTITUTIONAL REFORMS
The conspicuous point in the tax system reform in Rwanda is the
reintitutionalisation of the tax system through establishing an autonomous tax
revenue authority. Itwas an historical institutional shift, where the responsibilities
of tax administration were decentralized from central civil service to a quasi-
autonomous institution. In Chapter 2 we saw how institutional disintegration
contributed to the current tax system reform in Rwanda.
At first, the institutional crisis in tax administration was partly a result of a collapse
in public institutions after the 1994 genocide and war, when together with other
functions of the government; tax collection came to a halt. Similar to that,
institutional crises in the administration of the Rwandan tax system were not
unknown even before the 1994 genocide. Lack of personnel, corruption and a
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culture of non-compliance as explained in Chapter 2 was an indication
of the institutional disintegration of the centralized tax system. The institutional
approach to reforming the tax system in Rwanda is therefore not isolated from the
mega public sector reform program and reinstitutionalisation of the new
government (see Chapter 2). The principal aim of having a public sector of high
quality, as we saw in Chapter 3, underpins the need for an efficient tax system that
provides resources for policy implementation.
On one hand, creating the Rwanda Revenue Authority was one of the institutional
approaches in reforming the tax system. On the other hand, according to its
taxpayer's charter in Figure 4, the Rwanda Revenue Authority was expected to
present the image of quality public institutions in terms of good and efficient
services. Tanzi in Chapter 3 provided some facts on the performance of public
institutions, which also must be reflected in the RRA setting and working. The
performance of public institutions depends on many factors including (a) building
the tradition of reputation (b) maintaining resource bases for organisations with
discretion over their use, (c) the clarity of its mandate, (d) organisational
development (e) identification of public incentives (f) the quality of its leadership
and staff and (g) the freedom over organizational matters. In the next paragraphs
we shall look at how the Rwanda Revenue Authority was established.
4.6.1 Rwanda Revenue Authority
The Rwanda Revenue Authority (RRA) was established as a legally separate entity
for tax administration through an Act of Parliament in 1997.It acquired a corporate
structure with the strategic objectives of maximizing revenue, while minimizing
the cost of collection, and to provide a high quality, courteous and equitable
service to taxpayers and the Ministry for Finance (RRA 1998, unpublished).
Structurally the RRA came to be composed of the departments of Customs, Income
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Tax and of Auditing and Investigation, which were formerly
operating separately under the Ministry of Finance.
4.6.1.1 Objectives
According to its taxpayers charter Figure 4, the Rwanda Revenue Authority (RRA)
was established as a full-fledged institution for tax administration, with the
objectives of providing high quality services to the taxpayer, focusing on
encouraging voluntary compliance by providing certainty, fairness in terms of
accuracy of tax assessment and share of the tax burden, clearly explained
simplified procedures which involve the minimum amount of inconvenience and
effort for taxpayers in meeting their obligations, comprehensive taxpayer
education on responsibilities and accessibility, training to all staff on
communication and taxpayer handling skills and sanctions for non-compliance
(RRA1998,unpublished).
4.6.1.2 Structure of RRA
The Rwanda Revenue Authority was established through an act of parliament,
enacted on 8 November 1997. The act defined the new agency as an autonomous
public institution established with corporate status. Thereupon the law
promulgated the corporate mission of the organization, as it is to contribute to the
national development by maximizing revenue at minimal cost.
The law prescribed the supreme organ of the RRA to be a governing board of
directors, consisting of eight voting members appointed by the prime minister by
way of a ministerial order passed by the Cabinet (Art. 8). The main function of the
Board is to review and adopt the organizational policy of the RRA as presented by
the management team. Likewise the Board is also authorized by law to exercise the
administrative power and powers to depose property to carry out its purpose (Art.
6).
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The composition of the Board includes the chairman who is appointed
by the prime minister, and the Commissioner-General of Taxes who is the
executive secretary of the Board. Other members of the board include the
Secretary-General from the Ministry of Finance, the Secretary-General from the
Ministry of Commerce and the Governor of the National Bank; the three attend as
ex officio members, that is, by virtue of their capacities. The prime minister on their
own merit appoints three other members as upright individuals with distinguished
personalities in the fields of accountancy, auditing, law, economics and other
related fields (Art. 8).
According to the structure of the RRA, below the Board of Governors is the
Commissioner-General of Tax. According to Article 20 of the deed of foundation
the Commissioner-General of Tax is appointed by an order of the prime minister
issued in a cabinet meeting under the recommendations of the board, following an
open competition and selection. The Commissioner-General reports to the Board of
Governors on day-ta-day activities of the organization.
At the third level of the hierarchy in the administration of the RRA is the
Management Team, that is, the decision-making organ. The management team is
responsible for formulating policies for the organization, which must be submitted
to the Board for endorsement. It is responsible for the hiring and firing of junior
staff in the organization, and assists the governing Board in maintaining discipline
among the staff. According to the law the Board of Governors appoints the
management team on a three-year renewable performance contract (Art. 24-28).
The Rwanda Revenue Authority has three major departments: the department of
customs, the department of income tax, and the department of audit and
investigation. The three departments provide the line functions of the RRA. The
supporting functions, which fall under the Commissioner-General, are composed
of directorates of Human Resources and Training, Finance and Administration,
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Taxpayers Education, Management and Tax Information, and of Information
Systems and Technology.
4.6.1.3 Finance
According to the deed of foundation, the revenue collected by the RRA is credited
to the public treasurer. However, the second paragraph of Article 29 of the Act
allows the Revenue Authority to retain a percentage of its annual collection
corresponding to the annual budget allocated to the RRA, endorsed by parliament
through the ministry of finance in order to run its operations. Despite the public
budget finance the RRA is also allowed by law to appropriate other sources of
finance such as grants and loans, but with prior approval of the Minister.
4.6.1.4 Personnel
After its establishment, the RRA introduced a new employment policy with a
different employment package and incentives relatively higher than the civil
service package. By the year 2000 the Rwanda Revenue Authority had about 562
workers, both operational and managerial staff with 1-4 monthly increases
between January and March. In January 2000 there were 531 staff members while
there were 534 in February and March. In April the number dropped to 527, then
rose to 531 and 532 in May and June respectively. But from July to December the
number shot up to 561 in July and 562 in December (RRA2000). In December 1998,
the RRA still had only about 463 workers, while by December 1999 the number of
workers stood at 506. Between 1998 and 2000 the recruitment average was 33
workers per year (see Figure 3).
In Chapter 3 we saw that in order to maximize the utilization of human resources,
tax administration reforms must be free of the constraints resulting from the
traditional industrial relations of trade unions. The opportunity of firing according
to performance must be allowed; at the same time flexibility in hiring new
personnel or reallocating personnel should be allowed. In other words, tax
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administration reform needs to be free from the traditional labor
management influenced by the state and trade unions. Equally important, in
Chapter 3 it is advised that, in reforming tax administration, the personnel policy
must allow for salary differentiation and the provision of adequate salaries. Itmust
allow the transfer of individuals from lower levels to more productive functions.
Incentives and training becomes the core of personnel management in reforming
tax administration.
4.6.1.5 Training
The Rwanda Revenue Authority spends a minute percentage of its budget on
training: 0.8% in 2000, 1.1%in 1999,and 0.3 % in 1998 (RRAReports 1999& 2000).
Nevertheless, training has been a resource-consuming function in reforming the
administrative capacity of the tax system. In Chapter 3 it was emphasized that
training must be designed according to the strategy and objective of reform. For
example if the reform strategy is to achieve voluntary compliance, the training of
personnel should focus on particular goals to be achieved.
4.6.1.6 Resource allocation
The Rwanda Revenue Authority has spend approximately 5,7 billion RWF from
government coffers between 1998 and 2000. The reimbursement of annual budget
allocations was being done with deficit. In 1998, the allocated budget was 1.3
billion Rwandan Francs, while the requested amount was 1.6 billion, in 1999, the
allocated budget was 2.0 billion while the requested amount was 2.3 billion, and in
2000 the allocated budget was 2.4 billion while the demanded amount was 2.6
billion (RRAAnnual Reports 1998,1999,2000).
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Figure 3: growth of RRA establishment
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The critical functions of auditing, tax education and training, have a slim share of
the budget. According to Table 13, auditing and investigation are funded at
between 0.0% to 0.4% of the total budget, while tax education gets only 1.3%
(1998),2.2% (1999)and 1.9%(2000)of the total budget. The training function is the
least favored by the budget. According to the budget allocation the RRA spent only
0.9% of its budget for training in 2000 while in 1999, it spent only 1.1%, and even
less in 1998,where training consumed only 0.3% of total annual budget.
The lion's share of the budget goes towards the salaries of the workers, which
consumes more than half of the budget, at an increasing rate - 49.5% (1998),57.2%
(1999).Although seemingly at a diminishing trend, the transport sector and related
activities, especially the servicing of cars, comes next. Their share of the annual
budget was 14.0% in 1998, 9.8% in 2000, and 11.9% in 1999. The big budget slot,
however, is taken up by depreciation costs: 12% (1998), 9.4%(1999), and 5.6%
(2000). Administrative elements like maintenance and furniture seem to
appropriate a big share, in 1998 these two items had about 12.2% of the total
budget while in 1999, they were allocated 11,1% of the total budget. In 2000, the
two items dropped to 9.4%of the total annual budget.
4.6.1.4 Dynamics of the budget
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4.6.1.5 Information system
One of the millstones to RRA's performance has been the lack of adequate
computer facilities and the failure to develop a computerized system. This has
been a serious drawback to the integration of information from the RRA's local
offices with head office. While modern tax administration continues to depend on
a stable and reliable information system that normally caters for both taxpayer and
tax administrator, in Chapter 3 we saw that inadequate information systems and
communication facilities cause tax systems to perform poorly. In RRA's offices it is
a lamenting situation, as expressed in the 2000budget speech:
A visit to the tax office will quickly confirm the difficulties of working manually with the
outdated methods. We will therefore accelerate the computerization of tax department of
Revenue so that the collection and assessment of taxes due are closely monitored. In order
to reduce the under valuation of imports the customs documentation will be strengthened.
Further more there will be staff training especially in areas of tariff tax assessment,
accounting and auditing (Budget 2000).
The British government through its ministry of international cooperation is
undertaking a project of computerizing and setting up an information system in
the RRA. It is providing both technical and financial support to the project.
Likewise the British government is also handling the US$ 8 million project of
training RRA staff in Flexible Anti-Smuggling Techniques (FAST) to reinforce the
capacity of revenue protection service (Budget 2000).
4.6.1.6 Revenue performance
In 1999, two years after the establishment of the revenue authority, revenue
performance was mild. The tax collected by the end of 1999was 71 billion Rwanda
Francs, which was considered to be an improvement compared to the previous
year's performance at 61 billion Rwanda Francs. But, the performance was falling
short of the projected target of 86 billion. Factors to which this was attributed
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included lower production figures for beer, soft drinks and cigarettes; decline in
import volume, delays in completing the presumptive tax assessment of the
eligible small and medium sized companies; and poor enforcement of the payment
as well as overall decline of economic activities. Besides that, the revenue collection
fell short of its 2000 target by RWF 5.2 billion (0.8 percent of annual GDP) by
September 2000 (Budget speech 2000).
Table 13 RRA budget expenditure per function (percentage),
1998 1999 2000
Salaries 49.5 57.3 68.8
Traveling 2.5 3.8 2.8
Benefits 0.0 0.0 0.1
Transport 14.0 11.9 9.8
Maintenance 5.2 2.5 2.3
Furniture 10.9 7.9 5.1
Miscellaneous 3.3 2.6 3.5
Audit & Investigation 0.0 0.4 0.4
Tax education 1.3 2.2 1.9
Training 0.3 1.1 0.8
Board 0.4 0.2 0.2
Depreciation 12.5 9.4 5.6
Consultancy 0.1 1.1 1.2
Source: RRA Annual Reports 1998, 1999, and 2000
4.6.1.7 Changing Revenue Characteristics Over Four Years
Within a three-year period under the reign of the RRA, revenue productivity
became more obvious, especially in respect of customs collection that was
exceeding other departments by more than half of total collections. According to
Table 14, in 1997 revenues from customs amounted to 64% of the total revenue
collected, while in 1998 the figure was 61%. It started declining in 1999, when
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customs collections raised only 59.1% of the total revenue, and declined again
in 2000 to 58.8%.
Table 14 Revenue performance per department (percentage)
1997 1998 1999 2000
Customs 64.6 61.0 59.1 58.8
Income Tax 28.8 32.5 34.1 35.1
Others 5.6 6.5 6.9 6.1
Source: RRAAnnual Reports 1998,1999,2000
Contrasted with this performance is that of income tax administration, raising less
revenue but in an upward trend. In 1997 income tax was contributing 28.8%; the
percentage increased to 32.5% in 1998, in 1999 the collection of income tax
amounted to 34.1% and 35.1% in 2000. The upward trend in income tax collection
in this case has two implications. One implication is that the composition of the tax
structure in Rwanda is moving away from a dependence on trade tax to income
tax. The second implication is that this changing composition implies that tax
administration is slowly improving. Income tax has been a non-performing section
of taxation especially in developing countries, because of the demands of
sophisticated tax administration systems. By breaking down the tax collection
according to the tax regimes in two years consecutively 1999 and 2000 ICHA
continued to boom with 21% and 20.7 % respectively. Table 15, shows little
variation in terms of personal tax, which was 10%in both 1999and 2000; corporate
tax continued to be a dominant regime at 17% in 1999 and 16% in 2000. The same
applies to excise duties which in these two years contributed more to tax revenue
than other sources at 29% and 28% respectively; import duties raised 14% in1999
and 13,9%in 2000.
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Presenting the 2000 budget, the minister of finance and economic
planning told parliament that the shortfalls in revenue performance for the past
two years were mainly due to;
• Lower-than-programmed corporate profit taxes, as many companies
declared losses (still to be audited)
• Lower beer and soft drink excise receipts, as taxed sales remained
extraordinarily depressed
• Lower trade taxes, due to lower declared import volumes; and
• The expected improvements in tax (in particular customs) administration
not being realized.
The revenue failure according to the minister's diagnosis was the result of
administrative woes still identified with the tax system in Rwanda. In other words
the basic elements for tax administration reform outlined in Chapter 3 are yet to be
effected in the Rwandan tax reform program.
These elements are: an explicitly and sustained political commitment; a team of
capable and hard working officials dedicated full time to tax administration
reform; a well defined and appropriate strategy; relevant training for staff;
additional resources to the tax administration; changes in incentives for both and
tax administration.
4.6.1.8 RRA and Comparative Experiences
The formation of RRA was a major landmark in tax and public sector reform in
Rwanda. For the past 40 years the administration of tax collection in Rwanda has
been centralized as one of the core functions of the central government. In essence,
the ministry of finance was performing both duties, of being the central part of tax
policy making and at the same time undertaking supervision and implementation
of the policy.
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Table 15 Revenue performance per regime 1999/2000
1999 2000
Personal tax 10 10
Corporate tax 17 16
Property tax 0.0 0.2
Vehicles 1.0 0.8
Excises 29 28.8
Import duties 14 13.9
Surcharge 4 4.4
Others 2 1.8
Warehousing 2 2.3
ICHA 21 20.7
Land 0.0 0.0
Source: RRA Annual Reports 1999, 2000
All in all the formation of the RRA was influenced by the global trend of re-
instutionalising a tax system out of the conventional structure of the public service.
It is a new outlook that dominated a number of tax reform attempts in the 1990s
and 1980s in many African countries, including Uganda, Kenya, Ghana and
Tanzania, to mention but a few.
According to Tekper (1999: 171-2), the new approach focuses on harmonizing the
functions of different tax units under central coordination. This approach requires
the revenue agencies to be established as professionally competent organizations
within the public service and civil service in the country. Furthermore, this new
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outlook of corporate management requires these revenue agencies to have
operational as well as functional autonomy from civil service regulations, and it
requires the presence of an effective incentive policy for workers and employment
procedures contrary to that of central government.
The approach of autonomous tax administration organizations can be traced back
to the end of World War II. In 1947,the government of Japan established a national
organization for tax administration known as National Tax Administration (NTA).
The organization was established with the two main responsibilities of collecting
taxes and performing tax assessments nation wide. Actually the organization
emerged after the failure of the tax bureau in the Ministry of Finance to perform
these responsibilities (NTA, 2000).
Tekper (1999:172) identified two structures, that are common to most revenue
authorities in the world. The first is a structure where a revenue authority acts as
an apex body established to playa role as head institution. This model is common
with East African Revenue Authorities - Uganda and Kenya. With the East African
model other revenue agencies such as customs, income tax and their identities,
become departments under the unified command of the new structure. The second
structure is referred to as the Ghanaian model and entails that the revenue
authority is merely a coordinating institution, with the existing tax agencies
retaining their autonomy.
Under the East African model, technical and administrative functions are merged
in one management service of the authority. In the Ghanaian model, these
functions are decentralized. The two models are the result of comparative studies
conducted between East African Revenue Authorities - Uganda and Kenya - with
the Revenue Agencies Governing Board of Ghana (RAGB)by Tekper (1999:173).
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4.6.1.9 The Philosophy of Revenue Agencies
In Chapter 3 we discussed at considerable length the role of organizational
development in the process of tax administration reform. The formation of
Revenue Agencies or Revenue Authorities as part of tax administration reforms is
to institutionalize the determined functions of tax administration. The idea in short
is to organize the tax administration functions and strong organizational structure
to improve their effectiveness and efficiency.
Within a functional organization, the workflow within the tax administration is
more specialized in order to best support a self-assessment system. The main
objective is to identify the exceptions, that is, in the instances of non-compliance.
The major part of the staff concentrates on the exceptions, as well as on audits to
check compliance. Such an organization entails a strategic element of self-checking
among staff whereby the work in one function serves as a control on another. In
other words, the organizational structure itself becomes a self-enforcing measure.
The revenue agencies as we saw in Chapter 3 are supposed to cover the principal
functions of tax administration, including;
• Taxpayer education. Staff members in this function are responsible for
educating and assisting taxpayers in tax matters. They distribute printed
material that explains tax regulations
• They respond to inquiries from taxpayers. This is a very important function
that in the past often did not receive the attention that it deserves. Countries
such as Canada, New Zealand and Trinidad and Tobago provide good
examples of successful taxpayer education
• Registration, accounting and returns processing. Staff members in this
function are responsible for data entries and the processing of declarations
and payments. For instance, if a taxpayer uses the wrong tax rate, a
computer can detect the error and automatically send a letter asking for
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payment at the correct rate. After the data have been verified,
they are stored in a master file, which is a central record of all taxpayer
transactions with the tax administration
• Collections enforcement. The emphasis of this function is on collection of
taxes from stop filers and delinquent taxpayers. Basically, all compliance
control except inspection is centralized in this function. The accounting and
processing departments provide much of the information that is needed
• Audit. The audit function is devoted to the detection of underreported
taxes. Staff members in this function usually perform audits of taxpayers'
files and records at tax administration offices, or audits of business activities
and records at the taxpayers' premises. It is important to note that the
accounting and processing departments have already performed routine
checks
• Legal services and appeals. The staff members in this function take cases to
court, defend tax authorities against legal appeals in this court, and provide
advice as to which actions are legal and which is not
4.7. INFORMAL MAPPING OF PEOPLE'S ATTITUDES
The researcher has been working as a journalist in Rwanda for the last five years
up to 2000, with the local weekly "The New Times" and serving as economic news
reporter. But one of the primary observations he made on the tax reform program
is that it was and is still unpopular among the cross section of the population.
Going through shopping centers in Kigali or in other towns, people in different
categories, taxi drivers, businessmen, intellectuals, workers, opinion leaders and
groups of people in bars and in canteens or restaurants, the dominant complaints
are against tax and the Revenue Authority (see figure 5).
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Figure 4: Taxpayers charter
It is the right of the Taxpayer in Rwanda to expect the Rwanda Revenue Authority (RRA):
To be efficient
By assisting you to settle tax accurately and promptly
By informing you of your tax obligations
By handling your tax affairs with integrity and in confidence
To be fair
By assisting you to settle your tax affairs impartially
By expecting taxpayers to pay only what the law requires
By proving polite and courteous service
To help you
By informing you of your tax obligations
To put your tax affairs right
By providing clear leaflets and simplified forms
By providing information and assistance to all
If you are not satisfied
R RA will tell you exactly how to complain
RRA will re-examine your tax cases on request
The RRA in turn expects from you
To be honest
To provide RRA with accurate information
To settle your tax obligation on time
Source: RRA (www.rwandal.com)
There are two possible reasons for this; one is the culture of tax administration. In
the former political system tax administration was purely a responsibility of
central organs of state, enforced through bureaucratic instruments of state. To put
it differently, there have been no taxpayer's participation in tax policies in that the
country. The second factor, however, is the introduction of a national revenue
agency. There was a feeling among the political authorities and decision makers
that the Rwanda Revenue Authority can carry out both its managerial
responsibility while also adding political muscle to reform.
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Figure 5: Informal mapping of people's attitude to tax reform
We are suffering because of taxes in this country! Informal commentator.
My friend that is the price!! The revenue authority has got no mercy to us! (A retailer
talking to client)
Oh! Nothing my friend, this country isfull of taxes! (Businessman)
We are paying tax so that people can eat! (A desperate taxi driver)
People don't see what this money does! (Informal analyst in a bar)
Let us pay so that people in revenue authority can eat! (Businessman).
The problem is, we pay tax, but others do not, what can you do? Revenue authority has
destroyed everything here! (Importer of consumables)
Oh! These people in revenue authority are really enjoying, I wish I could get a job there!
(Graduate strategizing for a job)
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Figure 6:RRA ORGANIZATIONAL CHART (RRA Report 1999)
Board
.....
Commissioner-General
Secretary for Legal Affairs Director Human Resources
Director of Fiscal Information Director Administration and
and Statistics Finance
Director of Taxpayers Service Director of Information
Technology
I
Commissioner of Income Tax Commissioner of Customs Commissioner of investigation
J_Division of Large Division of Small Division of Excises --pivision Evaluation I External Internal auditEnterprises Enterprises investigation
loperational division ~
Division of Revenue I- Inspection andDivision of Resorts surveillance
II ~
Legal division
Division of Vehicles
I Legal divisioninspection
http://scholar.sun.ac.za/
151
4.8.CONCLUSION
This chapter has provided information on the nuts and bolts that fastened the
implementation process of tax system reform in Rwanda. To begin with, the
chapter started with the periodisation of the reform process that occurred in two
phases, from 1995 to 1997 and from 1997 to 1999. Actually the process is a
continuous one, but the two phases were identified deliberately in order to
contextualise the reforming of the tax system in terms of the broader macro-
economic reform policies, which were being implemented by the government
along with the tax reform program.
The first phase of tax reform, 1995-97, was being implemented along with the
Economic Recovery Program, adopted by the government in 1995as an initial step
in getting the national economy on track after the 1994 genocide and war. The
second phase of reform, from 1997to 1999,was being implemented along with the
Enhanced Structural Adjustment Facility, a macro-economic program adopted by
the government with sponsorship from the IMF and the World Bank.
In the first place the implementation process was executed through two reform
frameworks for reforming both tax structure and tax administration, as outlined in
Chapter 1. In short the reform concentrated on the two components of a tax
system, namely tax structure and tax administration. In reforming tax structure, a
number of reform measures were implemented to revamp the capacity of income
tax regimes, with major emphasis on reforming corporate tax.
Reform measures include the establishment of a Large Enterprises Unit, the
introduction of presumptive tax for small enterprises, and re-imposing tax on
public enterprises. As a result the performance of income tax regimes started
picking up, although it has been initially categorized as the least well performing
tax regime in the country. Yet theoretically, as it was observed in Chapters 2 and 3,
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its sustainability was still unreliable since many taxpayers in Rwanda are still
employed in subsistence economy.
Besides that, in reforming tax structure, the implementation process included some
measure of reforming consumption tax. Among these was the introduction of
Value-Added Tax (VAT). The government of Rwanda introduced VAT in mid
2000, replacing the unpopular turnover tax ICHA with the aim of improving the
performance of sales tax.
The chapter covers also the process of institutional reform initiatives in reforming
the tax system. A landmark is the formation of an autonomous revenue authority
in Rwanda, the Rwanda Revenue Authority. This new organization was formed
with the objective of introducing a corporate management approach, which in any
case is expected to improve the institutional capacity of the tax system in the
country. By and large the creation of the Rwanda Revenue Authority changed the
tax landscape in Rwanda. The new organization changed the institutional
arrangements of the tax system in Rwanda by absorbing former tax agencies such
as Income Tax and Customs as departments under one structure.
The chapter also went further in analysing tax administration reforms. Apart from
introducing new institutions, the tax administration reform included measures to
simplify tax procedures and institutional regulations. In terms of procedures and
regulations, different procedures were changed to improve tax collection. These
included the removal of exemptions and other forms of tax incentives. Procedures
and regulations were also adopted to improve the performance of customs and
accelerate the auditing of small enterprises.
Finally, it was found that the establishment of the new tax authority and other
reform measures enabled the government to register performance records in tax
collection, but without meeting the target for 1999 and 2000. The identified
setbacks were caused by, inter alia, lack of competent personnel and equipment,
and especially a serious impediment in information technology facing the Rwanda
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Revenue Authority. In the next chapter, therefore, we are going to look
at salient features patterning the entire subject of tax system reform in Rwanda,
draw more interpretations and finally make some recommendations.
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CHAPTER 5: INTERPRETATIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
5.1 INTRODUCTION
This chapter reflects on the findings of the research. In Chapter 1 the research
problem, based on the implementation dynamics of the tax system reform in
Rwanda, was formulated. In addition to that, the research hypothesis, the
theoretical framework, research design and methodology were outlined. In
Chapter 2 the background to the problem was described, making it clear that
policy decisions on reforming the tax system Rwanda have been beleaguered by
historical, fiscal and structural disequilibria, the explosion of social crises resulting
from the 1994 genocide and their harrowing effect on the ailing national budget,
the institutional crisis in the public sector and the total downfall of the public
realm in the post-genocide society.
On the basis of an in-depth scrutiny of the available literature, Chapter 3
outlined the normative requirements of a tax system, theories on the principles
of taxation, tax systems and their relation to the functions of the government,
tax systems and the quality of the public sector, the properties of a good tax
system and its applications in developing countries. InChapter 4, an analysis of
the operationalisation of the reform process was given. The implementation
process of tax system reform in Rwanda was examined with reference to the
reforming of the tax structure and tax administration, reforms in administrative
and legal procedures, and the institutional set-up.
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This chapter therefore is focusing on salient features reflected in this
research;
• Hypothesis testing regarding regular tax administration, tax
structure and resources mobilisation, followed by
Recommendations, which emphasised budget re-allocation,
outsourcing, and decentralisation of tax system in Rwanda
• Agenda for further research on Rwandan tax system,
Summary and Conclusion
5.2HYPOTHESIS TESTING
In Chapter 1 it was hypothesized that the success of tax system reform in Rwanda
was blurred by inappropriate trajectories of tax reform. The trajectories for tax
reforms as was explained in Chapter I, include the reform of tax structure and
administration of a tax system; participation of stakeholders or inclusivity (see
Figure 7); and resource mobilisation. The findings presented in Chapter 4 actually
showed different degree of inconsistencies in application of tax system reform
trajectories, including the gap persisted in reforming tax administration and tax
structure, high degree of exclusivity which stifled the participation of tax payers,
politicians and other interest groups, and shortage of resources.
5.3TAX STRUCTURE VS TAXADMINISTRATION
The two components of the tax system, tax administration and tax structure, were
identified in Chapter 1 as the objects of analysis, likewise in Chapter 4 we saw that
the implementation process of reforming the tax system was organized around
these two parameters. InChapter 1 it was indicated that tax administration and tax
structure are interdependent components of the tax system, which must be dealt
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with together if successful tax reform is aimed at. In other words the success
or failure of the attempt at reforming the tax system is evaluated by looking at the
implementation of both. As it was defined in Chapter 1, the term tax structure
refers to the configuration of tax bases and tax rates provided for by legislation
and/ or decrees. The term tax administration refers to the institutions and
mechanisms of the tax system, and includes the procedural and legal framework of
the tax system as well as the technical part of tax system such as auditing,
information technology, defaults control mechanisms, and application of penalties.
As far as the Rwandan case is concerned, the relationship of the two variables in
the reform process is manifested in three scenarios:
• The reform performance manifested in successful structural reforms
including the broadening of the tax base and altering tax rates
• The reform performance of tax administration reform based on structural
simplification of tax system
• The reform performance of tax administration subdued with the imminent
lethargy in improving the technical functions of tax administration - tax
auditing, collection, information technology and detection of tax evaders.
1st Scenario
The findings outlined in Chapter 4 indicate that tax reform in Rwanda seems to
have impacted significantly on tax structure, more so than on tax administration.
In other words the reform process achieved a lot as far as broadening the tax base
and tax rating is concerned. The argument is confirmed by such measures as the
introduction of presumptive tax, waiving of tax exemptions and deductions, the
introduction of Value-Added Tax, and other measures. Not only that, the
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structural performance of tax reforms also went deeper with the reforming of
tax rates, including decisions on balancing tax rates for imports and domestic
goods, the reduction of tax rates for income tax from 50% to 40%, increasing of
excise duties on alcohol, cigarettes and soft drinks, and reduction of tariffs.
2nd Scenario
Tax administration reform has a twofold function; the first is to create a simple and
fair tax structure, while the second part of tax administration reform is meant to
create enforcement capacity, that is, the technical capacity of the tax administration
to enforce compliance with tax law.
From the above definitions, the first function of tax administration is the structural
simplification of the tax system. This involves reforming tax procedures, tax
regulations and laws to facilitate the taxpayer's compliance. Generally speaking,
the material evidence provided in Chapter 4 shows that the reform process in this
area has registered sufficient success with a number of laws and regulations being
enacted to facilitate compliance. This legislation included the enactment of the
Code on Direct Taxation in 1997, which cleared some hurdles in income tax
administration, and the 1997Act for the establishment of an autonomous revenue
agency, the Rwanda Revenue Authority (RRA).
3rd Scenario
Yet scenario three shows fallout in the trend of reforming tax administration. The
second part, the technical part of tax administration - auditing, assessment,
collection and information technology, could not make it through. Instead it was
mired in a lack of resources. As a result, therefore, the expected revenue
performance in 2000 could not be attained despite the institutional build up and
policy measures which were put in place by the reform process to increase tax
collection.
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In summary the three scenarios showed that reforming a tax system
involves reforming the following:
• Tax structure - changing, adding or reducing the tax base and tax rates.
• Tax administration - changing the procedures and regulations of taxation.
• Tax administration - improving the technical capacity for tax system
auditing, assessment, information technology and management, skilled
personnel and efficient managerial systems.
It is true that there has been a tendency among tax analysts to emphasize structural
simplification of a tax system as a core requirement for successful tax system
reform. Actually the rhetoric has been that complicated tax regulations and tax
procedures always complicate a situation for a taxpayer, making it difficult to
comply with his/her tax obligations. Furthermore, tax analysts are of the opinion
that a simplified tax structure facilitates attempts to bring the small taxpayers into
the tax net. However, according to Bahl & Vaziquez (1992:83), simplifying the tax
structure alone cannot ease the bottlenecks of tax administration. The level and
speed of economic modernization continues to complicate tax structures, thus
demanding technically sophisticated tax administration.
The changes in economic trends are rendering the orthodoxy of structural
simplification insufficient, to say the least. These changes include the financial
structures of domestic companies with numbers of middlemen and financial
intermediaries, the dominance of electronic transactions (e-commerce), shifting
from a commodity-based economy to the service economy. These and other trends
are imposing new demands on tax administration that is paramount in a
sophisticated and technical tax administration system.
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5.4.RESOURCE MOBILISATION
In Chapter 1 it was hypothesized that the success of reforming the tax system in
Rwanda was blurred by deviating from appropriate trajectories of the tax reform
process, including according to Tanzi (1995) in Chapter 3, an explicit and sustained
political commitment; a team of capable, hard working officials dedicated full time
to tax administration reform; a well defined and an appropriate strategy; relevant
training; additional resources or reallocation of existing resources and changes in
incentives for both tax payers and tax administrators. In fact, the findings in
Chapter 4 revealed that the implementation of tax system reform in Rwandan
suffered a setback of availability of resources. This, of course, concurs with the
hypothesis.
Implementation of any reform policy requires mobilisation of resources. According
to the logical division by Grindle and Thomas (1991: 127), there are four types of
resources required for implementing public policy reforms. These include
financial, political, managerial and technical resources, which if ordered logically,
are reduced to two; bureaucratic resources (financial, managerial and technical),
and political resources (public support and stakeholders participation). To put it
differently, implementation of reforms requires both bureaucratic and political
capacity of implementing agencies.
5.4.1 Bureaucratic resources
It is common knowledge that there is a shortage of bureaucratic resources in
Rwanda, that is, financial, technical and managerial resources. As it is was stated in
the three scenarios above, because of a lack of resources, the reform measures
implemented could not make any headway in improving the technical capacity of
the tax system - auditing facilities, information technology, reliable registration,
limited skills and others requirements for the enforcement of good policies,
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procedures, and regulations. The fundamental issue was the lack of
financial resources to acquire the necessary technology to support tax
administration. The second issue was the lack of technically qualified personnel.
Of course this situation is not surprising to Rwanda, if we refer to the problem
situations in Chapter 2. Tax reform in Rwanda was implemented in the midst of an
economic crisis, and institutional and social crises. First the internal sources for
revenue were already rendered obsolete because of historical and economic
problems worsened by war and genocide in 1994. Secondly the dilapidated civil
service resulting from the events of genocide and war could not provide human
capital for any reform initiatives.
In brief, the implementation of tax system reforms in Rwanda could not mobilize
local resources, whether these are financial, or technical or even managerial
resources. In addition to depending on external finance, the implementation of the
reforms also depended heavily on external technical expertise.
All in all, the possibility of averting the resource situation in Rwanda tax system is
still illusive. The present budget allocation to the Rwanda Revenue Authority is
still dominated by deficit. In Chapter 4 we saw that in 1998, the allocated annual
budget to that authority was 1.3 billion Rwandan Francs, while the requested
amount was 1.6 billion. In 1999, the allocated budget was 2.0 billion while the
requested amount was 2.3 billion, and in 2000 the allocated budget was 2.4 billion
although the requested amount was 2.6 billion. Similar to that the allocated budget
is unlikely to meet the sophisticated technical demand of modernizing a tax
system, as the big share of the budget is for current expenditure. In 2000 the
current budget was 92.5% of the entire budget, in 1999 it was 86.7% and in 1998,
80%.
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5.4.2Political Resources
Implementation of public policy requires the mobilization of political support.
Political resources, according to Grindle & Thomas (1991), above all, mean the
broad-based public support for the policy implementation. Therefore, the interest
groups, popular and political groups as well as the public at large must be
mobilized to support the reform. Otherwise, according to Grindle and Thomas, the
policy has no legitimacy.
Mobilisation of political resources means the participation of different stakeholders
in policy implementation. Participation of taxpayers in implementing tax policies is
an important item on the agenda among tax analysts and specialists. Brinkerhoff
and Goldsmith (see Chapter 3) have recommended that the participation of
taxpayers in tax reform be achieved through the participation of civil society in
fiscal policy.
The implementation of the tax reform policy in Rwanda failed to mobilize enough
political resources. The process marginalized completely the agenda of taxpayers'
participation in the process. The reform policy documents do not indicate at all the
role of other role players - local authorities, business community, workers, and
other members of civil society. Major stakeholders were the government, through
the Ministry of Finance and the Rwanda Revenue Authority, while the important
patron was the donor community. In essence, there was scant involvement of
political institutions and personalities in the process of implementation. The role of
political personalities, parliamentarians, local leaders, cabinet ministers in the
process was not streamlined either.
Needless to say, there was an alienation of taxpayers, so is lack of political inputs
in implementation of tax reform proce~ses in Rwanda. As we saw in Chapter 4, this
created public discontent among sectors of the Rwandan community. Tanzi (1999)
refers to the necessity of involving political personalities in tax reform, saying that:
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• Genuine tax reform will require time as well as
commitment from the country's government, which will have to use up
some of its political capital in order to bring about changes in the system
(government with a long horizon)
• Tax reform is expected to succeed with a politically powerful government,
which is stable, has stamina, interest, and vision for reform. In this respect
Tanzi warns against a government whose members keep changing, as this
limits the chance for successful tax reform
• Successful tax reform requires equilibrium between political objectives, tax
policy change, and administrative development. All of these have to move
together
• Adaptation of reform to domestic economic conditions. Reflecting on
technical tax advisors, Tanzi insists that there is a need for substantial
domestic participation in the reform process, and the need to spend a
lengthy period in studying the characteristics of a country.
From the above observations there is no channel for the voice of a taxpayer in the
tax system. The current structure of the Rwanda Revenue Authority does not
accommodate any form of representation for taxpayers in decision-making. In the
first instance, the state's representatives, being in policy formulation or in the
implementation process, override the composition of its Board of Directors, which
could be expected to be more representative.
Amongst the eight members, four are government officials who become members
by virtue of their posts in government offices, including two secretary-generals
from the Ministries of Commerce and Finance respectively. Other state heavy
weights on the Board are the Governor of the Central Bank and the Commissioner-
General, while the Prime Minister appoints the rest in their individual capacity,
including the chairman who is appointed by the cabinet. Indeed the established
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law does not provide for any group's representation in the management of the
RRAor in any structure of tax administration.
5.5 RECOMMENDATIONS
The achievement of tax system reform in Rwanda has two sides to it. On the one
hand tax reform has succeeded in introducing relatively good tax policies. On the
other hand, the success of the implementation process is slowed down by the lack
of resources to transform the technical capacity of the tax system, thus putting a
strain on revenue performance. Technical functions - auditing, tax collection,
detection of tax evasion and tax assessment - are still characterized by crude
methods of work. Unfortunately the possibility of rectifying the issue of scarce
resources in tax system administration in Rwanda is still out of reach, therefore not
only the reform performance but also the stability of the tax system in Rwanda will
remain shaky, as the resource capacity to maintain whatever is achieved will
continue to be limited.
The transformation of the tax system in Rwanda may also for some time still be
hampered by a general lack of compliance with tax laws, because of two reasons.
First, a great effort will be needed to change the attitudes of the historically non-
compliant community. As we saw in Chapter 2, the culture of paying tax among
the Rwandan population has had a very low profile compared to other countries in
sub-Saharan Africa. Second, as it was indicated in Chapters 2 and 4, small and
informal income earners dominate the Rwandan tax community.
A great deal of effort will still be necessary to bring them into the tax net. So is to
change the attitudes of the elite community who lack a sense of obligation as
citizens. Then there is also the unprofessional business community that is fond of
smuggling and corruption. Implicitly therefore, the success of reforms to the tax
system in Rwanda is subject to economic and socio-political crises which still need
http://scholar.sun.ac.za/
to be unfolded
164
altogether. Accordingly the mobilisation of
resources for reforming the tax system in Rwanda will have to take into
consideration all the factors above. To start with, however, the tax authority in
Rwanda needs to examine some of the following issues:
5.5.1 Budget re-allocation
The RRA and the government of Rwanda at large need to re-assess the policy on
resource mobilization to enable not only successful tax system reform but also
sustainability of the system. RRA needs to review its annual budget allocation in
favor of strengthening the technical capacity of tax administration. The primary
alternative will be the shifting of resources from lower productive tasks to those
tasks of high productivity. For example, the Rwanda Revenue Authority can
determine how its wage bill that seems to consume more than half of its budget
can be reduced and set to it that the difference be re-allocated to an investment in
information technology. As was shown in Table 4, salaries consumed 68% of the
total budget expenditure of RRA in 2000, while functions like auditing took up
only 0.4%, training 0.8%, depreciation 5.6% and consultancy 1.2%.
Consolidating and upgrading the information system will have the effect of
replacing a number of jobs, from managerial to supporting staff. For instance,
auditing with computerized support will reduce the number of files to be audited
per one auditor, therefore reducing the number of auditors needed. To implement
this, broader incremental approaches will have to be adopted. The two projects
must go together, that is, informatization of the organisation and retrenchment of
staff. This will require the merging of departments, and the downsizing of some
activities. From this approach some resources can be saved towards the service and
maintenance of technological aids, and supporting the remaining small number of
staff to be able to provide good services. The scale effects of downsizing will
automatically include the reduction of expenditure on personnel benefits and other
administrative costs.
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5.5.2 Outsourcing
The Rwanda Revenue Authority has to conduct a study on how it can start
outsourcing some of its tax administration functions to private operators without
compromising its control. Commissioning and subcontracting to operators,
professional organisations, private companies, and other public institutions
including banks, to undertake some of the tax administrative functions, are valid
options to strengthen capacity.
The outsourcing, in terms of scaling down the labour force, as discussed above has
the advantage of creating an outlet for the readjustment of the working force. The
organization will opt more often to use consultancy services rather than maintain a
big establishment of workers. It is also expected that the retrenched experts with
tax knowledge and experience acquired from RRA will be able join or form
consulting firms on tax matters who will be engaged by Revenue Authority as an
independent consultants.
Outsourcing can also be practiced through engaging independent organisations,
community organizations, business organisations and others in collecting taxes
from their members with specific commissions. The important thing is to assist
these associations in updating their financial management. Civil society can also be
engaged in tax education prograffiI!les. The advantage of this approach is twofold.
Firstly, it reduces the administrative cost of tax administration. Secondly, it is one
of mechanisms for taxpayer's participation in tax administration, which eventually
encourages voluntary compliance. As it has been observed, in Chapter 3 the role of
taxpayer participation in tax policymaking and implementation is becoming a
critical issue for attaining voluntary compliance.
This has long-term and broader effect on the tax system. Apart from the envisaged
reduction of resource expenditure on labor force in the operation of the tax system,
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the devolution of tax resources to private people serves to enlarge the
source of policy advocacy as one step for the mobilization of political resources,
which is discussed below.
The outsourcing of certain functions of tax administration, as we saw in Chapter 3,
is not new in tax administration today. Countries such as Bolivia and Indonesia
have been hiring specialized companies to check the value of imports. Owing
usually to the absence of control systems at customs, this type of service basically
involves checking the value reported by the importer against the prices in order to
establish the duty payable (Ramireza Acuna 1992: 387).
Among the reliable institutions which tax authority all over the world work with
are banks. RRA may as well augment its contracts with banks by commissioning to
the different banks more responsibilities on tax collection. Countries such as
Bolivia, Brazil, Ecuador, Chile, Uruguay and Columbia have assigned a major role
to banks in tax collection. Generally this was done, first because of lack of
resources in tax administration in handling sufficiently tax collection, but secondly
also this was done in recognition that banks are already specialized in handling
payments (Bird & de Juntscher 1992: 7).
5.5.3 Decentralization
The Rwanda Revenue Authority needs to work out how the local authority can
participate effectively in tax administration. This will have a scale effect in resource
mobilization. First, as most of the taxpaying enterprises in Rwanda, as seen in
Chapters 2 and 4, are informal, small and scattered, including those in rural areas,
collection of taxes from these groups is administratively costly, with little returns.
Using local authorities therefore makes sense. Second, because of this nature of its
taxpayers, the Rwandan tax system will continue to depend on presumptive
methods of taxation, therefore the collection of such taxes can work effectively
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through decentralized structures. For instance taxes from small traders in local
markets can be collected and administered by the local authority. Another
advantage of the localization of tax collection is that it gives local political
structures the responsibility of tax policy advocacy. It is not necessary that the RRA
should use the established local government structures. It can design its own
structures, which will be easy to monitor but operate as facilitator of tax collection,
and not as a supervisor.
5.5.4 Democratization of the tax system
Tax system administration needs to be more democratic to allow civil society to
take part in tax education awareness campaigns and to participate in deciding on
changes in tax system. Taxpayers' participation should be improved through the
involvement of eso, local leadership, dissemination of tax information, not only
through the media but also through the seeking of advice or doing consultation
with different groups of people whose members are directly or indirectly affected
by the tax changes. These groups should among others include:
Workers organizations, youth, women and women representatives groups, as well
as businessmen from different groups, professionals and others. Senior politicians,
including the president, members of cabinet and MPs should be directly involved
in tax awareness campaigns instead of leaving the responsibility to the Ministry of
Finance and the Rwandan Revenue Authority.
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Figure 7: The scenario of tax system reform
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5.6 FURTHER RESEARCH
This thesis provided an analysis of the dynamics of implementing tax system
reforms in Rwanda. Further research is needed to evaluate the tax system reform
in Rwanda and its performance in terms of the cardinal principles of a good tax
system, namely efficiency and effectiveness as well as equity. Much is yet to be
done in finding out the performance of the Rwandan tax reform program in terms
of efficiency and equitability. On a general perspective the successful tax reform
must be assessed on the basis of how it is promoting equity and fairness among the
taxpayers, the rate of simplification and how it avoids economic distortions.
5.6.1Efficiency and effectiveness
Research is needed to evaluate the efficiency and effectiveness of tax
administration. Tax analysts believe that tax administration should be evaluated
on the principle of efficiency and effectiveness in collecting taxes.
According to Silvan (1992:255 in Tanzi 1995) the efficiency of tax administration is
gauged by how much is spent in collecting revenue. To put it differently, tax
administration becomes efficient when there is less expenditure per revenue
collected. Rwanda Revenue Authority for example in its 1998 report revealed that
it spent 1 Franc to collect 44.9 Francs, while in 1999 the collection ratio was 1 Franc
for collecting 30.8 Francs. In 2000, the report shows that J-Franc was needed to
collect 27.2 Francs (RRAReports, 1998, 1999 and 2000). Provisionary it can be said
that there is an element of efficiency in tax administration, but not according to the
trend for the cost of tax collection that are getting higher annually. The ratio of 1
Franc per tax collected declined by 14 Francs between 1988 and 1999. The same
applied in 2000, the revenue per Franc decreased at about 3.6 Francs, which is a
point of recovery. But between 1998and 2000 the average trend of decline amounts
to 17.7Rwf.
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At the global level the annual budget can be used too in determining the
relationship between administrative cost and revenue collected per year. In 1998
the allocated budget was 1.6 billion Rwanda Francs while revenue collected was
62.9 billion Rwf. However in 1999, revenue declined to 62.3 billion Rwf, while the
budget increased to 2.0 billion Rwf. In 2000 revenue collection increased from 62.3
billion Rwf (1999) to 65.3 billion where the budget increased as well to 2.4 billion.
5.6.1.2 Effectiveness
Silvan (1992: 275), when distinguishing between effective and efficient tax
administration, maintains that the maximum level of voluntary compliance is a
reflection of the effectiveness of tax administration; yet, the level of enforcing
compliance at the maximum low rate will determine the efficiency of tax
administration.
Performance indicators for the effectiveness of tax administration, according to
Silvan (1992: 275) are how the following four gaps are getting reduced:
1. The gap between unregistered and registered taxpayers; this shortfall
originates from the gap between the registered taxpayers and potential
taxpayers
2. Stopfiling gap resulting from the difference between registered taxpayers
and potential taxpayers according to the law
3. Tax evaders gap resulting from the difference between the tax reported by
the taxpayers and the potential tax according to the law
4. Delinquency gap resulting from the amount of taxes a taxpayer reports
owing or that the tax administration may eventually assess and tax
actually paid by taxpayers (Silvan 1992).
Below are some evaluating questions that can be used to assess the four gaps in
Rwanda.
http://scholar.sun.ac.za/
171
Q I.Compliance for the last four years
Year 1997 1998 1999 2000
The number of taxpayers registered with the
large taxpayers unit
The amount of tax collected from large tax
payers as a percentage of total tax revenue
The number of taxpayers registered as small
taxpayers
The amount of tax collected from small taxpayers
(% age of total tax revenue)
The amount of tax collected through
withholdings (%age)
The number of taxpayers who file their returns
through banks
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Q. 2 The level of non-compliance for the last four years
Differences 1997 1998 1999 2000
The difference of registered taxpayers and potential
taxpayers
The difference between the registered taxpayers and
those who file returns
The difference between the tax reported by the
taxpayers and potential tax according to the law
The difference between the amount of taxes that
taxpayers report owing and actual tax paid by the
taxpayers
Q. 3 The progressive assessment of voluntary compliance for the last four years
Year 1997 1998 1999 2000
The number of taxpayers who file their
returns voluntarily
The number of taxpayers who can
perform self-assessment
5.6.1.3Current Agenda for Research in Tax Administration
The tax authorities in Rwanda, tax analysts and academics interested in the
development and stability of the Rwandan tax system can as well focus their
attention of research on such topics which are world wide currents in tax
administration:
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• How the application of user charges would be a productive
revenue base to supplement sales tax as the main source of tax revenue.
User charge is a recommendable form of taxation in poor countries where
the hard to pay group is big
• Research is needed on the application of the principle of private-public
partnership in tax administration in Rwanda, in order to reduce the
administrative cost of taxation and promote taxpayer participation
• How tax administration can be centralized through local government
structures as a way to facilitate the taxation of the rural community
• The measurement of tax 'gaps' and the real resource cost (administrative,
compliance efficiency, evasion) of an alternative tax structure and
administrative procedure
• The relative effect of penalties, information systems (reporting) simplicity
(in laws), publicity on compliance
• The use of presumptive tax for 'hard to tax' sectors
• The efficiency with which audit resources are allocated and possible
analytical bases for the administrative rules of thumb and decision rules
used with returns for examination
• The pros and cons of the 'large taxpayer' approach
• Appropriate compensation for third party collection agents (for example
banks)
• The cost and benefits of 'tax amnesties'; the administrative implications of
rate differentiation and exemption
• The incidence and locative effects of judicial procedure. Possible systems
for linking administrative rewards to administrative efforts
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The topics are currently in urgent need of research in tax administration
world wide, in view of improving the efficiency and effectiveness of tax systems,
and tax administration for that matter. According to Bird and de Juntscher (1992:8),
the above topics are of immediate importance to the developing countries.
5.7 SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION
Broadly speaking tax reform in Rwanda formed part of a major program of public
sector reform by the new government after more than three decades of
degeneration. The 1994 genocide event, referred to frequently in this paper, was
just the culmination of a crumbling neo-colonial state institution. Owing to a lack
of competency and capacity in tax administration, corruption and the lack of
political sense of responsible citizens among the population, and dependence on
the primary economy, the tax system has not been able to ensure sufficient
compliance with tax laws.
The Rwandan tax reform started in 1995. Practically it was a technocratic project
designed by the local policy elites and international consultants. Apart from the
political process of enacting legislation, the rest of the process was left in the hands
of government bureaucrats and external expatriates through the newly established
Rwandan Revenue Authority. The implementation process was a top down
process; the role of other stakeholders did not prevail either.
Though it was not explicitly made clear, the failure of the tax system in Rwanda is
the result of what was described in Chapters 1 and 2, as structural and fiscal
imbalances. The variable of the 1994genocide and its effects appeared to be central
to our discussion but was just an extension of the crisis of institutional crumbling
of public governance (Chapter 2).
Tax system reform in Rwanda was among the best reform policies adopted by the
new government in Rwanda. Yet its implementation suffered from the lack of
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resources. As a result the changes had more impact on reforming tax structure
than tax administration, because of a lack of resources to build technical capacity
for the new tax system.
The research is the result of secondary data collection and analysis as well as
literature review. Chapter 1 of this thesis dealt with the process of conceptualizing
the research problem. The chapter contained the theoretical framework, research
methodology and design. Chapter 2 dealt with the background to tax reform in
Rwanda; it revealed the contradictory policy circumstances that persisted before
and during the decision of reforming the tax system in Rwanda, which influenced
and affected policy decisions, and the organization and implementation process.
Chapter 3 contained a literature review, which provided the normative
requirements of a tax system. It covered the theory of taxation and its impact in
determining the relationship between the state, citizen and economy.
Chapter 4 analyzed the processes undertaken in implementing tax reform in
Rwanda. We saw that the implementation was organized according to the macro-
economic reform programs, implemented through tax administration and tax
structure reforms. Lastly, Chapter 5 provided interpretations, recommendations
and conclusions. It tried to dissect the process of implementing tax system reform
in Rwanda, its failures and successes as well as policy recommendations, which
underscored the need for more resources mobilization and public support to
enable successful tax system reform.
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